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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the reactions of Egyptians living in the UK to the 2011 uprising in 
their home country, in terms of belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity, political participation 
and media use. The Egyptian revolution was a defining moment in the history of the country 
and several studies have focused on the effects of the unrest on Egyptians. Further studies 
are required to study the impact on the Egyptians abroad. This thesis focuses on studying the 
effects of the revolution on Egyptians living in the UK, including first and second generations.  
The study is qualitative research involving interviews and ethnographic work among 
Egyptians in the UK. The inclusion criteria of interviewees include Egyptians residing in the UK 
aged 18 and over who witnessed the 2011 uprising in Egypt or in the UK. Twenty-two semi-
structured interviews were conducted, four ethnographic events were attended and data 
from two groups on Facebook were collected. The transcripts of the interviews, the 
ethnographic checklists, reports and the groups’ data were thematically analysed and studied.  
This study has revealed that the revolution acted as a catalyst for the sense of belonging 
and identity in three dimensions, namely, differences among the first and second generations, 
in terms of reaction to the revolution, in defining the terms homeland, sense of pride and 
notion of return, among other parameters. Political participation of the diaspora in response 
to the revolution was variable and the sense of hopefulness faded away over time to a sense 
of hopelessness. Offline participation, compared to online participation, was a feature 
expressed more among the second-generation diaspora. Media use by the diaspora was 
studied regarding the role of social and mainstream media as a source of information of the 
revolution.  
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The study concluded that the exertion of the effect of the revolution on the diaspora 
during the early years faded away over time, witnessing an unexpected deviation with respect 
to changing events in Egypt. The study proposes a new framework for features of the second-
generation Egyptian diaspora in the UK, which covers eight different areas emphasised in this 
study.  
Keywords: Egypt, UK, Egyptian diaspora, 2011 uprising, generations, identity, political 
participation  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
Introduction  
Are diaspora communities politically active, whether in the affairs of their countries of 
origin or their host countries? According to the study conducted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) entitled the ‘Good Practice Guide for enhancing youth 
political participation’, young people including ethnic minorities in the West are not 
interested in politics. The guide also revealed that young people are interested in informal 
political activities, such as civic engagement and activism but not enrolling in formal political 
parties.  
The aim of the guide is to realise ways to encourage young people to be politically engaged 
in politics and change. The Arab Spring provided a great example of how young people can 
make a difference when getting involved in politics (UNDP 2013). In addition, a report 
conducted by the House of Commons (2014) demonstrated that the percentage of Black 
Minority Ethnic communities (BME) in the UK that register to vote is significantly lower than 
that of White British people. The report highlights that the turnout of White British people on 
the electoral register is 85.9%, while the turnout of black groups is 76%. Moreover, the 
turnout of Asian groups is 83.7%, whereas the turnout of other ethnic groups is estimated to 
be 62.9%. These figures demonstrate how ethnic minorities are less politically active in British 
politics.  
Indeed, the identity of diaspora groups is controversial, especially those with dual 
identities and belongings. The contribution of diaspora communities in both countries of 
origin and host countries is of scholarly interest. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the 
contribution of Egyptians in the UK to Egypt and its affairs regarding the 2011 uprising. 
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William Safran has been associated with defining diaspora and how diasporic communities 
are affiliated with their homeland. According to Safran (1991), one of the main features 
uniting diasporic groups is the image of the homeland. Diasporic communities hold strong 
relationships with their homeland. According to Kuşcu (2012), diasporic groups without the 
image of homeland in their minds, would be like any other immigrant groups; however, a 
strong relationship with their homeland is what makes diaspora groups unique. While 
diasporic communities are strongly connected to their homeland, diasporic groups would 
obviously be involved in historic events such as uprisings.  
The focus in this thesis is on the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK and how connected they 
are to Egypt, particularly with ‘new Egypt’ after the uprising. Their sense of Egyptian identity 
has been challenged, particularly in relation to historic moments, such as the 2011 uprising. 
Scholars’ studies conducted on the Egyptian Diaspora vary. The review of studies on Egyptians 
primarily focuses on the contribution of the Egyptian Diaspora in developing Egypt 
economically, for instance the study by Fawzy (2012). Fawzy (2012) contributed to a study 
conducted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) tackling the Egyptian 
Diaspora in the UK, specifically after the 2011 uprising. The main findings of Fawzy’s study are 
the contribution of Egyptians in the UK to Egypt, after the transformation in 2011, and 
furthermore, how Egyptians in the UK could be beneficial to Egypt. Fawzy’s study 
concentrates on how Egyptians in the UK could be the bridge between the UK and Egypt to 
exchange skills, goods and money.  
Karmi (1997) also conducted a pioneer study on Egyptians in Britain, in which she 
examines the integration of Egyptians in British society. Moreover, Caroline Nagel (2002) 
tackles Arab identity among Arabs residing in the UK and how challenging it is to live in host 
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countries. These studies have inspired me to tackle the issue of diaspora and identity amongst 
Egyptians in the UK who are, according to Fawzy (2012), the most diverse diaspora community 
in the UK, in terms of their being highly-skilled, qualified and professional groups.  
There is a historical relationship between Egypt and the UK; hence, for that reason, it 
is important to study Egyptians in the UK, particularly in the wake of the unrest in 2011, and 
how this might have affected the Egyptians’ sense of identity and belonging (to Egypt and 
Britain). Regarding the study of diaspora groups, it is essential to explore their sense of 
belonging to their homeland and the UK, especially for those Egyptians who have been settled 
in the UK for a long time (first generation) and for those who were born in the UK (second or 
third generation). Reviewing previous studies conducted on Egyptians in the UK, I have 
identified a gap in the literature: Most studies do not cover the diasporic identity and what 
factors affect it. Kuşcu’s (2012) study is on the political activities of Egyptian-Americans and 
the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; nevertheless, she did not tackle their sense of identity 
and belonging. However, this thesis focuses on the impact that the 2011 uprising had on 
belonging and identity among the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK.  
A qualitative approach has been adopted for this research on Egyptians in the UK and their 
identity, sense of belonging and political participation in the wake of the 2011 revolt. 
Interviews have been conducted with Egyptians in the UK across two generations to examine 
the impact that the 2011 rebellion has had on these specific groups of people. An 
ethnographic method has also been adopted which has predominantly involved attending 
protests organised by Egyptian groups in the UK and taking notes on such events. 
Ethnography has been useful in observing the political activities of the Egyptian diaspora in 
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the UK in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; a turning point in the history of Egypt, their 
homeland.  
In terms of theoretical framework, this thesis depends on the concepts of diaspora and 
identity. In addition, Goffman’s (1959) notion of ‘performing identity’ is what links both 
concepts. In this thesis, I apply Goffman’s concept to the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK and how 
political activities had been employed by the Egyptian Diaspora to achieve their Egyptian 
identity and to display their ‘Egyptianness’. In addition, I have applied Safran’s (1991) diaspora 
features or characteristics to the Egyptian Diaspora, in the UK, including second generation 
Egyptians. With my academic background in Sociology, I have highlighted Social Identity 
Theory, combining it with media and identity concepts in a novel theoretical framework.  
Research questions  
This research seeks to propose answers to three main research questions. The first one 
concerns the effects the 2011 Egyptian revolt had on belonging and Egyptian identity. Given 
the fact that the 2011 Egyptian revolution was a defining moment in every aspect of the lives 
of Egyptians, Ghannam (2011), for instance, concentrated on social media and the uprisings, 
specifically in Egypt. Consequently, more focus is required on researching the impact of the 
Egyptian uprising on Egyptian expatriates, especially those in the UK and raises the following 
question: 
• To what extent has the 2011 revolution in Egypt impacted on Egyptian-British 
communities, particularly with regards to their sense of belonging and identity? 
Kuşcu (2012) highlights the significance of diaspora groups being involved in their 
homeland’s politics; on the one hand, she argues that this was not possible for American-
Egyptians during President Mubarak’s era; conversely, the 2011 uprising was a turning point 
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for American-Egyptians – a sense of being beneficial to Egypt resumed among Egyptians in 
the US after the uprising (p. 136). This has proved an essential point; specifically, how 
important the role of diaspora groups is to the homeland, and how historic events such as the 
uprising have dramatically changed everything. Can we generalise findings obtained from 
Egyptians in the US to the Egyptian community in the UK? This is one of the questions which 
this study seeks to answer.  
The second question focuses on the assumption that ethnic minorities in the UK are not 
enthusiastic about British politics. The assumption is based on the report conducted by the 
House of Commons (2014), which reveals that Black and Ethnic Minority1 communities in the 
UK are not keen on becoming involved in politics. Based on this specific report, a further 
research question has been formulated as follows:  
• To what extent has the participation of Egyptians in the UK in political activities been 
challenged, after the 2011 revolution?  
The third research question focuses on media use among Egyptians in the UK. The Arab 
Spring is generally described as a ‘social media revolution’, or ‘Revolution 2.0’, as Ghonim 
(2011) defines it. Eltantawy (2011) tackled the role of social media in the Egyptian uprising. 
His article demonstrates how powerful the media can be, especially social media. The role of 
mainstream media in the uprising, however, especially among diaspora communities, has not 
been covered. The additional focus is on whether the 2011 revolution has had any effects on 
the use of social media and consumption of Arab and Western mainstream media by 
Egyptians in the UK. The most important point in this research question is whether Egyptians 
                                                          
1 BME refers to Black and Ethnic Minorities in the UK. 
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in the UK have used media as a tool to express their political engagement, belonging and 
identity. The third research question then asks the following: 
• To what extent have mainstream and social media been used as a tool to enforce 
a sense of identity and belonging to Egypt and political engagement?  
Thesis outline  
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter One presents the motivation behind 
studying Egyptians in the UK and the impact the 2011 revolution has had. The aims and 
objectives of the project have been presented to introduce readers to what unfolds in the 
subsequent chapters of the journey. Chapter Two is the background on Egyptians in the UK 
and the Arab uprisings, including the Egyptian revolution. Chapter Three is primarily 
concerned with theoretical foundations, for instance, diaspora, identity and Goffman’s 
theory. Chapter Four focuses on studies conducted on Arabs in the UK, particularly Egyptians 
and supporting studies regarding the topic of this thesis. The literature review is significant 
because by reading what the literature has covered, a gap has been discovered in the 
literature. This specific gap is what has led to this study on what effects the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution has had on Egyptians abroad, particularly Egyptians in the UK. Chapter Five focuses 
on the methods used in the project and justification for using such methods. A qualitative 
approach has been adopted in this thesis and the main methods used are interviews and 
participant observation.  
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight include the principal themes formulated by conducting 
interviews with Egyptians in the UK. Chapter Six focuses on belonging to Egypt and Egyptian 
identity; Chapter Seven focuses on the political participation of Egyptians in the UK, including 
first and second generations; Chapter Eight concentrates on media use among Egyptians in 
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the UK; whilst Chapter Nine is the analysis of Chapters Six, Seven and Eight and links them to 
the theories adopted. Chapter Nine is a substantial discussion of all the themes generated in 
this thesis. Chapter Ten is the conclusion. The limitations of conducting this thesis have been 
dealt with in this chapter, as well providing suggestions for further research to enrich the 
literature regarding the topics covered.  
  
 
 
8 
Chapter Two: Background 
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the background to the Egyptian community in the UK and the 
2011 Egyptian revolution, the main topics of this thesis. This chapter also explains the events 
which motivated Egyptians to rebel, such as the Tunisian uprising in 2010. The first section 
deals with the Egyptian community in the UK, such as how many Egyptians reside in the UK 
and general information regarding the Egyptians in the UK followed by a discussion on the 
Arab Spring, primarily the Tunisian uprising in 2010 and the effect it had on motivating many 
Egyptians to start a peaceful revolution. It is important to mention the Tunisian uprising as it 
was taken as the role model for Egyptians to follow regarding their own revolution. The third 
and most important section is the Egyptian revolution, and the part it played in the Arab 
Spring. The chapter ends with a summary of the topics covered.  
There have been many scholars, critics and journalists such as Al Aswany, who have 
written about the situation in Egypt and analysed what led Egyptians to the uprising in 2011. 
The factors leading up to the revolution may have been internal – revolting against President 
Mubarak’s regime – and external influences from Tunisia and Syria, for example. The roles 
that social media played in the Arab uprisings and with respect to the Egyptian diaspora 
worldwide are examined. Attention is drawn to the current situation in Egypt concerning the 
use of social media, the arrests of activists, and political activities in Egypt and worldwide.  
The Arab Spring  
One of the catalysts of the Arab Spring was the death of Bouazizi, a Tunisian grocer, who 
set himself on fire in 2010. This incident is one of many that happened throughout Tunisia, 
but Bouazizi’s death went viral on social media and led to the uprising in Tunisia. Bouazizi’s 
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death was a symbol of resistance, freedom and dignity. The crucial question is why this 
incident raised so much attention rather than other incidents that happened prior to his 
horrific death (Lim 2013, p. 921). Lim argues that some people refer to the uprisings in the 
Arab world, principally in Tunisia and Egypt, as ‘social media revolutions’. Other scholars such 
as York (2011) claim that they were people’s revolutions, and the revolutions would have 
happened with or without the help of social media. The one strength associated with Lim’s 
argument is that social media revolutions and people’s revolutions are not detached from 
each other. Lim adds that the media had successfully been used in uprisings for a long time 
prior to 2011 (p. 922), and social media was one of many media tools used in the uprisings. 
Calling the uprisings social media revolutions is unfair to other types of media used in the 
uprisings. This can be applied to Tunisia and Egypt as, at the time of the revolts, the youth did 
use social media to spread the word and organise protests. However, other types of media, 
such as satellite channels and mobile phones also played a role in mobilising and organising 
protests in Tunisia (p. 922). Having said that, this is not to deny that social media played a role 
in the uprising, but it was not the reason, or the only tool used in the uprisings, as Lim 
maintains.  
Lim explains in his article framing Bouazizi, how the death of Bouazizi was not just the 
death of an ordinary man but was about the narratives behind this death. For instance, how 
people reacted to this death and how they framed the story of Bouazizi’s death is the most 
significant element in the uprising (p. 926). According to Sidney Tarrow, a social movement 
scholar, violent emotions can be triggered by violent deaths. People could express that at the 
funeral and the images could subsequently be forgotten. Therefore, such deaths need to be 
framed within, or linked to, something bigger, beyond death itself (p. 926). Additionally, there 
are some facts regarding Bouazizi’s death that need expanding upon to link Tarrow’s 
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definition of the emotions concerning death. The immolation of Bouazizi was recorded and 
then distributed online (p. 926). This made the case of Bouazizi’s death unique, and people 
around the world became aware of it. Thanks to the Internet and social media, people had 
the chance to watch the incident and witness what had happened to Bouazizi. According to 
one of Bouazizi’s cousins: ‘Images are like weapons – they can topple a regime’ (p. 926). Wael 
Ghonim, the Egyptian activist, shares this position as, once he had seen the picture of Khalid 
Said, the Egyptian man who was beaten to death by the Egyptian police, Ghonim decided to 
create his famous page on Facebook: ‘We are all Khalid Said’, which attracted thousands of 
Egyptian supporters (Ghonim 2012, p. 58). This proves the importance of images and how 
influential they can be in the case of repressed countries.  
Simon Cottle (2011) explains how social media in the Arab Spring played a role in making 
people aware of the Arab world and what was happening in Egypt, for instance, by 
broadcasting images and videos of the peaceful protests in Tahrir Square (p. 648). Cottle 
supports Lim’s argument about the media playing a crucial role in the uprisings. It is not 
strictly accurate to call the Arab uprisings solely social media revolutions, as other types of 
media, such as mobile phones and satellite channels also played an essential role. Cottle tries 
to present the current situation in the Arab world in his article. What Cottle fails to consider 
is (i) what the Arab uprisings might bring to the Arab world; and (ii) the article is descriptive 
without a deep analysis of events currently happening and what might happen in the Arab 
world. Cottle deals with Western media coverage of the Arab uprisings and terms it ‘blind 
Western media’ (p. 650). Cottle fails to acknowledge the magnitude of the Western media’s 
coverage and how the Western media could have played a significant role in shaping the 
future of the uprisings.  
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The relationship between mainstream media and social media is crucial (p. 652); for 
instance, during the Arab uprisings, mainstream media, mainly Arab such as Al-Jazeera, 
broadcast videos originally published on YouTube; this shows how powerful social media are. 
One question that might need to be asked is whether material published on social media is 
accurate or not. The credibility of material published on social media is questionable. For 
instance, some videos or images on social media can be fabricated using software such as 
Photoshop. Cottle fails to tackle this issue of credibility of material published on social media 
but does mention how mainstream media depends on social media, even though anyone can 
publish whatever he or she likes on social media such as YouTube, Facebook or Twitter, the 
accuracy may be questionable.  
Authorities in Arab countries have attempted their best to control and censor the flow of 
information through social media. Mainstream media can, to some extent, be controlled by 
the authorities, as satellite channels, especially State-owned, are controlled by the State; 
whereas social media such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, on the other hand, cannot be 
censored by the State, as they are controlled by ordinary people. Governments such as the 
Egyptian one, shut down the Internet, as a result, to prevent people from joining and 
organising protests (Cottle 2011, p. 652). Cottle (2011) thus argues that this has not banned 
people from protesting but has led to people finding a way to join their fellow protesters. The 
authorities also limited coverage by foreign journalists to prevent the world from seeing or 
hearing about what was happening in places like Egypt. This point contradicts what Cottle 
says regarding the role of Western media being ‘blind’ and not that effective. It is the 
opposite, in fact, as Western media coverage of the uprisings has been crucial in terms of 
making the voice of Arab people heard worldwide. For instance, Kuşcu (2012, p. 121) argues 
that the Egyptian-American diaspora has played a significant role in informing people 
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worldwide about what is going on in Egypt and demanding that the US government should 
support Egyptians in Egypt by using social media and mainstream media. This shows the 
powerful role diaspora groups and the mainstream media can play.  
Cottle (2011, p. 654) also tackles the issues that uprisings in the Arab world have been 
contagious. In this sense, this is true, and can be applied to the Tunisian uprising which in turn 
led to the Egyptian uprising. The sharing of the symbol of ‘self-immolation’ in Tunisia and the 
murder of Khalid Said in Egypt helped to spread the Arab Spring. Consequently, the symbolism 
of ‘martyrs’ was shared among Tunisians and Egyptians and thus, motivated them to revolt. 
Furthermore, there were specific tragic incidents which prompted citizens to revolt in Tunisia 
and Egypt. Those incidents were the self-immolation of a young Tunisian vendor, Bouazizi, 
and the brutal killing of Khaled Said by the Egyptian police in 2010. It is worth mentioning that 
Bouazizi was not the first to set himself on fire, and in fact, just a few months before Bouazizi, 
another young Tunisian immolated himself. The difference between Bouazizi and the other 
Tunisian is that the incident was not filmed nor broadcast on Facebook (Rane et al. 2012, p. 
97). The role of the media is thus essential, especially social media. According to Rane et al., 
the Arab world had witnessed uprisings across Arab countries in 2011, starting with Tunisia 
and spreading to many other countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Syria (p. 98).  
According to Rane et al. (2012, p. 99), the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, 
were leaderless; they were steered by ordinary people, especially the youth, the unemployed, 
and those who were suffering from high food prices and corruption. The main demands made 
by protesters were with respect to freedom, dignity and democracy, which were the key 
reasons for the uprisings. Rane et al. (2012) claim that the Arab uprisings were a response to 
the local conditions which people wanted to change (p. 98); they wanted democracy that had 
 
 
13 
been diffusing from developed countries to developing countries. The violation of human 
rights in many Arab countries has attracted support from the West through the revolutions 
(Rane et al. 2012, p. 100). Rane et al. (2012) also state that although the uprisings were 
leaderless, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political opposition parties, human 
rights groups and unions led successful revolts by organising the protesters and providing 
instructions (p. 100). Human rights groups and NGOs have been helpful in terms of lobbying 
support worldwide, especially from Western governments. Rane et al. (2012) claim that there 
are common elements that united the Arab uprisings, such as poverty. Populations had been 
oppressed by Arab regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and many other Arab countries (p. 100). 
Additionally, numerous people from countries witnessing the uprisings in various countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been humiliated and tortured by police 
forces, and many have been imprisoned without fair trials. The most common elements 
among countries that have witnessed uprisings have been the high rate of unemployment 
and poverty.  
Rane et al. (2012, p. 101) assert that Egyptians were inspired by what happened in 
Tunisia, and how the Tunisians were successful in forcing President bin Ali to step down. This 
is part of what Rane et al. (2012) tackle in terms of diffusion theory: how actions in one 
country in the MENA region were diffused and inspired other nations to revolt. Social media 
was helpful in terms of Tunisians giving instructions to Egyptians on what reaction to expect 
from the authorities, according to what they had already experienced. It is worth noting that 
having geographical locations for every revolution, for instance, Tahrir Square, were 
significant, not only for gathering protesters in a certain place, but also for distributing videos 
and news from and to mainstream media. Tunisian and Egyptian regimes blocking the 
Internet connection did not prevent the activists from using text messages, phone calls and 
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social media (Rane et al. 2012); protesters found other ways to communicate by using social 
media and teaching fellow citizens how to use it (p. 101).  
The 2011 Egyptian uprising  
‘A year that shook a region and the world: how it happened and what it means’, writes 
Toby Manhire (2012, p. 10). Manhire describes the Arab Spring as a storm that unnerved the 
Arab region. He goes on to describe the Arab Spring as contagious, given the fact that it 
started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Yemen, Syria and many other Arab countries. Egypt 
had been living in fear for generations. Emergency law had been in force from 1967 until mid-
2011 and gave the right to Egyptian authorities to arrest any Egyptian and jail him or her for 
up to six months (Ghonim 2012, p. 2).  
Egyptian activists risked being easily arrested; Wael Ghonim was one of these activists 
who had been arrested for his online activities. Ghonim is famous for creating the Facebook 
page, ‘We are all Khalid Said’, the young Egyptian who was arrested and tortured to death by 
the Egyptian police in 2010 for no apparent reason (Ghonim 2012, p. 2). His Facebook page 
attracted millions of followers in only a few months. Ghonim (2012) in his book, Revolution 
2.0: The power of the people is greater than the people in power: A memoir, expresses how 
he expected that he would not be returned to his family, after the Egyptian police had called 
him in for investigation, or, according to Ghonim, a ‘chat’, in late 2010. Ghonim did not inform 
his family that he had been called in by the police, to save them from worrying. Ghonim did 
inform his friend, however, in case he ‘disappeared’ (Ghonim 2012, p. 4). Ghonim was correct; 
he was one of many Egyptians who had been arrested and subsequently disappeared, and 
whilst many more were most probably killed by the Egyptian police.  
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Egypt has gone through three main historical phases: Egypt before 2011, Egypt during 
2011, and present-day Egypt after 2013. Experts argue whether Egypt is on the right 
development pathway. For instance, according to Critchlow (2015), Egypt at present is going 
through massive investment such as the new expansion of the Suez Canal under President 
Abdel Fatah El-Sisi. Moreover, the Egyptian investment minister stated that Egypt is currently 
regaining the trust of investors which was almost lost, after the instability caused by the Arab 
Spring (Critchlow 2015). Many investors were invited to attend a major conference in March 
2015 in Sharm El-Sheikh, to discuss gas, electricity, agriculture and tourism in Egypt. These 
conferences raised many issues relating to Egypt and may help to find solutions for the 
problems Egypt is going through (Critchlow 2015).  
The relationship between Christians (Copts) and Muslims in Egypt has been strained. 
There has been tension between these two religious groups for many years; however, the 
tension increased after the 2011 uprising. Kalin (2015) argues that the situation deteriorated 
in 2012, when Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the presidential election and 
became the Egyptian president. When El-Sisi pronounced that the military was taking over 
the role of governing Egypt in 2013, thus ending the Muslim Brotherhood’s one-year tenure, 
Egyptian Copts were relieved. The mission of President El-Sisi was to heal divisions in Egyptian 
society and give hope to Copts for equality (Kalin 2015). When El-Sisi’s forces killed thousands 
of former President Morsi's supporters allegedly objecting to the coup, the attacks on Copts 
increased. El-Sisi, considered to be moderate, endeavoured to win the trust of Egyptians 
again, by defending the rights of the Copts (Kalin 2015).  
Khalil (2013) reviewed the police in Egypt in 2013, two years after the beginning of the 
2011 revolution, and how it affected the police academy in Egypt. Khalil (2013) claims that 
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the police in Egypt lost respect after the revolution, given the fact that revolution started on 
the 25th of January, the Egyptian police’s national day. The Egyptians began to disbelieve the 
police regarding human rights and the Egyptian police were accused of human rights 
violations, one of the main reasons that Egyptians revolted against the Egyptian regime. Since 
then, the police claim that human rights have been modified and that Egyptians once again 
trust the police.  
Khalil (2013) argues that Egyptian streets in 2013 were lawless and the police had no 
control. When Egyptians were asked for the reasons, they claimed that the nation was being 
punished for what happened during the 2011 revolution. According to Khalil (2013), chaos 
such as car thefts, robbery and kidnapping was common on the Egyptian streets. Egyptians in 
2013 were still complaining about the brutality of the Egyptian police, and the 2011 revolution 
did not change much in relation to the police’s behaviour. Egyptian police officers believe that 
the media had played a key role in overplaying their negative image. Khalil (2013) interviewed 
an Egyptian policeman, who states, ‘the media exaggerated some incidents’. The policeman 
admitted that mistakes had been made by some policemen; however, this did not mean that 
everyone in the police was bad. The policeman added, ‘the media keeps showing the one 
negative incident and this will make the police’s situation look bad to Egyptian citizens’. There 
are several policemen who believe the same about the media’s exaggerated reporting, 
whether it is social or mainstream media, especially nowadays, as everyone can upload any 
videos on YouTube or Facebook and the truth cannot be verified (Khalil 2013).  
Al Aswany (2011, p. 11) claims that Egyptians have lost faith in the Egyptian elections 
and decided to boycott them. According to Al Aswany, the Egyptian government did not offer 
any guarantees that the elections would be fair; in addition, decisions were not made to 
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discontinue with emergency law which had been effective in Egypt for almost thirty years – 
since 1981 when President Saddat was assassinated. Al Aswany (2011) believes that the 
decision taken by Egyptians to boycott elections was not a sign of passivity, as the Egyptian 
authorities claimed but in fact it was a conscious decision (p. 15). Al Aswany maintains that it 
was the right decision to make, because electoral fraud existed, and the Egyptian government 
was not trying to prevent it. Therefore, the boycott was the correct right decision. Al Aswany 
also suggests that the Egyptians choice to boycott the elections was made to demonstrate to 
the world that the government does not represent all Egyptians (p. 15).  
Egyptians are not passive, and are ready to participate in fair elections, not ones that 
are rigged. For instance, Al Aswany (2011, p. 15) demonstrates how Egyptians were keen to 
vote in sports club elections but had lost hope in ever having fair presidential or parliamentary 
elections. Even if Egyptians decide to take part in elections, genuine parties would not have 
an effective voice, as most parties would be representing the government. Al Aswany (2011) 
has tackled the ‘moment of awakening’ for Egyptians, as he called it in his book. This moment 
was when the politician Mohamed El-Baradei returned to Egypt in early 2010.  
According to Al Aswany (2011), many Egyptians went to the airport to greet El-Baradei. 
Al Aswany adds that he did not expect Egyptians to be at the airport to welcome El-Baradei 
with the fear of possible torture, arrest and abuse by Egyptian police hanging over them (p. 
16). According to Al Aswany (2011, p. 16), this moment was historic for Egyptians: it was the 
breaking point for Egyptians who had decided to no longer fear the Egyptian police. This 
moment also proved that the Egyptians were not passive and believed in a better life. The 
Egyptian people believed in El-Baradei, who had fought President Mubarak’s regime for years 
and placed their faith in him to return the rights they had lost (Al Aswany 2011, p. 130). Those 
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Egyptians, Al Aswany (2011, p. 118) claims, were ordinary Egyptians – teachers, workers or 
students, and not politicians or members of any party – regardless of their religion, faith or 
gender. Muslims and Copts were united as Egyptians, who agreed on one thing: Egypt needed 
change to restore freedom, justice, dignity and human rights to all.  
Al Aswany (2011, p. 136) states that young Egyptians had started organising Facebook 
pages and campaigns to support change in Egypt ever since El-Baradei’s return to Egypt in 
late 2010 (p. 20). Young Egyptians began to feel empowered to make the necessary changes 
and gained back the hope they had lost many years ago. The youth prepared everything for 
the historic reception of their hero – El-Baradei. Young Egyptians were responsible for 
distributing instructions to those who wished to join the welcome party, such as airport maps, 
and how to reach the airport by car or public transport. The young Egyptians even prepared 
an emergency strategy in case the police interfered and destroyed their plans (Al Aswany 
2011, p. 137). 
Al Aswany (2011, p. 140) describes how underprivileged Egyptians suffered from poor 
care, especially regarding public hospitals during President Mubarak’s regime (p. 145). He 
adds that the minister of heath was not only responsible for poor public health services, 
especially for poor Egyptians, but that President Mubarak was directly responsible. According 
to Al Aswany (2011, p. 142), it was Mubarak’s obligation as the Egyptians had not elected him 
to represent them. President Mubarak was sure that he could punish any Egyptian who 
opposed him, without mercy or consideration, as the Egyptians were not able to resist his rule 
(p. 145). As a result, this attitude generated a sense that all Egyptians, including ministers, 
should please and serve the president, rather than the Egyptian people. Al Aswany continues 
to explain how the Egyptian police adopted the ideology of beating and torturing State 
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security detainees, and how they deserved this punishment. The State also believed that the 
Islamic religion orders them to treat Egyptians that way, according to Shari’a law; 
consequently, torturing Egyptians had become the norm, according to police officials; in Al 
Aswany’s opinion, this was one of the factors which led the Egyptians to rebel (2011, p. 146).  
Al Aswany had read about the situation in Egypt since 2009 and was convinced that a 
revolution was going to break out because of the inequality and injustice the Egyptians were 
experiencing. His prediction was correct, and the Egyptians revolted against President 
Mubarak’s regime in 2011. Al Aswany (2011, p. 147) adds that Egyptian authorities were not 
only fighting the rebels, but they were also fighting against capable Egyptians. These citizens 
had limited options: the first being to immigrate to a democratic country, to freely express 
their opinions and demonstrate their abilities. Secondly, skilled Egyptians may prefer to stay 
in Egypt and raise their voices, but the circumstances would be difficult, as torture and 
imprisonment would be waiting for such people.  
The example that Al Aswany provides to show how capable Egyptians were being 
fought by the Egyptian authorities is Ibrahim Eissa, an Egyptian journalist who had opposed 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime, for years. Al Aswany (2011, p. 147) adds that Eissa was one of the 
most talented Egyptian journalists and directed his blame for Egypt’s suffering on the head of 
the Egyptian regime, President Mubarak. This led the Egyptian regime to fight Eissa, and to 
stop him encouraging the youth to revolt and change the situation in Egypt. Moreover, Eissa 
was against the notion of transferring power from father to son, as Hosni Mubarak intended 
to do, by appointing Jamal Mubarak, his son, to the presidency (Al Aswany 2011, p. 148). The 
Egyptian regime sought to silence Eissa on many occasions; he was once accused of 
questioning the health of President Mubarak, which was a taboo: Mubarak’s health should 
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never be mentioned, according to Al Aswany (2011). Al Aswany concludes his book with this 
statement: ‘Egypt has risen, and no one, whoever he may be, can stand between Egypt and 
the future’. Al Aswany sees that in 2010 and asserts that ‘democracy is the solution’ and on 
its way in Egypt (p. 138).  
Eltantawy et al. (2011) explain that the Egyptian revolution only lasted 18 days – it is 
known as ‘the 18-day revolution’. Egyptian cities were filled with millions of protestors 
demanding President Mubarak’s resignation; he had ruled Egypt for almost 30 years (since 
1981) and it was time for him to go. Eltantawy et al. (2011) also state that the reason that 
Egyptians revolted was not only Mubarak’s long period in power, but there were many other 
factors: the presidential and parliamentary elections lacked transparency; the corrupt 
Egyptian authorities; lack of political freedom; inequality and poverty; injustice and limited 
freedom of speech; and the state of emergency.  
Egypt had been under the state of emergency law since 1967. The law allowed the 
government to arrest citizens and put them into prison for no good reason. It gave the 
government the right to quash any protests organised by the Egyptians, who obviously 
opposed it. Finally, this state of emergency law had censored the media since 1967 (Eltantawy 
et al. 2011, p. 1207). Moreover, emergency law in Egypt violated its citizens’ human rights, 
according to the 2008 United Nations Development Programme’s annual report; nonetheless, 
it was extended many times until 2011. In addition, President Mubarak drafted 34 
constitutional amendments in 2007, including revoking the judicial supervision of 
parliamentary elections and restricting those who would like to run for presidential elections 
(Eltantawy et al. 2011, 1208). This intimidating and repressive emergency law was one of the 
principal reasons for Egyptian protests and the consequent demand for President Mubarak 
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to quit, but there were also other reasons. The law resulted in poor Egyptians facing more 
difficulties in meeting their basic needs (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1208). The final key reason 
for the Egyptian revolution was the fact that President Mubarak was preparing his son, Jamal, 
to succeed him as president; this was a legitimate move, as Jamal Mubarak was a member of 
the National Party (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1208). The restrictions imposed by this never-
ending emergency law and the amendments to the constitution resulted in a frustrated 
Egyptian population who wanted to see change.  
Eltantawy et al. (2011) argue that El-baradei, winner of the Nobel peace prize in 2005, and 
chief of the United Nations’ international Atomic Energy Agency, gained popularity among 
the Egyptians, and thus, became one of the major leaders of the 2011 revolution (p. 1209) El-
baradei started to reach young Egyptians. He was able to motivate them to keep demanding 
political change for Egypt and to show them how it was possible. El-baradei soon became an 
enemy of the Egyptian regime because of his opposition to the regime and encouraging the 
youth to demand changes to the current situation in Egypt (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1210).  
Moreover, in February 2010, El-baradei and a group of politicians and intellectuals formed 
the National Association for Change. This association gained popularity in Egypt – the 
Egyptians hoped that it would help to bring about the changes they desired (Eltantawy et al. 
2011, p. 1210). What led to the success of the uprisings was overcoming the fear of the police 
and the security forces. People felt inspired by the large numbers of protesters in the streets 
sharing the same demands for freedom, democracy and dignity, for all. Social media helped 
to diffuse the news about brutal killings of innocent people, for example. As a result, 
governments blocked the Internet to prevent people from being informed of what was 
happening in the country. This did not prevent alternative action. For instance, in Egypt, many 
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young Egyptians joined fellow Egyptians in Tahrir Square to personally witness the events 
happening there, rather than checking online forums and Facebook.  
Eltantawy et al. (2011, p. 1211) stresses the importance of Tahrir Square situated in 
the heart of Cairo. The central location of Tahrir Square, close to a metro station, was one of 
the principal reasons for the success of the Egyptian revolution. The location of Tahrir Square 
was one of the major destinations for protestors to unite. Tahrir Square not only attracted 
millions of Egyptians to gather there, they also found it easy to join the protestors and share 
their grievances with Western and Arab media reporters. Mubarak’s thugs attacked these 
media reporters, though they managed to set up cameras in buildings surrounding Tahrir 
Square to witness the activities and report the truth. Eltantawy et al. (2011) go on to reveal 
that one of the main factors which led Egyptians to revolt was the brutal death of Khalid Said 
in June 2010. Reporters and bloggers claim that police officers demanded money from Said, 
and when he refused because he did not have any, they started beating him until he died 
(Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1211).  
Cyber-activism in the Arab world 
Cyber-activism2 in Egypt started in 2004, according to Khondker (2011, p. 676); since 
when, it began to spread across the Arab world. Khondker fails, however, to acknowledge 
which Arab countries have been involved in cyber-activism. The focus was predominantly on 
Egypt, although his article also focuses on the role of social media during the Arab Spring and 
includes all the Arab countries that experienced the uprisings, not specifically Egypt. This is a 
limitation that is associated with Khondker’s study, as many Arab countries, including Egypt, 
                                                          
2 Cyber activism in Egypt includes blogging, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Azer 2013). Azer proved that cyber 
activism is considered a new social movement in Egypt which led to change in Egypt.  
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have been affected by the ‘cyber-activism invasion’. Khondker criticises Wael Ghonim’s 
exaggeration when Ghonim was interviewed by CNN, on how the freedom of any nation 
depends on the Internet, and how the Internet can empower people and bring freedom. 
Khondker may be correct regarding the exaggeration of Ghonim’s statement; however, it 
would have been more beneficial to look at the reasons why Ghonim made that statement: 
how the Internet can be effective in countries such as Egypt. Therefore, Ghonim’s statement 
can be justified in terms of looking at how the Internet was successful in the Egyptian 
revolution. Khondker argues that some scholars consider the Internet to be a tool for 
democracy, while others believe the Internet can threaten freedom and privacy (p. 676). 
Khondker continues to explain how in Tunisia the immolation of Bouazizi became a public 
issue, thanks to the Internet and some mainstream media, such as Al-Jazeera. Consequently, 
the Internet can be an effective tool for democracy but has its limitations and requires support 
from other sources.  
According to a report conducted by the Sixth Annual E-marketing Insights conference, 62% 
of respondents revealed that the Internet in Egypt, primarily social media like Facebook, has 
enhanced their social activity and their learning opportunities (Daily News Egypt 2016). The 
report adds that Egyptians mostly use the Internet to access social media, check emails, play 
games, follow events and news and additionally, for online shopping. Moreover, Egypt ranks 
13th among countries that use Facebook the most, with 28 million users. During the Arab 
Spring, the number of Egyptians using Facebook increased according to the report. As a 
background to the use of the Internet in Egypt, it was estimated by Internet World Stats 
(2012) that there were 29,809,724 users in 2012. Moreover, Internet use in Egypt increased 
dramatically from 450,000 users in 2000 to 29,809,724 users in 2012. A huge difference in 
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just 12 years. The number rose dramatically between 2009 and 2012, especially since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010 (Internet World Stats 2012), as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Internet Usage and Population Growth in Egypt (source: Internet World Stats 2012) 
YEAR Users Population % Pen. 
2000 450,000 66,303,000 0.7 % 
2006 5,100,000 71,236,631 7.0 % 
2008 10,532,400 81,713,517 12.9 % 
2009 12,568,900 78,866,635 15.9 % 
2012 29,809,724 83,688,164 35.6 % 
 
An Egyptian activist concluded the role of social media as follows, ‘We use Facebook to 
schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the story to the world 
(Khondker, p. 677). This quotation sums up how social media was effectively used in the Arab 
world during the uprisings. Having said that, Khondker also states that although social media 
played a significant role in the uprisings, mainstream media helped to present the uprisings 
to the global community, which probably depended on mainstream media rather than social 
media. Khondker’s argument is valid in terms of paying attention to social media, 
nevertheless, he ignores the role of mainstream media.  
Rane et al. (2012) demonstrate how social media has enabled people to function as 
‘journalists’, by conveying messages to mainstream media, and social media forums which 
they owned. There were some incidents that were not covered in the mainstream media; 
hence, an alternative method was found by ‘citizen journalists’, as Rane et al. (2012, p. 98) 
named them, as the conveyors of news items to social media and mainstream media 
audiences. According to Tufekci et al. (2012, p. 363), the penetration of Facebook in Arabic 
countries in 2009 made it easier for activists and ordinary people to follow political unrest in 
Egypt. Facebook has become incredibly popular among Egyptians to the extent that many 
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protesters first heard about the protests via Facebook. Egyptians used Facebook a great deal 
for distributing videos and photos of protests in Tahrir Square (Tufekci et al. 2012, p. 364).  
It is worth mentioning that social media has empowered people to take control of their 
lives. A good example of the powerful role of social media is what happened in Egypt during 
2011 uprising. Egyptians inside and outside Egypt have become more connected thanks to 
social media. Many studies have dealt with the impact of the 2011 revolution on Egyptians 
inside Egypt despite the effective role of social media on Egyptians inside and outside Egypt. 
In addition, social media websites have not only had an impact on the use of Internet among 
Egyptians, but social media have also affected the identity and sense of belonging to Egypt 
among Egyptians residing in the country. Consequently, this has led to this study being 
conducted on the effect of the 2011 uprising on Egyptians in the UK.  
The Egyptian community in the UK  
This section presents a historical background related to Egyptians in the UK. According to 
Sameh Fawzy (2012), the number of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate. Egyptians in the UK 
seem to be disorganised for many reasons. The first reason is that Egyptians in the UK are 
polarised and cannot be unified and agreed on one aim. For instance, El-Shafey (2000) has 
written about how polarised Egyptians in the UK are in meetings of members of the Egyptian 
community and how the British police intervened to end a clash that took place in London 
between members. El-Shafey (2000) adds how members of the Egyptian community were 
fighting with each other to the extent of beating up other members due to different points of 
view. The second point is that Coptic-Christian Egyptians in the UK tend to organise 
themselves apart from Muslims. Though there is a long history of the presence of Coptic-
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Christians in the UK since 1954, they organise themselves as a separate component from 
Egyptians in the UK (Coptic Orthodox Church, UK 2015).  
Moreover, the other factor contributing to the disorganisation is the sense of suspicion 
that Egyptians have of any strangers. Egyptians are extremely suspicious of strangers and fear 
that activities might be secretly planned by the Egyptian intelligence, as I sensed as a 
researcher from the reactions of potential participants. Having said that, there were 
individual initiatives launched to unionise Egyptians in the UK. For instance, there was an 
attempt to form a union for Egyptians in the UK led by a surgeon, Hany Shouaib, who is still 
interviewed in Egyptian media as the ’leader’ of Egyptians in the UK. The union failed to hold 
regular general assembly meetings; in fact, the London-based Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper 
ran a short piece poking fun at that union when their members physically attacked one 
another at a meeting. The newspaper also claimed that the Egyptians were the worst 
community to form unions and associations (El-Shafey 2000).  
Groups such as the Association of Egyptians in London fail to maintain an official website 
gathering Egyptians in the UK. This shows how fragmented Egyptians in the UK are. You can 
find individual websites of Egyptians in the UK or pages on social media such as Facebook; 
however, Egyptians in the UK still lack a group or association which unites Egyptians in the 
UK. The page for the Association of Egyptians in London had attracted 1,906 likes although it 
was not that active, when I examined it back in 2014.  
To find valuable information about Egyptians in the UK, I contacted several associations 
and groups claiming to represent Egyptians in the UK. The groups I contacted were the 
Egyptian Union in Europe, the Egyptian Union in the UK, the Egyptian Community Association 
in UK, the Egyptian Arab British Cultural Forum Association, the Anglo-Egyptian Society 
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Association and finally, the British Egyptian Society. Some groups’ websites such as the 
Egyptian Community Association in the UK are unavailable to view and gather information. 
Below is the sample of the email sent to groups acquiring information regarding Egyptians in 
the UK.  
 
Figure 1 Email enquiry sent to Egyptian groups  
The number of Egyptians in the UK was estimated to be 250,000, whilst the total Egyptians 
outside Egypt was 6,500,000, according to 2008 statistics (cited in Fawzy 2012). Moreover, 
communication with the Egyptian embassy is limited; consequently, the number of Egyptians 
in the UK cannot be verified. Fawzy adds that Egyptians in the UK are mainly concentrated in 
different areas of London, depending on the financial situation of the individual, and other 
cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Brighton, with others living in Wales and Scotland (p. 
47). Most Egyptians in the UK are Muslims, with a minority of Christian Copts.  
Egyptian Copts in the UK participated in the 2011 uprising by organising protests. Copts 
have organised protests and showed their solidarity with fellow Egyptians in Egypt, especially 
after the terroristic attacks in 2011 on the Egyptian Coptic Church (El-Kedesseen) in Cairo. 
Fawzy adds that the tension between Muslims and Christians in Egypt declined after the 25th 
of January 2011 revolution, especially as Egyptians shared the same demands and felt they 
were ‘one family’, as expressed by Al Aswany (2011, p. 20). To obtain an accurate number of 
the number of Egyptians in the UK, the researcher contacted the UK Census Centre. The 
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contact was in March 2015. Below is a screenshot of the email that was sent. The reply from 
the census services shows that number of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate due to the fact 
place of birth is not an indication of the number of Egyptians in the UK.  
 
 
Summary  
This chapter has presented some vital information relating to the Egyptian uprising in 
2011 – one of the most important uprisings in the Arab world. It was not only linked to 
previous Arab uprisings, primarily the Tunisian one, but has also shown the similarities and 
Figure 2 Email enquiry regarding the number of Egyptians in UK 
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differences between them. This chapter has also revealed how important the Egyptian 
uprising has been to all Egyptians, both in Egypt and abroad. After reviewing studies 
concerning social media among the Egyptian diaspora worldwide, theoretical considerations 
should be drawn based on the relationship between diaspora groups, identity and social 
media. Having a background to Egypt, the Egyptian diaspora, identity and social media leads 
smoothly to constructing a theoretical framework extracted from theories of diaspora and 
identity in the following chapter, Theoretical Considerations.  
  
 
 
30 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Considerations  
Introduction  
This chapter addresses the theories adopted in this research. The approaches I adopt are 
multi-disciplinary. Studying sociology, cultural and media studies previously has encouraged 
me to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, which incorporates theories of sociology, political 
science and cultural studies. The chapter has been divided into sections discussing the main 
concepts pertaining to the diaspora, including the principal features of diaspora groups 
suggested by William Safran.  
I have consulted theories related to sociology, political science and media studies. For that 
reason, I categorise theories into three groups. The first group is the school of sociology 
represented by William Safran and Robin Cohen. The second theoretical group is also based 
on social sociology and focuses on identity represented by Erving Goffman and his concept of 
‘performing identity’. Moreover, part of this sociological concept is social identity theory 
spearheaded by Abrams and Hogg (1990) and Tajfel (1972). The third theoretical perspective 
is from media studies reported in Faiza Hirji, Nikos Papastergiadis and Roza Tsagarousianou. 
This group of media theorists have principally focused on the connection of the media to 
diaspora groups. Other schools such as political science, history and cultural studies have 
been consulted in some sections to gain an idea of how other theories might deal with the 
concept of diaspora and identity. However, the focus has been on diaspora and identity, 
particularly social identity theory and diaspora, to draw a picture of how such groups interact 
and deal with the concept of diaspora, homeland and country of origin vs. host country.  
Thus, the theoretical framework is anchored in sociology, with focus on diaspora groups 
and the relationship between diaspora groups and their host country versus country of origin. 
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I have chosen to operationalise and highlight the concepts introduced by Goffman and Safran, 
namely how identity could be performed as suggested by Goffman, and how this ‘identity 
performance’ can be applied to diaspora as theorised by Safran and Cohen. Although Cohen 
and Safran, among other sociologists, have dealt with the historical background of diaspora 
with the Jewish example of such diaspora groups, there is need to test those concepts on 
other diaspora groups. In this thesis, I apply Safran’s model to study the Egyptian diaspora in 
the UK, whilst integrating Goffman’s concept of performing identity, as explained below.  
The main theoretical foundation then rests on diaspora theories, and this chapter 
discusses how such concepts can be applied to the case study of Egyptians in the UK. The 
discussion of the main features of diaspora leads to an examination of identity and belonging 
to diaspora groups. This allows further discussions on how diaspora communities deal with 
their identity and belonging to their homeland or host countries. The second section of this 
chapter deals with the term ‘identity’ in social identity theory, collective identities and its 
relationship to constructing identities. Presenting theories regarding the construction of 
identities allows more understanding of how they are constructed; in addition, it can be linked 
to diasporic identities and how diasporic communities adopt multiple identities and a sense 
of belonging. The link between identity and diaspora is what Goffman terms ‘performing 
identity’. The platform used by diasporic groups to perform their identity is political activities, 
which will be discussed in the following section.  
The next section of this chapter tackles the issue of how significant moments in any 
nation’s history can have an impact on its citizens; in the case of Egyptians, it is the Egyptian 
uprising in 2011. How diasporic groups react to such historic moments is significant, as a 
nation may not witness such historic moments for centuries. Studying the impact of historic 
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moments on diaspora communities such as a revolution, sheds new light on our 
understanding of the relationship between diaspora communities and their homeland.  
Diaspora  
Sheffer (2003) claims that the term ‘diaspora’ had always been associated with Jews and 
their dispersion, throughout history. Cohen (1997) also associates the term diaspora with the 
Jewish case, though Safran (1991) includes the diaspora in other nations to be called ‘diaspora 
groups’ (cited in Brubaker 2005). The main features are the following: (i) a dispersion of 
people from a country of origin to multiple host countries, either by force or voluntarily; (ii) 
how diaspora groups always preserve a memory of their homeland, even though it may be a 
mythical one; (iii) the overwhelming notion of not being fully accepted in host countries. The 
sense of adaptation to host countries is not an easy task, and, even if they do manage to 
adapt, the host country may not completely accept them in their society; (v) how strong the 
notion of return to one’s homeland is among diaspora groups. This consequently creates the 
sense of impermanence in host countries; (vi) there is a belief among diaspora groups that 
they are committed to the maintenance of the notion of homeland by any means; and (vii) 
the sense of duty that diaspora groups should sustain links with their home country, no matter 
what the political, economic and social conditions are.  
Sheffer (2003, p. 5) and Cohen (1999, p. 15) have associated the term diaspora with the 
Jewish example and consider it the classic example of diaspora; even in Cambridge dictionary, 
the term is defined as ‘the dispersion of Jews to different countries around the world’. 
However, the term has been redefined to include all dispersed people from their homeland. 
The new definition is ‘the situation of people living outside their traditional homeland’ 
(Sheffer 2003, p. 9). According to Sheffer (2003, p. 7), the term ‘diaspora’ has been defined in 
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ethno-nationalist terms. Ethno-national groups are groups which are politically and socially 
formed and share the same ethnic background, such as a shared language and heritage and 
a shared experience in residing in different host countries because of forced or voluntary 
migration.  
According to Clifford (1994), diaspora has always been associated with emigration. A 
group can be called ‘diasporic’ or a diaspora group, even though it may never have previously 
migrated. Those groups are the offspring of diaspora groups (p. 14). Does diaspora mean 
settlement rather than immigration? This question is important in the case of the offspring of 
diaspora groups, who are born and raised in the host country. They occasionally still do not 
feel that they belong to this country, however, like other offspring, because of their 
background (p. 14). Belonging to a specific country can be difficult in the case of diaspora, 
especially when they cannot decide to which country they belong. The meaning of diaspora 
is deeper: should multinational immigrants be called ‘a diaspora’ or merely an ‘immigrant’? 
For instance, an Egyptian-British person cannot be only called ‘Egyptian’ or only ‘British’ 
because he or she lives in a country but keeps ties with the home country. Some diaspora 
might just belong to one country which is the country of birth. Or the opposite – some 
diaspora groups might experience belonging to a country to which they have never been 
before but consider as their homeland. Diaspora therefore describes people with dual 
nationalities labelling them as people with dual nationalities (p. 14). Diaspora is about how 
such movement can affect both the sending and receiving countries. For instance, building 
relationships and ties with the host country is as important as keeping ties with the country 
of origin (Clifford 1994, p. 15). It is argued by Kissau and Hunger (2010) that new diasporas 
describe how people can sustain the links between their home country and host country (p. 
246).  
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There has been a new wave of diasporas which involve multiple loyalties to a place. A new 
type of migration is a population’s activities and networks relating to both homelands and 
host countries. Maintaining both the homeland’s and the host country’s activities and 
traditions creates what is called ‘transnationalism’ (Van Hear 2005, p. 4). According to 
Bruneau (2010, p. 37), all diaspora groups experience what Bruneau calls ‘socio-spatial 
networks’ and ‘territorial expansion’ (p. 36). Both concepts are concerned with the notion of 
living and belonging to a place of residence, host country and the place of memory; the 
country of origin (p. 36). Moreover, territories cannot be moved and are based on specific 
locations. However, diaspora groups tend to create their own ‘places of memory’ by adopting 
the identities and customs of the country of origin in the host country (p. 37). This is what 
could be termed as a diaspora experiencing transnational lives. Bruneau (2010) adds that 
diasporas can be divided into four types (p. 39). These types depend on religion, politics and 
a combination of race and culture. The first type of diaspora is associated with culture and 
race and how religion does not play a vital role for multiple religions in specific nations. The 
examples of such diasporas are the Chinese, Indian and Lebanese diasporas (p. 39). Such a 
type of diaspora is interrelated with the concept of transnationalism for multiple belongings. 
The second type is concerned with religions’ role in shaping diasporas, such as the Jews, as 
well as the Greek and Armenian diasporas. The third type of diaspora is governed by political 
conflict, for example the Palestinian diaspora.  
Diasporic groups share several characteristics, for instance, the dispersal of people to 
more than one country (Safran 1991, p219). Hirji (2009) explains in her article about second 
and third generations of immigrants, how these generations of immigrants do not meet this 
characteristic of diaspora. She has also written about the role played by second and third 
generations of immigrants regarding the concept of homeland and diaspora. Second and third 
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generations of immigrants might not consider themselves as part of a diaspora in the first 
instance. In addition, they might not have any bond with their parents’ homeland or it might 
differ from one person to another. Hirji (2009) claims that this can create an ‘identity crisis’, 
and young people may struggle in terms of defining themselves. Hirji (2009) adds that second 
and third generations of immigrants in the United Kingdom, United States and Canada can be 
known as ‘inhabitants of diaspora’. They are so called because they have never migrated 
before and were born in a country which they consider to be their homeland.  
Hirji (2009) also argues that the definition of diaspora proposed by Safran and Cohen deals 
with those who were forced to leave their homeland and were dispersed from their country 
of origin for reasons of war or disaster. Moreover, the offspring of immigrants, or, as Hirji 
terms them, ‘inhabitants of diaspora’ are not mentioned in any of the classic definitions of 
diaspora. The definition of diaspora should therefore stretch to include various types of 
immigrants. Hirji provides an example in her article, suggesting that none of the criteria of the 
diaspora Cohen or Safran set are met by second and third generations of residents, even 
though they are classed as diaspora groups. Hirji therefore puts forward a definition of 
diaspora which includes those who have been dispersed from their homeland to a host 
country, as well as the offspring of first generation immigrants, meaning second and third 
generations. Hirji includes second and third generations of immigrants because they are part 
of diasporic groups and are involved in the businesses of their parents’ countries of origin. In 
this thesis, I define ‘diaspora’ as the immigrants who have been dispersed from their country 
of origin because of war or any disaster in addition to ‘inhabitants of diaspora’ including 
second and third generations. In this case, my definition combines the classical definition of 
diaspora suggested by Safran (1991) and Cohen (2007) with the new definition suggested by 
Hirji (2009).  
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According to Safran (1991), diaspora can be limited to populations that have been 
dispersed from their homeland to one or more foreign countries. Other features of diaspora, 
according to Safran (1991), are slight alienation in the host country and the wish to return to 
the homeland. Reis (2004, p. 43) tackled the classical versus modern diaspora phenomenon 
in his article and uncovered the difference between them. The classical example of diaspora 
has always been the Jewish case, given the fact that they were dispersed from their land (as 
previously mentioned). Hirji (2009) has discussed the second and third generations and how 
they deal with the notion of diaspora and whether or not they can be considered as part of a 
diaspora, according to the Jewish example.  
Reis (2004) claims that the Jewish case is not the classical example of diaspora. The main 
features of diaspora include dispersal from country of origin to one or more foreign countries 
due to war, violence or natural disaster. Secondly, the notion of return to the country of origin 
is common among diasporic groups. Thirdly, not being able to integrate into the host country 
or not belonging to the host country is another feature of diasporic groups. Diasporic groups 
enjoy the notion of the preservation of memories or myth about the country of origin, 
including its location and history. Moreover, diasporic groups have the sense of duty to 
rebuild the country of origin. Finally, diasporic groups believe in one community and a shared 
fate which depends on the country of origin and their adaptation to the host country. Reis 
(2004, p. 44) claims that all the characteristics of diaspora cannot be applied to one group; a 
group of people might have two out of five features or might enjoy the main features of 
diaspora.  
The feature of not being accepted in a host society can be applied to second and third 
generations of immigrants. Occasionally, second and third generations who were born in a 
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country which is not their parents’ homeland, may not be accepted or feel they do not belong 
to that country because they are originally from another country. This raises the issue of place 
of birth and its effects on diasporic groups (Hirji 2009). Bauböck and Faist (2010) also associate 
the concept of diaspora with the Jewish dispersion. However, in the present day, it can be 
associated with various nations.  
As suggested by most scholars, there are six criteria concerning diaspora. The first 
criterion is the notion of dispersion from countries of origin by force. ‘By force’ means that 
people have been compelled to leave their country of origin because of a natural disaster, 
war, poverty or political conflict (Bruneau 2010, p. 35). What about those who have not 
previously migrated but are classified as a diaspora group because of their parents’ migratory 
history? The second criterion is the choice of destination for diasporic groups in relation to 
residing in host countries. The option of choosing the country of destination is up to the 
migratory chains. For instance, when a group of people are dispersed from their country of 
origin, they join other groups who have previously settled in host countries. Thus, previous 
migratory routes can be reused by newly diasporic groups to make it easier for them to 
integrate into host countries (Bruneau 2010, p. 36). The third criterion is the awareness of a 
common identity among diasporic groups. Diasporic groups tend to have a strong identity 
awareness and a strong sense of community life within diasporic groups. The fourth criterion 
is the creation of a networked space among diasporic groups. This networked space is created 
by diasporic groups by means of exchanging goods or information. Moreover, this networked 
space does not only link diasporic individuals with each other, despite their differences, but 
also links them to their country of origin if it still exists (Bruneau 2010, p. 37).  
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The fifth criterion is the transmission of dispersion experience from generation to 
another. For instance, the first generation of diasporic groups that are settled in host 
countries would transfer their experience and identity of dispersion to their children. 
Consequently, generation after generation would transmit the dispersion experience and 
would be considered as diasporic groups, even though they may never have been dispersed 
before, for example, second and third generations of diasporic groups (Bruneau 2010, p. 44). 
The last criterion is the relatively autonomous nature of diasporic groups. This autonomous 
social formation is because of the various cultural, social and professional associations, 
according to Bruneau (2010, p. 45).  
The most well-known type of diaspora is ‘victim diaspora’, of which the Jewish case is a 
classic example. However, Reis (2004) fails to fully acknowledge the other nations which can 
be classified as ‘victim diasporas’ such as the Palestinians and Armenians. Reis (2004) 
mentions other nations, as part of the ancient period, but does not give examples of the 
ancient diaspora period. Reis (2004) has discussed the notion of globalisation and 
‘diasporisation’, as he has termed it. It is also important to state that technological revolution 
has affected diasporic groups in terms of making it easier for them to stay in touch with 
families and their homelands, unlike before, where travelling was hard and kept people away 
from their families and friends. The current inexpensive and fast travel, in addition to 
advanced communications, have eased the notion of diasporic groups being far away from 
their homeland and families. Furthermore, the expansion of economic transactions among 
countries has increased due to globalisation and advanced telecommunications. Reis (2004) 
elaborates further on the effects of globalisation on diaspora by showing how borders 
between countries are fading, or as Reis (2004) calls it ‘eroding’. Reis (2004) adds that 
globalisation has benefited diasporic groups in terms of strengthening ties between their host 
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country and homeland. Regarding ‘emotional distance’, it has been reduced due to 
globalisation and advances in technology, such as the telephone, more frequent cheap flights 
and the Internet. Nevertheless, globalisation and advanced technology have made it easier 
for everyone to keep in touch and stay connected with their family and friends, not only for 
diasporic groups, as Reis (2004) claims. This can be considered as a weakness in his argument.  
Waterbury (2010, p. 132) also addresses the diaspora and diasporic politics. He argues 
that state borders create a mode of ‘logic’, according to which diaspora groups can create a 
threat to social solidarity. Additionally, as nations share norms and traditions, diaspora groups 
can bring their own traditions and norms which, in turn, can affect the natives’ norms and 
traditions. Waterbury’s (2010) argument can be challenged, based on globalisation and how 
the world has become a small village. Appadurai (1996) addresses the issue of living in a 
globalised world. Accordingly, as the number of diaspora groups has risen due to many of 
them leaving their countries of origin to work and settle somewhere other than their 
homeland, the world can be considered to be ‘one small village’ or a ‘transnational 
community’, as Waterbury defines it.  
Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 53) identifies the stages through which diasporic groups have 
passed and perceptions of understanding the concept of diaspora have evolved. 
Tsagarousianou challenges the notion of how ethnicity, mobility and displacement can allow 
nations to make sense of the concept of diaspora or diasporic communities. The article 
questions if some of the traditional assumptions of diaspora should be rethought (p. 56). 
Tsagarousianou suggests that diasporas should not only relate to displacement, as some 
scholars such as Cohen (1997) believe. Moreover, diasporas should be taken as given 
communities not as imagined communities, as suggested by Anderson (1991), and should be 
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dealt with as communities that can be reinvented and reconstructed (cited in Brubaker 2005). 
Tsagarousianou (2004) suggests that the media and new technology can play a significant role 
in transforming and reconstructing diasporic identities. She also believes that Safran’s 
features of diaspora are debatable, as they focus only on the relationship between diasporic 
groups and their homeland and neglect other relationships and linkages. Tsagarousianou 
(2004) asserts that diasporic groups can only be classed as a sub-category of an ethnic group 
or a specific nation (p. 55). Cohen (1997) suggests that the diaspora features suggested by 
Safran need to be readjusted and that more elements should be added to those of Safran. 
Those elements include specifying whether groups who have left their country of origin have 
left voluntarily or by force; furthermore, sufficient time should be given before any groups 
can be called diasporic. The third element that should be added to diaspora features is the 
positive aspects of diasporic groups, which should be taken into consideration, and which can 
lead to creative formulations, according to Cohen (1997). The final element Cohen (1997) 
proposes is that diasporic groups do not only form collective identities in host countries but 
also in their homeland.  
However, Tsagarousianou (2004) argues that Cohen contradicts himself in his analysis of 
diaspora, or his vision of diaspora. Cohen (1997) claims diasporic groups have ‘strong links to 
the past’ which does not push forward Tsagarousianou’s (2004) debate regarding updating 
Safran’s features, previously mentioned, or of updating Safran’s features by adding modern 
elements of diaspora. Reis (2004) has addressed the notion of diasporic groups benefiting 
their homeland by using advanced technology to send money home. This is part of one 
feature of diaspora which is a united notion of benefiting the country of origin, either 
psychologically or by sending money. Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 55) alleges that not all groups 
which have been dispersed can be called a diaspora. However, using the label diaspora or 
 
 
41 
diasporic identity indicated willingness and imagination that constitute the transformation 
from ethnic to diasporic identification. Diaspora is not considered to be a given community 
but reinvented and reconstructed (p. 56). Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 56) argues that although 
diaspora is not considered to be an ‘imagined community’, in contrast to Benedict (1991), 
features of imagined communities are still met in diaspora. Tsagarousianou (2004) maintains 
that what makes diasporic groups is their ability to realise themselves – self-mobilisation 
around their awareness of who they are is what makes a group ‘diasporic’.  
Papastergiadis (2013) argues that the late modern migration movements are associated 
with three terms: solitude – the state of being lonely and the loneliness which diaspora groups 
experience; itinerary – related to the state of moving and travelling; and illegality – the state 
of living illegally in foreign countries. Each of these terms can be applied to various diasporic 
groups. To call a dispersed group a diaspora, they should meet an important element: self-
mobilisation or self-imagination as diasporic groups (Tsagarousianou 2004, p. 57). Likewise, 
the awareness of being a diasporic group is essential regarding categorising any group as 
diasporic. Bruneau (2010, p. 40) contends that when a diasporic group settles in a community, 
there would be a common identity among people living in that society. This relationship might 
be family, religion or economic ties. Additionally, a group of people can create a common 
identity which depends on a shared trauma or catastrophe. According to Bruneau (2010, p. 
44), diaspora groups preserve the links between two places: the place of memories (place of 
birth) and the place of residence (host country). Kenny (2013) asserts that the concept of 
diaspora has covered not only diaspora groups but refugees, guest workers, ethnic 
communities and exiled communities. According to Kenny (2013), the concept diaspora is 
used by people as a way of explaining daily life and their experience; while for scholars, 
diaspora is more of a category of analysis, as Kenny states. The category of analysis is related 
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to explaining the theoretical concept and relating it to other concepts, while people adopt 
diaspora as a category of practice (Kenny 2013).  
The main features of diaspora groups, according to Safran (1991, p. 220), attract some 
criticism. For instance, Reis (2004) claims that all features of diaspora cannot be applied to 
one group, seeing as a group of people may have two of the five features, or may enjoy the 
main characteristics of diaspora. If each of Safran’s features is individually addressed, there 
are some gaps in his suggestions. Regarding the first feature vis-à-vis dispersion, this is applied 
to people who had to leave their country of origin by force. However, what about those who 
left their country of origin by choice? What about the offspring of immigrants who have never 
been dispersed from any country? Regarding the feature of having a collective memory of 
one’s homeland or even the myth of a homeland, this feature can be shared with not only 
immigrants from the first generation who have left their country of origin, but with the second 
generation who shares the same feature as the first generation. Safran (1991) has not dealt 
with other generations of immigrants and whether or not to include them. The interviews 
conducted with Egyptians concerning this thesis, have shown that, many second generation 
Egyptians share a collective memory of Egypt, even if some had not lived in Egypt or were 
visiting the country as a holiday destination. The feature of how political events in the home 
country could have an influence on diaspora communities and how this could have an impact 
on the sense of belonging to a specific country could be added.  
The characteristic of not being accepted in a host society can be applied to second and 
third generations of immigrants. Occasionally, second and third generations who were born 
in a country which is not their parents’ homeland, are not accepted or do not feel that they 
belong to host country because they are originally from another country. Second and third 
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generations suffer from not belonging to the country in which they were born because of 
their origins. This raises the issue of place of birth and its effects on diasporic groups (Hirji 
2009). Bauböck and Faist (2010, p. 44) also associate the concept of diaspora with the Jewish 
dispersion; yet, today it can be associated with various nations (p. 35). The findings in this 
thesis, however, have revealed that second generation Egyptians do not experience this sense 
of not being accepted in British society, although some Egyptians from the first generation 
might experience such feelings. One of the main findings in this thesis is that many first 
generation Egyptians are fully accepted and happy to live in British society and, 
simultaneously, retain the sense of belonging to Egypt. Furthermore, the combination of 
residing in both Egypt and in the UK has been an advantage for many.  
The other factor Safran discusses is the notion of return. One of the main features of 
diaspora groups is the notion of their return to their homeland when the situation there is 
stable. This feature is designed to be applied to immigrants who have left their countries of 
origin; some second generation immigrants also share this feature with the first generation. 
Safran’s features together with those of Cohen need to be modified and include new features 
regarding other groups of immigrants, which I discuss later in the dissertation. Cohen (1999) 
contends that not all immigrants can be part of diaspora groups, such as second-generation 
immigrants. Nevertheless, through conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK, the 
findings show that second generation Egyptians share many of the features proposed by 
Safran (1991). Diaspora features should therefore be updated to include second and third 
generations as part of the modern diaspora concept.  
Cohen (1999, p. 10) readjusted some of Safran’s features of diaspora to include as many 
groups as possible. For example, regarding Safran’s first feature of diaspora, Cohen added the 
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notion of having a traumatic incident, initiating dispersal from the country of origin to other 
host countries. The sample from this thesis, however, reveals that this feature does not apply 
to Egyptians in the UK. Consequently, this feature needs to be readjusted once again to 
include groups who have not witnessed any traumatic incidents and have not been dispersed 
by force, such as the offspring of immigrants. The second feature to which Cohen has added 
specific elements is the notion that diaspora groups have a collective memory of a territory 
(homeland). However, this should also include a collective identity, as Cohen states, diaspora 
groups also share their identity with diaspora members in other countries who have the same 
background (identity) (p. 7), which Cohen terms ‘deterriotorialized diaspora’. This type of 
diaspora is not associated with a specific territory or homeland but a shared culture, religion 
and language. According to this concept, Egyptians in the UK in the wake of the 2011 uprising, 
could be named members of a ‘deterriotorialized diaspora’, whether they are the first or 
second generation, because they all shared their demands with their fellow Egyptians in a 
show of solidarity. The concept of homeland, according to Brah (1996), is placeless and 
founded in the diaspora imagination.  
Diaspora has been linked to the term ‘deterritorialized identities’ which describes groups 
whose loyalties, hybrid identities and orientations are connected to neither homeland nor 
host countries nor any known territory. The term diaspora applies to groups that are 
connected to their homeland, even though they reside in numerous different host countries, 
as they feel they have a loyalty to their original homeland. Sheffer (2003) argues that sense 
of belonging and loyalty among diasporic groups are based on psychological and emotional 
elements. Jon Armstrong defines diaspora in his book Mobilised and Proletarian Diasporas 
(1976) as, ‘any minority groups which do not belong to any territorial base within states’. 
Armstrong’s definition has been problematic for diaspora scholars. The definition is 
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challenging because other scholars stress the notion that diasporic groups belong to their 
countries of origin. For instance, critics such as Mishra (2006), discuss Sheffer’s new definition 
of diaspora.  
Sheffer’s (1986) new definition of diaspora is: modern diasporas are groups of ethnic 
minority groups residing in host countries and actively involved in these societies but 
retaining their links and ties with their countries of origin or ‘homelands’. Mishra (2006) 
maintains that, the weakness of Armstrong’s definition is the generalisation that diasporic 
groups are not connected to any territory. In addition, Mishra (2006) adds that Sheffer fails 
to include other generations of diaspora in his definition and whether or not the new diaspora 
definition applies. Sheffer (1986) elaborates on the definition of modern diasporas by 
mentioning the causes of migration, voluntary and forced, and gives examples of each type. 
Diaspora groups in any host country remain minority groups, regardless of the length of stay 
in that country (Mishra 2006). One question that needs to be asked, however, is whether this 
definition can be applied to the second and third generation of diasporic groups who were 
born in host countries and consider the host countries as their homeland. I define ‘diaspora’ 
as the ethnic groups dispersed from their countries of origin and residing in host countries in 
addition to second and third generations of immigrants with keeping links with homeland for 
first generation and parents’ homeland for second and third generations.  
Political activities have acted as a tool to express identity and belonging by diaspora 
groups. Martiniello (2005, p. 11), for instance, has dealt with how immigrants are involved in 
unconventional activities such as politics. Della (2013, p. 3) has dealt with unconventional 
political activities and how to create a social movement, in which case, the Arab uprising could 
be a social movement. Martiniello (2005) asserts that immigrants tend to be active in politics, 
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especially in host countries, for the purpose of ‘self-identification’ and to prove themselves 
as citizens of host countries. Conversely, when immigrants are not guaranteed ‘citizenship’ or 
‘naturalisation’ in host countries, they tend to be interested or active in the politics of their 
countries of origin (Labelle and Midy 1999).  
Identity  
In this section, I discuss selected theories of identity including collective and social 
identity. Social identity, for one, is defined by Abrams and Hogg (1990) as the membership of 
individuals to specific social groups (p. 2). Tajfel (1972) contends that social identity would be 
identified by other individuals through acknowledging social identities in shared beliefs, 
norms and values with other members (cited in Abrams and Hogg 1990, p. 2). Abrams and 
Hogg (1990, p. 50) maintain that Social Identity Theory (S.I.T.) is based on comparing 
individuals of the same social groups with each other. Additionally, recognising similarities 
and differences among members of the same social groups also allows self-evaluation (p. 3). 
Consequently, identities are constructed through interaction and comparison of members of 
the same social group. According to Social Identity Theory, individuals tend to be attached to 
more than one identity, such as religious, organisational and national (Ashforth and Mael 
1989, p. 20). Ashford and Mael suggest that individuals tend to psychologically belong to the 
societies of which they are members (p. 4). This could be applied to diasporic groups, as they 
remain part of the societies of which they are members but do not necessarily reside in the 
same places.  
According to Langellier (2010), identities are the stories we tell ourselves, to let us know 
who we are and to let others see ourselves (p. 68). Identity is constructed by daily 
performances controlled by race, religion and culture. Cooley (1964) claims that people tend 
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to construct their identity and know who they are through the opinions of others and adds 
that it is like looking in the mirror and discovering oneself. According to classic sociological 
constructs, such as those of Durkheim (collective conscience), Marx (class conscience) and 
Weber (cited in Cerulo 1997, p. 386), collective identity is concerned with the ‘we-ness’ of a 
group. It is regarding shared norms, beliefs and any other similarities. According to Collective 
Identity Theory, the need for individuals to belong is part of human nature (Baumeister and 
Leary 1995, cited in Brewer and Gardner 1996). The need to belong results in adopting specific 
identities and is how individuals define themselves according to how engaged they are in 
collectives and social groups; thus, developing collective identities. The term ‘we-ness’ could 
be applied to any social group such as diasporic groups, with a shared language, beliefs and 
norms. Adamson (2008) claims that diaspora groups can be linked through common identities 
and attachment to a real or imagined homeland.  
Hall and Gay (1996) discuss the concept of identity and how it is formed. First, identity is 
a concept mentioned by Hall and Gay as operating ‘under erasure’ or that the changing nature 
of the concept of identity relies on the terms ‘emergence’ and ‘reversal’. Therefore, the 
concept of identity is not fixed but changing (p. 4). Emergence means new statuses and 
concepts emerge regarding the concept of identity. Nature is associated with the identity 
concept at the same time, therefore, the reversal of nature is also related to identity 
formation and nature reverses from one type to another. Hall and Gay (1996) use the term 
‘irreducibility’, meaning ‘complicated and impossible to simplify’ in relation to the concept of 
identity (p. 2).  
According to Foucault, the concept of identity is not about finding a theory of knowing 
but finding a theory of ‘discursive practice’ (cited in Hall and Gay 1996), which means forming 
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an identity is an ongoing process. Hall and Gay (1996) believe that identity requires the 
‘reconceptualisation’ of terms and not ‘abandonment’ of subjects and terms. To explain how 
identity is formed, the term ‘identification’ needs to be defined here. According to Hall and 
Gay (1996), the identification of a group involves sharing common origin and characteristics 
by a group of people (p. 2). According to the discursive approach, however, the formation of 
identity including identification, is never completed and always in the process of development 
(Hall and Gay 1996).  
According to the psychoanalytical approach, identification is associated with semantic 
legacy, which Freud calls ‘the expression of an emotional tie with another person’ (Hall and 
Gay 1996, p. 3). Hall and Gay (1996) assert that the formation of identities is associated with 
many terms. For instance, identities are fragmented and non-integrated and are always 
constructed by means of the differences among people and being dissimilar (p. 4). 
Furthermore, identities are always in the process of change and transformation (Hall and Gay 
1996), but, more importantly, identities are about ‘becoming’ and not about ‘being’ (p. 4). 
Hall and Gay explain how forming identities among people is not about ‘who people are’ or 
‘where people came from’ but rather about ‘who people might become’ (p. 4). Hall and Gay 
(1996) define identities as ‘constructed through difference’ (p. 4); people are unified by being 
different in terms of constructing identities. Burr (2015) argues that the way people think in 
any society gives meanings to actions and concepts, and consequently, provides a framework 
of meanings that are derived from original language. Language is not only about determining 
words and meanings, but also sends signals regarding identity (Mead 1934).  
Given the fact that identity is a changing concept, Hall and Gay (1996) present three 
different notions to explain the concept of identity. The first is associated with the ‘real me’ 
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or ‘inner core’, which is the identity associated with birth. The second is a sociological subject 
which is about interaction between self and society. The third is a postmodern subject which 
is about the fragmentation of the conceptualisation of identity, as described by Hall and Gay 
(1996). Identity is a changeable process and ‘a social product’. To prove how identity is 
changeable, the essentialist approach regarding formulating identities focuses on how fixed 
identities are; however, the de-essentialised approach rejects the notion of identities being 
fixed. Moreover, the social constructionist approach tends to focus on how identity is not 
fixed as the essentialist approach argues (Cerulo 1997, p. 387). Additionally, the de-
essentialised approach allows for the construction of multiple identities, unlike the 
essentialised approach, in which case, the de-essentialised approach is adopted for this thesis, 
in order to examine the situation of Egyptians and their Egyptian identity, as well and other 
identities they might adopt, such as British.  
Regarding social constructionism, based on theorists of identity formation, such as 
Goffman, Berger, Becker and many others, identity formation rejects the notion which the 
essentialist approach suggests, that are the essential features of collective members and their 
identities (Cerulo 1997, p. 387). It is worth mentioning that Joshua Meyrowitz (1985, 1989, 
1997) is one of the theorists who discuss the effects of New Communication Technologies 
(NCT) on identities (cited in Cerulo 1997). Meyrowitz tackles the notion of how television has 
empowered the identities of women and disabled people. Furthermore, NCT could therefore 
be applied to the present regarding the identities of diaspora and how social media have 
empowered diasporic groups.  
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Diasporic identity, belonging and identity performance  
Belonging is associated with diaspora in terms of belonging to place of birth and place of 
residence. Stuart Hall (cited in Kalra et al. 2005, p. 29) explains how ‘diaspora’ is about living 
in a place and being attached to another place. Likewise, it can be viewed as a complicated 
term. A diasporic conscience is crucial for diasporic groups in addition to belonging. For 
instance, diasporic groups can sense they are different from their culture and the society in 
which they live. According to Clifford (1994), a diasporic conscience is ‘the product of cultures 
and histories’. Moreover, Hall believes that sensing the difference and not ignoring it can help 
to create real identities in societies, rather than ignoring being different. Factors which can 
bond people together and strengthen belonging to a nation are no longer religion and faith, 
but media, newspapers and television. Benedict Anderson says in his book Imagined 
Communities (1983) that the consumption of media will result in connecting people and 
building bonds between them (p. 31).  
According to Tsagarousianou (2004), home is not only related to the term ‘nostalgia’, 
home is about the processes of inclusion and exclusion experienced by diasporic groups under 
specific circumstances. Home is a fairy-tale place about which diasporic groups dream. This 
can be related to the notion of ‘return’ and how important this feature is to diasporic groups. 
Fazal and Tsagarousianou (2002) argue that home, for diasporic groups, is all about the 
multiple relationships they have with various locations through cultures and beliefs. 
Questions of how people can differentiate between ‘feeling at home’ and the claim that ‘a 
place is like home’ are addressed by Fazal and Tsagarousianou. The notion of ‘lost homeland’ 
is that diaspora groups tend to adapt to the host country whilst keeping the notion of a ‘lost 
homeland’, according to Clifford (1994, p. 16). The notion of a lost homeland is associated 
with the notion of the ‘imagined community’ presented by Benedict (1991, p. 18). Benedict 
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(1991) expresses how diaspora groups are more associated with the concept of an imagined 
community as they experience the loss of their home. Consequently, they tend to create their 
own home by other means, such as the media, organisations and the Internet.  
One characteristic is shared among diaspora groups and it is an ‘illusion of 
impermanence’, as Van Hear (2005) terms it. Diaspora groups who live in a host country 
always feel they are not settled and only temporarily living in a host country, although in the 
case of children of diaspora groups who were born in the host country, they might not have 
the same feeling as they consider the host country to be their homeland (Van Hear 2005, p. 
4). The notion of return to one’s homeland plays a significant part in the illusion of 
impermanence. If diaspora groups keep thinking about the idea of returning to their 
homeland, they will end up feeling unsettled. Organisations which gather diaspora groups in 
host countries, play an important role in diaspora groups’ lives, not only in terms of keeping 
ties with their homeland but also in terms of adapting to a new home or a host country (Hirji 
2004, p. 18). The mission of such organisations is to offer ways to adapt to a new home (host 
country) and, at the same time, to preserve ties with the homeland (country of origin). This is 
the case of diaspora groups who have recently left their country of origin, but, what about 
those who were born in a country in which their parents were not born? 
Goffman and performing identity  
Goffman (1959) addresses the formation of identity and deals with significant aspects of 
construction of identity. There are three main aspects of identity formation. The first is social 
structure of identity, the second aspect is to expect risk and failure in identity formation, the 
third aspect is the role of audience in the process of identity formation and finally, the last 
aspect is the details of face-to-face interaction and identity construction. For Goffman (1959) 
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the construction of identity consists of three main aspects or characters as in a theatre or a 
film. The first character is individuals in any given society acting as performers. The second 
character is audience members in society, whilst the third aspect is outsiders operating in 
social spaces or stages, as Goffman explains. In addition, Goffman (1959) deals with the 
concept of ‘impression management’. Impression management is associated with how 
individuals represent themselves and what impression they give to others about themselves. 
Consequently, impression management is termed management because individuals choose 
and manage what to reveal and what to conceal. Goffman (1959) illustrates that in any 
society, ‘performers’ act accordingly to a set of expectations the audience in any society set 
for performers to perform.  
For Goffman (1959) the main aspect of the influential dramaturgical approach is that any 
society is a stage and individuals of that society act as performers or actors who play various 
roles in life, written for them and according to what suit them. Goffman is influenced by 
Shakespeare’s famous line ‘All the world’s a stage’. Goffman adds that performers tend to 
prepare the performance they would perform to audience. In this sense, performers tend to 
prepare the ‘given’ and ‘given off’. Given off refers to what performers tend to conceal from 
the audience and what they want to show to the audience. Goffman (1959) adds that the 
given information is uncontrolled by individuals unlike given off information which is 
controlled. Goffman (1959) divides the stage of performance into two arenas; specifically, 
frontstage and backstage. Frontstage is where interactions occur and what is shown to others, 
while backstage is what is not revealed to others and where actions are prepared to be shown 
to others, as an idealised image of the self.  
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Goffman’s theory basically focuses on the notion of how individuals interact to form their 
identity in society. This theory is associated with the notion of individuals who form their 
identity according to the environment they are in, which is what impression management is. 
Goffman (1959) came up with the term ‘impression management’ and refers to the 
management of individuals of their activities, appearance and words in their interaction. The 
purpose of this management is to convey a specific image about the self to others. However, 
Mead (1934) constructed the notion of how individuals form their identity according to what 
it is expected from them in society. For that reason, Goffman clarifies and shifts the notion of 
forming identity among individuals from conveying a special message to the audience, so that 
the audience expect a specific performance from performers and consequently, performers 
should meet such expectations, Mead (1934) claims. Moreover, such expectations are set by 
the audience for performers to meet. In other words, Goffman (1959) believes that forming 
an identity would be as a result of what others expect from you, so your identity is constructed 
according to what is expected from you in society.  
According to Goffman (1959), impression management is associated with face-to-face 
interaction and physical presence of others to perform a specific identity. Farquhar (2009) 
questions Goffman’s notion of ‘impression management’ regarding offline and online 
interaction and the absence of physical presence, which is the main aspect of impression 
management according to Goffman. Moreover, Farquhar (2009) investigates how impression 
management could be applied to online interaction giving the fact interaction online does not 
involve a physical presence or face-to-face interaction. Farquhar (2009) agrees with Mead’s 
(1934) notion regarding performing identity according to what reaction the audience creates 
about performers and not what the audience expect from individuals regarding identity 
formation.  
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In this thesis, I explore how Goffman’s theory can be applied to diasporic communities 
and how their identity is being performed. The question is how could diaspora groups perform 
the identity of their homeland when some have not lived or have not been to their parents’ 
home country before? According to Goffman (1959), presentation of self is regarding 
performances. Goffman argues that performance can be taken in two areas. The first area is 
known as ‘private region performances’, where individuals prepare for ‘public region 
performances’ (p. 28). In addition, Goffman (1959) adds that societies set expectations for 
their citizens and that citizens are expected to meet such expectations. Consequently, 
performances are socialised.  
Goffman (1959) calls the process of concealing and revealing aspects of self or identity 
‘mystification’. Furthermore, Goffman (1983) argues that every activity an individual 
undertakes, either face to face or online has its own rules, and that such rules can be governed 
by society’s expectations of its citizens. Sinclair (1997) built on Goffman’s theory by naming 
performance as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’. In the case of the Egyptian diaspora, Egyptians’ 
actions are governed by how they are expected to behave and what identity they should 
adopt. People might fail to meet some of the expectations set by societies. Consequently, 
interaction order, according to Goffman (1983), will be incomplete and people will 
subsequently be criticised. For instance, Egyptians abroad, if they do not meet expectations 
of Egyptian society by being politically active, supporting Egypt financially or by any other 
means, would be called ‘non-Egyptian’.  
Criticism of Goffman  
As mentioned previously, the main notion of Goffman’s theory of self-representation is 
the front and backstage performance. In addition, another aspect of Goffman’s theory of self-
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representation is ‘given’ and ‘given off’ and how to control information given to the audience 
about ourselves. Hugh Miller (1995) criticised the concept of Goffman regarding face-to-face 
interaction and how to apply the concept to what Miller calls the ‘Electronic Self’. Miller 
(1995) argues that Goffman’s concept does not apply to the electronic self’ and how people 
interact online nowadays. However, the Internet can be used by people as a good medium to 
enclose and disclose what they like. As a result, Goffman’s concept regarding representing 
self could be applied online especially for those who do not want to enclose everything online. 
However, regarding Goffman’s face-to-face interaction, proper interaction with others would 
be incomplete. Moreover, Kendon (1988) also tackled the issue of ‘electronic selves’ and how 
to employ Goffman’s concept. To apply ‘electronic selves’ to diaspora groups, it is essential 
nowadays for them to interact online and present themselves electronically. It is part of 
Goffman’s concept of performing identity online, especially among diaspora groups.  
Theoretical framework  
Having discussed the concepts of diaspora, identity, performing identity and 
transnationalism, this section presents how those concepts are linked and applied to the 
Egyptian diaspora in the UK. Initially, reviewing the main concepts of diaspora has enabled a 
better understanding of how to apply the concept ‘diaspora on other groups’. Some of the 
diaspora features proposed by Safran and then amended by Sheffer and Cohen have been 
applied to the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. One of the main features is the notion of return 
to Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising. Moreover, not only have the first generation 
diaspora had this feeling of returning to Egypt, the second generation of Egyptians 
experienced the notion of return after the transformation which Egypt had gone through. 
Furthermore, another feature to be applied to the Egyptian diaspora is their holding 
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memories of Egypt. The Egyptian diaspora, especially the first generation, hold memories of 
their childhood, besides memories of their teenage years and even adulthood. Such 
memories motivate diaspora groups to hold the idea of having a duty to rebuild their 
homeland. For instance, Egyptians after the 2011 uprising felt they had a duty to rebuild Egypt 
after the revolution. It is worth mentioning that both features of return to homeland and 
sense of duty to maintain homeland are interrelated. Moreover, the final feature which is 
preserving links with the homeland, also applies to the case of Egyptians in the UK.  
The unifying factor among Egyptians is the temporary effect of the 2011 uprising on 
different generations despite their place of birth, age and ideology. In contrast, some diaspora 
features proposed by diaspora theorists cannot be applied to the Egyptian diaspora, such as 
dispersion by devastating causes and the sense of not belonging to host countries. However, 
regarding not being accepted in the host country, some of the Egyptian diaspora might 
experience such a feeling despite residing in the UK for a long time. Therefore, most Egyptians 
particularly those belonging to the second generation do not experience such a sense of not 
belonging to the host country, seeing the UK as a host country as well as a homeland for such 
people. The gap in literature has features which can be applied to any group of second 
generation diaspora, which is what I propose (more details in Chapter Nine). Regarding 
identity theories, primarily Goffman and performing identity, performing Egyptian identity 
could be explored here, particularly amongst the second generation, in the wake of the 2011 
uprising. In addition, the term transnationalism could be linked to the theories of identity and 
diaspora. For instance, in the case of Egyptians, the Egyptian diaspora may experience a 
transnational identity due to the fact they are living in a transnational world, residing in one 
host country whilst maintaining a strong relationship to Egypt. Consequently, the terms 
diaspora, identity and transnationalism are correlated. The theoretical framework in the case 
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of the Egyptian diaspora therefore incorporates features from theories of diaspora, identity 
and transnationalism.  
Summary  
The main theories adopted in this research such as identity and diaspora have been 
discussed in this chapter. The main theories of diaspora such as those of Safran, Cohen, 
Clifford and others have been examined regarding their ideas on diasporic communities and, 
a link has been made between diaspora and identity. This chapter has drawn a picture 
regarding identity among diaspora communities and how significant events, such as political 
upheavals or revolutions may affect the sense of identity and belonging among diaspora 
groups. The analysis chapters applies these concepts (of diaspora identity and how it can be 
‘performed’ to a specific diaspora community, namely Egyptians in the UK, in the wake of the 
2011-revolution, which was met with euphoria by Egyptians both inside and outside Egypt. 
Prior to engaging with this analysis, a review of relevant previous studies about Egyptians in 
the West and the UK is presented in the following chapter. I have adopted theories related to 
sociology mainly diaspora, identity, social identity and Goffman’s performing identity for 
many reasons. The first reason is to apply existing theoretical concepts of diaspora on a 
selected group, i.e. Egyptians in the UK. Secondly, social identity theory is instrumental in 
studying groups in their societal environment and to explore their interactions. The other 
aspect of sociology is anchored in Goffman’s concept of performing identity in order to link 
both the diaspora and identity theories. Another way of linking concepts of diaspora and 
identity is through exploring media and political activities. For instance, in the case of 
Egyptians in the UK and the 2011 Egyptian revolution, political activities were a tool to display 
their ‘Egyptianness’ and to prove to fellow Egyptians in Egypt that they still belong to Egypt.  
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Chapter Four: Literature Review  
Introduction  
This chapter discusses some of the studies conducted on diaspora communities in various 
parts of the world, particularly in Egypt, and their role in and methods of, maintaining links 
with their homeland. The aim of this chapter is to give readers an overview of studies 
conducted in the field of diasporic communities and their connection to their country of origin 
and host country. I have divided the chapter into sections concentrated on studies conducted 
on diasporic communities living away from their country of origin. Moreover, the chapter 
deals with studies on the Arab Spring and how diasporic communities have reacted to such a 
historic event in Egyptian history.  
Studies on diaspora communities  
There is a large volume of published studies on diaspora communities residing outside of 
their country of origin. Diasporic groups can contribute to their homeland by spreading news 
of events to broadcast on local TV in the host country (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013, 
p. 2185). The new methods of advanced communication, such as the Internet including social 
media, are a modern way to keep in contact with the homeland. Caroline Nagel (2002) studied 
Arabs in London, including Egyptians, Iraqis and Moroccans. She has dealt with the problem 
of being ‘Arab’, particularly in London (Nagel 2001, p. 381). Nagel discusses the concept of 
‘race’ and how ‘Arabness’ in London is considered neither a separate race, nor as part of the 
‘white’ race (p. 389). Nagel states that being different or labelled ‘white’ is as problematic as 
being labelled ‘black’ (p. 385). For example, being labelled as an Arab is problematic in the 
case of Arabs in London, because, according to Nagel, they are considered as ‘Other’. Many 
interviewees who participated in Nagel’s study were struggling to define themselves as 
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‘British’, or ‘Arab’ or ‘British-Arab’, and whether they fitted into British society. One of the 
interviewees in Nagel’s study explains how having a British passport does not mean that you 
are ‘English’ (Nagel 2002, p. 269) – a British passport only means security and legal permission 
to stay in the UK.  
A study conducted by Işık Kuşcu (2012) examined the role of the Egyptian-American 
diaspora in their homeland affairs. Kuşcu claims that members of the Egyptian-American 
diaspora group are connected to their homeland by following events there (p. 121). The 2011 
Egyptian revolution has, moreover, been a turning point in terms of Egyptians abroad – they 
are more involved now in Egyptian affairs than in Mubarak’s era (p. 121).  
This study seeks to look at the role played by the Egyptian-American diaspora group 
during the 2011 revolution and the aftermath, and how this group can influence both the 
homeland’s and host country’s politics. Diaspora groups, in general, used to be disconnected 
from events in their homelands. It used to be difficult to stay connected due to expensive 
flights, there was no social media, the lack of new communications to call family and friends 
at home, such as WhatsApp and other phone applications. However, nowadays, thanks to 
new technology, communication and transport, diaspora groups are now more easily able to 
stay in contact with their homelands (p. 122).  
The question that needs to be asked and answered, however, is why would diaspora 
groups want to be connected to their homeland while living abroad? Safran (1991) defines 
homeland as ‘occupying a central position as a major component of diasporic identity’ (cited 
in Kuşcu 2012, p. 123). The relationship between diasporic groups and their homeland is 
strong as a result, especially concerning diasporic identity. Diasporic identity depends on the 
notion of homeland. The characteristics which make diasporic groups unique are the notion 
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of returning to their homeland when it is safe to do so, and the connection to the history of 
the homeland by way of being connected to its roots. These characteristics, as Kuşcu 
expresses, keep the identity of diasporic groups alive (p. 123).  
Diasporic communities can play an essential role regarding their homeland affairs. One of 
several studies conducted on diasporic communities focuses on diasporic communities in 
Germany, specifically, the Egyptian community. The study concentrates on the contributions 
of diasporic groups to their country of origin, such as the transfer of economic, social and 
health information from the country of residence to the country of origin. Furthermore, it 
also investigates the impact these have on the societies in both countries. Egyptians, Serbians 
and Afghans are among the diasporic communities that have been studied in Germany 
(Baraulina et al. 2007, p. vi). Baraulina et al. (2007) believe that Egyptians in Germany are 
highly-educated and well-integrated into German society.  
There have been many scholarly studies conducted on Egyptian diasporic groups 
worldwide. Zohry and Debnath (2010), for instance, studied the Egyptian diaspora in three 
countries: specifically, Kuwait, the United States and the United Kingdom. Zohry and Debnath 
highlight the issue of not allowing the Egyptian diaspora to vote, as Egyptian citizens, in 
Egyptian elections, and how this would affect their political participation. One major 
drawback of this study is  that it was conducted in 2010, and the laws have been changed in 
respect of political participation of diasporic groups, especially after the Arab Spring. Zohry 
and Debnath (2010) also assert that diaspora groups have the right to contribute to their 
countries of origin. This contribution could be possible in three ways: (i) financial capital – by 
sending money or remittances to the country of origin; (ii) human capital – by transferring 
knowledge and skills; and finally (iii) social capital – by exchanging ideas and beliefs.  
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Zohry and Debnath’s study (2010) has revealed that the United Kingdom hosts almost four 
per cent of Egyptian migrants (p. 19). Another study (in Arabic) was conducted on the Egyptian 
diaspora in the Gulf by M. Morsi (2000) (cited in Zohry and Debnath’s 2010 article). The 
research conducted by Zohry and Debnath (2010) fills the gap in studies on the Egyptian 
diaspora in Western countries, primarily Germany, and Morsi’s study on Egyptians in the Gulf. 
Then, this thesis attempts to fill the literature gap concerning Egyptians in the UK, especially 
regarding the 2011 Egyptian uprising and its effects on members of the Egyptian diaspora in 
the UK, in terms of political participation, belonging and their role in the media.  
Karmi (1997) studied Egyptians in Britain and integration into British society. The main 
points raised by Karmi (1997) are how Egyptians in the UK are strongly attached to Egypt. The 
strong attachment is represented by regular visits to Egypt by those respondents who 
participated in the study. However, many of Karmi’s respondents do not wish to return to 
Egypt to settle down. This demonstrates that strong attachment to Egypt is symbolic and not 
related to settlement. Moreover, Karmi stressed the notion of ‘myth of return’ and how it is 
a shared notion among Arab communities, including Egyptians in Britain.  
Fawzy (2012) conducted a study on Egyptians in Britain 15 years after Karmi’s research. 
Fawzy studied Egyptians in Britain, where the focus is on Egyptians in Britain and the 
immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Fawzy shares the same group as Karmi but with a 
different focus. The main points discussed in Fawzy’s study are how Egyptians in the UK are 
attached to Egypt; the symbol of strong connection with Egypt is regular visits to Egypt, as 
Karmi showed. The other symbol is the sending of money to Egypt by Egyptians residing 
abroad, predominantly the UK. The interesting finding Fawzy came up with is the emergence 
of the notion of rebuilding Egypt after the 2011 uprising. The 2011 uprising has enforced the 
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notion of a return to Egypt to contribute to its rebuilding. In this sense, Fawzy (2012) has 
shown in his study how the opinion of many Egyptians changed after the uprising and the 
notion of return restored, in contrast to what Karmi (1997) claimed in her study. This shows 
the effectiveness events like the uprising had on Egyptians abroad. Although they conducted 
their research 15 years apart, Karmi and Fawzy are unified in the notion of studying the same 
group of migrants (Egyptians) and the same country (the UK). However, things have changed, 
such as the opinions of Egyptians regarding the notion of return.  
Fawzy states that Egyptian identity is undeveloped, unlike other Arab groups of migrants 
in the UK, such as the Moroccans. Fawzy (2012) adds that Egyptians in the UK are integrated 
into British society more than other Arab groups. The weakness related to Fawzy’s argument 
about Egyptians being integrated into British society is that the interviewees in his study 
cannot be generalised to all Egyptians in the UK.  
The notion of return is common among many Arab groups in the UK. This notion, however, 
is not common among Egyptians in the UK. Fawzy states that one interviewee believed his 
being abroad would benefit Egypt more than going back to his home country. Egyptians 
cannot return to Egypt and build their lives from scratch there because of the critical political 
and economic situation. Moreover, Egyptians have succeeded in looking for alternatives to 
help Egypt. The alternative is to send money to Egypt to rebuild the country and contribute 
towards supporting a ‘new Egypt’. The 25th of January revolution, moreover, has led 
Egyptians to believe that Egypt is making progress and heading in the right direction. Almost 
all the respondents Fawzy interviewed agreed that Egypt was progressing towards being a 
developed country, although progress was slow.  
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Fawzy adds that Egyptians abroad are more attached nowadays to Egypt, thanks to the 
revolution. Fawzy finally tackles the issue of difference between first and second generation 
Egyptians living in the UK. The first generation of Egyptians refers to those who were born in 
Egypt and currently reside in the UK and can be from different age groups; moreover, the age 
varies regarding when Egyptians left Egypt and settled in the UK (Rumbaut 2004, p 1166). The 
majority of second generation Egyptians were born in the UK and those who came to reside 
in the UK at an early age are included in the second generation group. He states, for instance, 
that both first and second generation Egyptians do not wish to permanently return to Egypt. 
Although they regularly visit the country; settling down in Egypt is uncommon. The second 
generation do not wish to live in Egypt because some of them were born in the UK and prefer 
to continue living there. The fact that they were born and raised in the UK and were becoming 
used to the British way of life compared to the critical economic and political situation in 
Egypt, was a good reason for second generation Egyptians not to consider settling down in 
Egypt. The different lifestyles, the uncertain and even risky situation in Egypt, are a few of the 
factors which prevented second generation Egyptians from permanently returning to Egypt.  
Belonging and identity among diasporic groups  
The term citizenship is complicated especially among immigrants. Those who reside away 
from their countries of origin tend to adopt multiple identities and citizenships. Immigrants 
tend to adapt to the new culture of host countries, and, simultaneously, maintain links with 
their country of origin (Staeheli 2003, p. 98). Labelle and Midy (1999, p. 214) dealt with the 
definition of citizenship and the differences between citizenship and nationality. Citizenship 
is the formal status of individuals who have a set of rights when awarded citizenship, whereas 
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citizens of a specific country enjoy rights and obligations and are protected by that country as 
a member of its society.  
According to Labelle and Midy (1999, p. 215), dual citizenship is not recommended in 
some countries such as the US and Canada. The sense of belonging to countries of residence 
has weakened among some immigrants due to dual citizenship being discouraged. In 
Germany for instance, to be naturalised as a German citizen, immigrants should abandon their 
first citizenship. This has resulted in some of them becoming involved more in the politics of 
their countries of origin to show their identity and belonging. Nagel and Staeheli (2004, p. 
216) study the terms citizenship, state, nation and belonging among Arab migrants in the US. 
The findings extracted from interviews with Arab-Americans in the US have shown that the 
relationship between homeland and host country is correlated. This has not merely affected 
the level of integration in host countries but has also affected the level of Arab-Americans’ 
activities in the politics of their home country.  
According to Labelle and Midy (1999), integration in the host country’s politics not only 
affects immigrants’ standard of living in host countries but it also affects their country of 
origin’s development. For instance, Labelle and Midy (1999) argue that, according to their 
study conducted on the Haitian diaspora in North America, some immigrants seek not only to 
change foreign policies in their host countries but are also part of political organisations in 
their home country, to have a voice in both countries. According to Zapata-Barrero et al. 
(2014), there are mechanisms to follow to keep immigrants involved in the politics of their 
countries of origin. The first mechanism is termed ‘diaspora-building’. Diaspora-building 
primarily focuses on recognising existing diaspora communities and identifying the new ones, 
worldwide. The second mechanism is known as ‘diaspora integration’. Diaspora integration is 
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interested in extending the rights and obligations of diaspora communities and focuses on 
the construction of a legitimate transnational power.  
It should be stated that International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA)3 (2007) was the first to propose the right of immigrants to vote in the elections of their 
country of origin. The right of immigrants to vote in these elections can strengthen the 
relationship of immigrants to their homeland, by allowing their right to vote, even if they 
reside outside of the country (cited in Zapata-Barrero et al. 2014). Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014) 
argue that the notion of double loyalties comes from the idea of having two nationalities and 
practising voting and other political activities in multiple countries. There are some European 
countries, such as Germany, which do not support multiple citizenships. This started to 
change in many European countries, when certain scholars came up with the notion of the 
‘zero-sum game’.  
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the Egyptian diaspora in 
the United States. One of these studies was conducted by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 
which shows that the United States is not the number one destination for Egyptians (MPI 
2014). In fact, the United States is the fifth destination for Egyptian migrants, while the Gulf 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are the first ones. According to the MPI study, the 
number of Egyptians in the United States is estimated to be 240,000. There are first, second 
and third generation Egyptians in the US – approximately 175,000 first generation and 
100,000 second generation. The sort of Egyptians who migrate to the US are more likely to 
be educated, and those who were born there, study for their bachelor’s and higher degrees. 
                                                          
3 IDEA is an intergovernmental organisation located in Stockholm, Sweden, that has many offices across 
Europe, Africa and Asia. It supports the democratic process in institutions around the world. 
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It is worth noting that the US received many more Egyptians, especially after the 2011 
revolution (MPI 2014). The Arab Spring encouraged migration, especially those who had 
witnessed the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The number of Egyptian migrants rose between 
2010 and 2012 (MPI 2014), which means that although Egypt is losing skilled citizens because 
of migration to foreign countries, it also benefits economically because of migrants sending 
money back home.  
The role of the diaspora is essential in respect of shaping public perceptions of Egypt. 
The Egyptian diaspora could help to change the opinions held in foreign countries regarding 
Egypt and its politics. There are new organisations in the US that not only defend human rights 
in Egypt, but, after the 2011 uprising, they also defend prisoners’ rights in the country (MPI 
2014). Conversely, during President Mubarak’s era, organisations in the US concentrated on 
cultural activities which did not involve political activities. Things dramatically changed after 
2011, seeing as Egyptians inside and outside of Egypt felt a sense of liberation.  
‘Zero-sum’ is the correlation between how involved immigrants are in their homeland’s 
politics against the host country’s politics. The argument in favour of zero-sum is that the 
more immigrants are involved in their homeland’s politics, the less they would be interested 
and become integrated in the host country’s political activities (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2014). 
In contrast, according to Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014), other scholars disagree with the 
concept of ‘zero-sum’ and believe immigrants being involved in the politics of both country 
of origin and host country would strengthen links between immigrants and their homeland 
and host country. Destination countries endeavour to support the groups disagreeing with 
their host country’s policies in some cases, and, at the same time, support the disagreement 
of some groups of immigrants with their homeland’s governments. In this sense, a political 
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confrontation will be created because of multiple loyalties. It is worth mentioning that social 
media websites have been employed by people and diasporic groups to stay connected to 
their homeland, as was the case among Egyptians during the 2011 uprising. The subsequent 
section explains more about the studies dealing with the role of social media and the 2011 
Egyptian revolution.  
Studies about the role of social media in the 2011-uprising  
After reviewing studies conducted on Egyptians abroad including the UK, this section deals 
with the role of social media (an important contributor to the Egyptian revolution) with 
respect to the Egyptian society. This section introduces readers to factors contributing to the 
Egyptian uprising. The introduction of social media in Egypt approximately six years ago was 
a turning point in the lives of Egyptians, as they started to use blogs to express their opinions 
(Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 363). Tufekci adds that although authoritarian regimes, such as 
that of Mubarak’s were strict in limiting political activities in Egypt, social media websites thus 
gave freedom of expression to Egyptians. The Egyptian government had started to lose 
control of political activists by way of social media. In addition, social media was just one part 
of new political communication. As Howard (2011) states, most studies conducted on the 
MENA, Middle East and North African countries, as well as the Arab Spring, focus on the 
effects of social media on the uprisings. Barrie Axford (2011), for instance, tackles this 
phenomenon in his article ‘Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and The MENA Uprisings’ 
and the effects of social media in these uprisings (p. 681).  
The new political communication system consists of three main components (Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012, p. 365). The first is satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, which have introduced 
Arabs to a new information platform. The second component is the penetration of the 
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Internet into the Arab world. The Internet has allowed Arabs to freely express their opinions 
and receive news from various sources. The third component is the introduction of mobile 
phones, with pictures and video specifications (p. 365). Taking pictures and recording videos 
by means of mobile phones is considered a turning point among Arabs. Arabs could record 
events such as the uprisings in the region and publish on social media to spread the word 
about some events not broadcast on mainstream media. As a result, people have taken 
control of what to broadcast, thanks to modern technology.  
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the role of social media, during 
the Arab uprisings in different Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia. One of these articles 
is written by Axford (2011, p. 681), who tackles the role of social media across the Middle 
East, particularly focusing on the MENA area. Axford examines the role of the mainstream 
media and discusses the number of Internet users in the Arab world. A developing country 
can have many Internet users; however, it can only be a number in terms of outcomes and 
impact – ‘the voice of guns and bombs wins the revolution’ according to Axford (2011). This 
is arguably true, but what Axford fails to acknowledge is the reasons behind the large number 
of Internet users who have no real impact in developing countries. Axford contradicts himself 
here, in terms of arguing that an essential role was played by social media in the Arab Spring, 
but, at the same time, Arab countries only have a limited number of Internet users although 
the real impact would take a long time to be realised. This is a weakness in Axford’s argument. 
He could have explained that the Internet’s impact can be effective over the short term, 
though in the long term, developing countries need time to adopt a real democratic model.  
The Internet in the MENA region is considered to have been influential in dispersing news 
and events that were not covered by main media outlets. The governments in Tunisia and 
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Egypt shut down the Internet connection during the uprisings in 2010 and 2011 in order to 
stop people from using it and spreading the word among other citizens. This action was 
unsuccessful, however, as people found other ways to use social media. Besides, this action 
was too late as people were already protesting in the streets and receiving global support. 
New technology, such as cell phones, had become one of the most effective weapons to use 
in uprisings, especially in the MENA region. Tunisian protestors were holding a stone in one 
hand and a cell phone in another. Consequently, cell phones could be used to let others know 
what was going on worldwide. One of the problems is that, in order for cell phones to be 
effective, Internet connection is required to be in contact with the world; without an Internet 
connection, cell phones and social media would be practically useless. Governments in the 
MENA region such as those in Egypt and Tunisia, realised this, and shut down the Internet 
connection in the hope it would stop people from protesting, and moreover, to quell the 
uprisings.  
Waters and Lo (2012, p. 297) examine how social media, primarily Facebook, is used by 
non-profit organisations to promote themselves in Turkey, China and the United States. The 
main findings in this study, are the following: social media, including Facebook, Twitter and 
blogs have changed the way the public uses the Internet. Waters and Lo claim that social 
media creates a new virtual culture which challenges current traditions and cultural habits in 
any society. Waters and Lo’s study (2012) examines how non-profit organisations use social 
media to promote themselves (p. 298). These organisations use Facebook’s wall facility, as a 
platform to advertise their products, services and to request donations. They also use 
Facebook’s wall facility to have open discussions with members and to share information 
about specific topics. The ‘status’ facility on Facebook is also used to publicise goods and 
services.  
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This is almost the same way in which the participants in the Arab Spring used social media, 
predominantly Facebook, as a platform to share ideas, to give instructions to protesters and 
to gather them together, and to organise protests. Social media was used by both local people 
and those living abroad to stay connected and updated. This is in alignment with Water and 
Lo’s (2012) idea of social media being revolutionary in terms of how the Internet was used 
and how social media created a new cultural platform. Social media is not only used for 
publicising goods and services, but as a source of information for some audiences (p. 299). 
Facebook and Twitter were used for information, as people had lost faith in the mainstream 
media during the Arab uprisings.  
The term ‘dialogic communication’ was developed by Kent and Taylor (1998). This 
principle or term concentrates on five dimensions. The first dimension is two-way 
communication or ease of navigation, as stated by Waters and Lo (2012). Social media is 
basically based on two-way communication regarding members interacting with each other 
and also the administrators (‘admins’) of Facebook pages communicate with members, 
worldwide. Members from different countries can also interact with each other via posts, 
videos and links on Facebook or Twitter. Audiences can express their opinions and share ideas 
with others and receive rapid feedback and responses from admins and members thus, 
‘dialogic communication’. The second dimension is providing valuable information which can 
be easily distributed using social media by posting instructions and sharing experiences. 
Protestors in the Arab revolutions, such as the one in Egypt, were giving instructions to each 
other on where to meet, and warning others not to go to specific locations which might be 
dangerous. Protestors could view official pages of the army and police and were thus able to 
pass on instructions and information regarding which streets were safe by way of social 
media.  
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It is agreed that social media is a platform for engagement, although real audience 
engagement is far from being achieved via social media. This is a criticism of dialogic 
communication on which social media is based (Kent and Taylor 1998); however, there is also 
a cultural aspect to communication. According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), culture can 
have over 160 definitions. Researchers and scholars do not have a united definition of culture 
as it is rather complex. Culture, as Philips and Sackmann (2003 p.10) define it, is ‘a coherent 
and enduring set of values that members of the nation-state carry and act upon’. Defining 
culture is essential in terms of examining the creation of new virtual culture via social media. 
Culture can also be defined as a set of habits and behaviours learned and passed on to other 
members of a group through daily interaction, which shows how dynamic culture is. If culture 
is dynamic, it can be changed and modified and a new one can even be created from scratch, 
as social media is creating a new culture (of communication).  
Waters and Lo (2012, p. 290) observe the use of social media by non-profit organisations 
in high-context and low-context cultures. The findings have shown that in high-context 
cultures, people tend to communicate more virtually, or, as Waters and Lo describe it, 
‘implicitly or indirectly’. In contrast, in low-context cultures, they tend to communicate 
directly and explicitly. Social media have helped high-context nations to communicate 
implicitly. Waters and Lo, however, failed to fully address the definition of high-context and 
low-context cultures, in the first instance. Giving these definitions would have been beneficial 
in terms of having a clear picture of how using social media might differ in these cultures. 
Nonetheless, it is true that Waters and Lo (2012) have acknowledged that further research is 
required into different cultures to arrive at some conclusions.  
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Individualism and collectivism are different in the three countries studied by Waters and 
Lo (2012). For instance, in the United States, the level of individualism is high, unlike China 
and Turkey where the level of collectivism is high. These levels of individualism and 
collectivism will affect the level of engagement and use of social media in such cultures. The 
use of social media, primarily Facebook, in individualistic cultures such as the US, reveals that 
the level of interaction is high, unlike China and Turkey, where face-to-face interaction is more 
common. Consequently, the study has proven that in countries with high levels of 
individualism, levels of virtual engagement are also high. The study by Waters and Lo (2012) 
has illustrated that social media and technology can create new cultures, particularly in the 
case of the three countries examined, but this cannot be a generalisation, as explained above. 
Waters and Lo (2012) argue that social media and technology can facilitate cultural change – 
proven in the case of the Arab Spring, in which the Internet, mainly social media, helped to 
organise protestors and facilitate protests in various countries such as Egypt, Syria and 
Tunisia.  
Agichtein et al. (2008, p. 184) dealt with the issue of social media being the platform for 
audiences’ inquiries. Social media, specifically Facebook and Myspace, have recently become 
‘user-generated content’, according to their article. The process of user-generated content is 
by members asking questions and receiving answers from other members. Waters and Lo 
(2012) tackled the issue of how dynamic and interactive cultures can be; consequently, social 
media can act like separate cultures, by creating interaction and communications or ‘user-
generated content’ (Agichtein et al. 2008, p. 185). Members of social media platforms such 
as Facebook, use them as a source of information by interacting with others – the unique 
feature of social media is the communication and interaction facility. People who are 
concerned about a specific topic, for instance, can receive immediate responses by way of 
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social media, rather than using search engines and receiving automated responses. However, 
as social media responses are based on personal opinions, these can be misleading and even 
problematic as they are regularly subjective and even biased. Agichtein et al. (2008, p. 186) 
believe using social media with regard to questions and answers, on the other hand, is more 
accurate than traditional content. 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the role of social media in the Arab 
uprisings. One of these studies was conducted by Rane and Salem (2012). The Arab 
revolutions, according to their research, have been termed ‘Facebook or Twitter revolutions’. 
The role that social media played in the Arab uprisings is undeniable. Nevertheless, Rane and 
Salem (2012) argue that the failure or success of such uprisings depends on domestic factors, 
and not necessarily social media, contrary to what others believe. They also state that social 
media was not responsible for the success of revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – it was 
the tool used to facilitate intra-inter group communications among protesters (Rane and 
Salem 2012, p. 99). 
Rane and Salem (2012) also highlight the role of mainstream media in the uprisings and 
not merely social media. Mainstream media was responsible for conveying the message that 
the uprisings were peaceful and pro-democracy and were freedom movements. This resulted 
in gaining support, not only from Western governments but from the entire world, as their 
demands were also legitimate. According to the Guardian journalist, Peter Beaumont (2011), 
social media protesters across the MENA region could transmit messages to the public which 
could never have been broadcast on mainstream media, whether it was Western or Arab. 
Rane and Salem (2012) claim that the main source of information is still the mainstream 
media. In the case of the Egyptian revolution, people were dependent on Egyptian state TV 
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for information regarding the revolution’s progress, although social media, at the time of the 
Egyptian revolution in 2011, was dominant (p. 97). The statistics in a study conducted by the 
Abu Dhabi Gallup Centre (2011) show that eighty-one per cent of Egyptians relied on the 
Egyptian state channel, sixty-three per cent depended on Al-Jazeera, whereas only eight per 
cent of Egyptians relied on social media. This study confirms the assumptions made by Rane 
and Salem (2012). However, the study can be challenged on the basis that it is concerned with 
2011; therefore, the statistics would have probably changed after the Arab Spring, especially 
in the MENA region. After the Arab Spring, the number of social media users dramatically 
changed. Consequently, the study conducted by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Centre (2011) is 
challenged. Moreover, the percentage could be different nowadays due to the dramatic 
change after the Arab Spring.  
It should be pointed out that the mainstream media has been under the control of various 
governments in the MENA region; consequently, content in the mainstream media has been 
in favour of the State. Al-Jazeera, a channel privately-owned by Qatari businessmen, was even 
deliberating whether to broadcast news which contradicted the agenda of other governments 
in the Arab world. Therefore, the media, especially the State media, was the first challenge 
which protesters revolted against in the MENA region in 2011. Rane and Salem (2012) add 
that, with the emergence of social media, governments in the MENA region began to 
understand that citizens were out of (their) control. Social media had therefore been 
revolutionary, especially for protesters in the MENA region, where the number of Internet 
users rapidly increased and where it was expected to reach 100 million users in 2015 
(Ghannam 2011, p. 30).  
 
 
75 
Rane and Salem (2012) suggest that social media in the Arab uprisings have not been the 
main reasons for people to revolt, although social media played a vital part in mobilising the 
uprisings. It is true that the number of Internet users in the MENA region has increased by 
seventy-eight per cent, but in some Arab countries, the percentage of Facebook users is still 
low – in Egypt, for example, it is only twenty-two per cent. It is evident from the above, that 
social media was not the main cause of the Arab revolutions – it was merely a facilitator. 
Additionally, Rane et al. (2012, p. 99) assert that some countries with a low percentage of 
Facebook users witnessed uprisings. The example of that is Tunisia with only 8 per cent of 
Tunisians using social media. This shows that high percentages of social media are not the 
best indicator that a country would go through a revolution like that in Tunisia.  
It has been suggested by Ghannam (2011, p. 36) that the percentage of Facebook users in 
the MENA region is rising, due to what he calls ‘the youthful generation’. Young people make 
up almost seventy-five per cent of Facebook users (Ghannam 2011, p. 36). It is worth 
mentioning that young people in the MENA region constitute one third of the population 
(Ghannam 2011, p. 36). Most of the MENA region’s population can therefore be considered 
to be the transmitters of the Arab uprisings, as Rane and Salem (2012) suggest. According to 
the UN, most of the population in the MENA region is under 25 years old (cited in Rane and 
Salem 2012). In Egypt, for instance, young people constitute fifty-two per cent of the entire 
population, making the youth the dominant population group in the MENA region, as Rane 
and Salem (2012) suggest. This has led to young people demanding democracy, freedom and 
dignity, by revolting against authoritarian regimes. 
Rane and Salem (2012, p. 99) raise two questions: why the revolutions started in 2010 and 
not before, and why in certain countries and not others? The answers, according to them, 
 
 
76 
concern social media. Egypt and Tunisia are pro-West, for example, which led to the United 
States supporting the uprisings in those two countries. Tufekci and Wilson (2012, p. 369) claim 
that activists have not only met online, but also in reality. This raises the issue of ‘virtual’ and 
‘real’ communities – virtual communities can sometimes dominate without meeting each 
other. This has created many virtual communities, especially for protesters in the Arab 
uprisings, wherein they could exchange ideas and give instructions on a ‘virtual’ platform. It 
is more likely, however, in the case of activists in the Arab uprisings, that community members 
had already met in person, and gained each other’s trust, before they started organising 
themselves and gathering protesters, both personally and virtually. Activists would have met 
in venues like conferences, or Arab ‘techies’ (computer technologists) collectives in Cairo and 
so on (Tufekci and Wilson 2012). According to Tufekci and Wilson, these networks were not 
just for meeting local activists, but also assisted other activists to meet each other around the 
world, and to build a rapport (p. 370).  
The media – particularly social media (Facebook, for example) – was the main 
communication medium for protesters in Egypt and Tunisia during the uprising. Furthermore, 
although face-to-face communication played an additional major role in disseminating 
information, the print media and satellite channels played a lesser part regarding the uprising 
in Tahrir Square in Egypt (Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 362). It is interesting to note that the 
attendance of women in the uprisings was significant. These women were educated, and 
some came from better economic backgrounds than the males and joined in the protests to 
show solidarity with their male counterparts. Social media was, moreover, also liberating 
women regarding using Facebook: Facebook gave them a chance to express themselves 
‘virtually’ and a voice when they attended meetings. The female interviewees also stated that 
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it was difficult for them to have an opinion, but the protests allowed them to show their 
support (Tufekci and Wilson 2012).  
Participatory journalism or citizen journalism and the Arab Spring  
Participatory journalism has been common in England since the eighteenth century. 
Newspapers used to let audiences engage in the news they reported by publishing the 
comments made by readers in each edition (Singer et al. 2011). The advance of modern 
technology has changed the techniques employed in participatory journalism, especially 
regarding social media sites. According to Goode (2009), citizen journalism can include re-
posting, linking and tagging.  
Tufekci and Wilson (2012) tackled the issue regarding the notion of ‘citizen journalists’ 
mentioned by Rane and Salem (2012). Tufekci and Wilson stressed the point that Al-Jazeera, 
for instance, used ordinary citizens as ‘citizen journalists’ in order to record the most 
important incidents in various areas of Egypt and Tunisia. Citizen journalists are significant in 
terms of recording news which ordinary journalists cannot reach and reporting to the 
channel. Reporters can be present in major cities, for instance, but the locals would be more 
involved in incidents happening in their small towns or villages, which they could 
subsequently report by using social media. As a result, the notion of ‘citizen journalists’ is 
essential with regard to uprisings and revolutions, as small details provided by journalists 
cannot always be ‘spot on’.  
Tufekci and Wilson (2012) conducted a study on Egyptians who participated in the Tahrir 
Square protest in 2011, and on those who had not previously participated in any protests (p. 
371). The interviews revealed that several of the respondents in the study had participated in 
activities with social movements and political organisations, but not in protests such as those 
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in 2011. This shows that people had become more aware of the notion of protesting for 
change and how a ‘protesting culture had emerged’.  
Studies on the Arab Spring  
Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) conducted a study on the activities of the Syrian 
diaspora, and its role as Syrians in the uprising. The study focuses on how the Syrian diaspora 
was the bridge between activists inside and outside the country. The term ‘citizen journalists’ 
emerged then, as citizens, acting like journalists, informed the world of what was happening 
in Syria. This term was later used in Egypt with the help of social media, when ordinary people 
were able to report incidents which actual journalists could not reach (Andén-Papadopoulos 
and Pantti 2013).  
The authors also argue that diaspora groups are inclined to interfere with their country of 
origin’s political activities; with the rise of globalisation, diasporic groups are more involved 
in politics and engagement with conflicts than they previously were. The Syrian uprising, as 
with other Arab uprisings, had what is called ‘distributed leadership’. Distributed leadership 
was present in most Arab revolutions, primarily Tunisia and Egypt, due to the public’s 
contribution to the uprising by way of publishing videos and news via social media (Andén-
Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013). This demonstrates the idea of citizen journalists raised by 
Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) and how they played an essential leading role in the 
success of the revolution. Syrian activities, especially in the diaspora, raised awareness of the 
role that the Syrian diaspora can play using social media.  
Regarding the importance of diasporic groups pertaining to revolutions, particularly in the 
case of the Syrian uprising, Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) claim that, not only have 
Syrian families in the United Kingdom and United States been threatened by Syrian 
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authorities, but also that their families back home in Syria have been intimidated. The Syrian 
authorities have introduced these measures to stop Syrian activists in the country and abroad 
from reporting any abuses of human rights; and those who did so faced torture and even 
death.  
The role of diasporic groups became more powerful when the Syrian regime restricted 
communication between Syrian activists inside Syria. Syrian activists in the diaspora therefore 
adopted a strategy to raise the issues that internal activists could not publish. New media has 
made activists in the diaspora more powerful and helped to make their mission less difficult. 
The term ‘members of both worlds’ is coined by Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) and 
refers to ‘host country’ and ‘homeland’. It has been used in order to demonstrate the vital 
role that diasporas play with regard to repressed nations such as Syria, and their uprising 
against President Assad’s regime.  
The strategy of Syrian activists in the diaspora is as follows: (i) report the sufferings of 
Syrians inside Syria to the whole world; (ii) share the hatred of the Syrian regime with Syrians 
inside Syria: (iii) tell the host country they are aware of their homeland’s situation; and finally 
(iv) show their solidarity with Syrians inside Syria and what the Syrian regime is doing to them 
(Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013). One of the interviewees in the study by Andén-
Papadopoulos and Pantti states that even if some people are not considered journalists but 
act as journalists or ‘citizen journalists’, they have a duty to report the truth to the whole 
world. Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) have written about social media in the Egyptian revolution 
and called the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria ‘web-fuelled social movements’ or 
cyber-activism. Additionally, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) argue that social media has given 
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the chance to some groups which are under-represented in developing countries, such as 
HIV/AIDS sufferers and Muslim feminists to raise their voice.  
Summary  
The Egyptian diaspora, the main scope of this thesis, has been thoroughly discussed. 
Studies on diaspora communities principally Egyptians in the UK have been dealt with. The 
other topic discussed is the Arab Spring, primarily the 2010 Tunisian uprising and how the 
Egyptian uprising was affected by it. This is followed by the Egyptian revolution and its causes 
and effects on Egypt, to show the importance of such a historic moment in Egyptian history. 
Given the fact that the Egyptian uprising has been termed the ‘social media revolution’, the 
role of social media has been dealt with.  
It is crucial to mention studies on diaspora communities to have an idea of such 
communities and compare them with the targeted group. The chapter also dealt with studies 
that dealt with the role of the media in the Arab Spring to apply to a targeted group and how 
the media have played a role in Arab uprisings. However, there is a gap in the literature 
concerning the effects of the 2011 uprising on Egyptians in the UK in regard to belonging, 
identity, political participation and the role of the media; hence, the present study focuses 
principally on these issues.   
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Chapter Five: Methodology  
Introduction  
A presentation of methods adopted in this research is given in this chapter. The first 
section of the chapter concerns the main methods that are used in this thesis, such as 
interviews and ethnographic work. The second section focuses on the reasons for choosing 
these two methods. The following section discusses the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and why the qualitative approach has been selected as the main 
method for this research. The ensuing section focuses on the interviews and how they were 
conducted with 22 Egyptians in the UK. The section regarding interviews is divided into sub-
sections comprising participants, recruitment, access, ethical consideration, transcription, 
translation and analysis; in addition, the concept of saturation in qualitative research is 
presented as justification for conducting a specific number of interviews. The concluding 
section in this chapter discusses the role of participant observation as part of ethnography 
and is the second method used in this thesis. It should be stated that ethnographic research 
involves participating in and observing events or procedures. The participant observation for 
this research project involved attending and engaging in protests and marches organised by 
the Egyptian community in the UK. A summary concludes this chapter. 
Kumar (1999) argues that conducting research is a way of thinking and adopting ‘a habit 
of questioning’ (p. 2); furthermore, that research is not only about statistics and techniques. 
Research can be simple and find answers to questions concerning day-to-day activities (p. 6). 
Although conducting research can be simple, researchers need to be careful in formulating 
theories and laws constructed from research (p. 6). Lynch (2014) maintains that in qualitative 
research, meaning can be found in the entire text and, by examining experiences and personal 
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views, this meaning can be found, unlike in quantitative research which is principally 
concerned with numbers and statistics.  
The researcher’s voice in qualitative research is enormously important and should be 
echoed throughout the whole thesis. Qualitative and quantitative approaches meet at some 
point of the investigation, although processes vary. According to Newman and Benz (1998), 
the difference between qualitative and quantitative approaches is: first, the qualitative 
approach interprets and describes reality and subsequently develops a theory, which will 
explain the research journey. Conversely, the quantitative approach starts with a theory or 
hypothesis, with the possibility of either confirming or rejecting it (Newman and Benz 1998). 
Research problem  
To start conducting the research, a research problem has to be identified. The research 
problem in this thesis is that more studies need to be conducted on the Egyptian Diaspora, 
especially in the UK Studying the effects that the 2011 Egyptian revolution has had on the 
diaspora and Egyptians would hopefully reveal new results and would be a new contribution 
to current studies on diaspora groups, especially Egyptians abroad. The identification of the 
research problem generated three research questions:  
(i) Has the 2011 revolution affected the sense of belonging, Egyptian identity and 
sense of pride among the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK?  
(ii) To what extent has the political participation of Egyptians in the UK in political 
activities, for example protesting, changed after the 2011 rebellion? And, to what 
extent has the 2011 Egyptian revolt represented a turning point regarding the political 
participation of Egyptians in the UK?  
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(iii) How did Egyptians in the UK use the media, mainly social and mainstream and 
Arabic and Western media during the 2011 revolution and its aftermath?  
Qualitative research  
Qualitative research primarily adopts a naturalistic approach. This approach generally 
examines phenomena in the real world (Golafshani 2003). Golafshani (2003) asserts that 
quantitative researchers try their best not to become personally involved in the research, 
unlike qualitative researchers whose personal involvement is imperative. This is what Haynes 
(2012) discusses in his article on reflexivity in qualitative research (reflexivity, validity and 
other terms are discussed in the following sections).  
Brannen and Coram (1992) claim that there is a difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research. Defining variables is how to differentiate qualitative and quantitative 
research. For instance, in qualitative research, the researcher starts by looking through a wide 
lens, searching for patterns of inter-relationships between known concepts, whereas in 
quantitative research, the researcher starts with a narrow range of variables (p. 4). The 
second difference between qualitative and quantitative research is related to the instruments 
used in data collection. For example, in qualitative research, the researcher needs to be 
physically involved in collecting data by way of participant observation. Thus, the researcher 
must be present in person to observe people in their social worlds (Brannen and Coram 1992). 
The same is expected when conducting interviews, as the researcher is personally involved in 
the interview by means of asking questions and interacting with the interviewees (p. 5). 
Conducting quantitative research, by contrast, involves merely designing a questionnaire and 
having no further interaction with the respondents. It should also be mentioned that 
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extrapolation and generalisability are the concepts which differentiate quantitative and 
qualitative research (p. 5).  
Regarding induction and deduction, quantitative research adopts the inductive approach 
– discovering whether a group of people has a specific character. The main aim of quantitative 
research is to conclude whether a specific character which already exists is present or not in 
a group of people. Conversely, Brannen and Coram (1992) claim that qualitative research is 
about the concepts and categories themselves, and not their frequency (p. 5). Moreover, 
qualitative research concentrates on the concepts themselves and how to test them, rather 
than the implication of theories; thus, qualitative research is theoretical rather than 
descriptive (p. 6).  
Reaves (1992) defines quantitative research as measuring the quantities of a specific 
thing, while qualitative research measures the quality of something; thus, qualitative research 
does not deal with numbers but rather with the meaning of a phenomenon or object (p. 16). 
Moreover, the qualitative approach concentrates on the significance of meaning and 
experiences of individuals rather than the numbers and statistics related. This does not 
indicate that the meaning of, and emphasis on, experiences are not significant, or that 
quantitative research does not address them. As previously mentioned, qualitative research 
is responsible for the meanings of experiences. Reaves (1992) maintains that quantitative 
research does not ignore the importance of the meaning of experiences, nonetheless it is not 
the focus (p. 16). According to Brannen and Coram (1992), most qualitative research is 
descriptive, unlike quantitative research which is more about numbers, graphs and 
calculations (p. 6). Researchers who use quantitative research tend to focus on the term 
‘validity’. To achieve validity in quantitative research, data should be generated from more 
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than one type of method, such as interview questions (p. 14). In contrast, in qualitative 
research, the focus is the nature of data and how data are related to established theories and 
their relation to the problem to be addressed (p. 15).  
There are some research projects that require mixed methods. For instance, some cases 
require using the quantitative approach at the beginning of the project and using the 
qualitative approach later. The reason for that is that some qualitative research requires 
quantitative data at the beginning of the project to provide a statistical background for the 
problem to be addressed. Using mixed methods is therefore valuable regarding statistical 
information about a phenomenon and, by using the quantitative approach this might benefit 
the findings of a qualitative research project (p. 25). Thomas (2003) defines qualitative 
research as ‘a researcher describing kinds of characteristics of people and events without 
comparing events in terms of measurements or amounts’ (p. 1). Conversely, the focus of 
quantitative research is on measurements and the amounts of characteristics of people in the 
sample being studied by the researcher (p. 1). These definitions are a simplified explanation 
of the two different methods of research and how they could be used.  
Thomas (2003) adds that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
environments, and tend to interpret phenomena according to how people see them and 
through their stories. Consequently, qualitative methods depend on people’s experiences in 
their natural settings (p. 1). Qualitative researchers look at empirical material such as 
interviews, case studies, life stories and personal experience and begin interpreting them 
according to people’s personal lives (Thomas 2003). According to Thomas (2003), qualitative 
research is simply about making sense of personal stories and the interaction between people 
in a society (p. 2).  
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The focus of quantitative research, in contrast, is on statistics and numbers to test 
hypotheses (Thomas 2003). Quantitative researchers tend to depend on previous 
quantitative research conducted by others and build on it (p. 2). In quantitative research, 
researchers tend to seek interpretation of the material to produce generalisable results 
(Thomas 2003). Thomas (2003) argues that most authors believe that qualitative and 
quantitative methods are complementary and not antagonistic. The quantitative approach, it 
is claimed, is supported by a scientific approach, believing that the world is paved with 
measurable and observable elements (p. 6). The qualitative approach, in contrast, is 
supported by an interpretivist approach which reveals that reality is socially constructed by 
people in a society (p. 6).  
Interviews  
The interview technique has been selected as a method in this thesis for many reasons. 
An interview is not only a structured conversation but, according to Kvale (2008), it is ‘a 
conversation site for knowledge’ (p. 5). Conducting interviews allows the exchange of ideas, 
opinions and knowledge. In addition, examining people’s experience and feelings can be 
approached by means of conducting interviews. Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013, p. 
22), for instance, conducted research on ‘diasporic Syrian activists and their role, as Syrian 
citizens, in what was happening in their homeland’. The interview method was used to 
examine their feelings. Semi-structured interviews were chosen in the current project for 
various reasons. For example, interaction between the interviewer and interviewees is 
possible, unlike in surveys or questionnaires.  
Drever (2003, p. 10) claims that surveys are inflexible once they have been sent by post – 
the researcher cannot edit or elaborate some questions. During an interview, mainly face to 
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face, the interviewer can not only explain unclear questions, but other questions can be raised 
during the interview. Moreover, in the case of surveys, the questions are typically close-ended 
and require only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. These answers do not demonstrate feelings or explain 
a specific matter in more detail. Drever (2003) explains that several answers might be 
incomplete in surveys, as respondents answer questions individually without supervision. 
These answers may be useless for the project. In addition, respondents cannot be asked to 
answer them again or to elaborate on a specific question. Interviews, in contrast, allow 
elaboration of the questions and answers to obtain an appropriate answer. Surveys do not 
capture feelings or memories of a specific event, and body language and emotions cannot be 
observed through surveys. Consequently, interviews are the most appropriate tool to adopt 
for this purpose.  
According to Drever (2003, p. 11), in some cases, interviewers visit interviewees in their 
homes to observe their daily lives, as such details can have considerable significance when 
researching specific topics. Interviews are essential for the current research, for several 
reasons: the project examines the feelings, sense of belonging and effects of the revolution 
on peoples’ lives. This can be examined by using the qualitative method which deals with 
quality rather than quantity. Padgett (2008) argues that qualitative methods involve 
engagement in peoples’ lives, not merely quantitative statistics (p. 2). Padgett implies that if 
the researcher needs to investigate the in-depth feelings of people and their lived 
experiences, the qualitative method is the best tool (p. 16). The focus in this research is on 
how, and to what extent, the revolution affected the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK. 
Consequently, conducting interviews and adopting ethnographic research methods are 
essential in this case.  
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Marshall et al. (1995, p. 81) claim that the most significant element in conducting in-depth 
interviews is how a researcher asks the questions that can help to interviewees to reveal their 
opinions. There are some cases in which interviewees might not answer the researcher’s 
questions in full detail. The researcher’s mission is to rephrase the questions to encourage 
interviewees to further explain their experience in a specific issue. Close-ended questions will 
probably not give the researcher what they want (or need) to know, therefore, asking open-
ended questions is the solution (p. 80). One of the most essential tasks of a researcher is to 
encourage answers which reflect the interviewees’ points of view and not those of the 
researcher with the aim of avoiding bias (p. 80).  
One of the major weaknesses of conducting interviews is the notion that participants may 
not disclose everything about their personal lives to the researcher. This is problematic, as 
the researcher hopes for responses that might be valuable in explaining the research 
phenomenon or problem studied (p. 81). It should be mentioned that this may be the 
researcher’s fault for not asking questions which do not encourage long narratives. This may 
be because the researcher lacks the expertise and knowledge of the local language, or lacks 
the skills required (Marshall et al. 1995, p. 81). Gill et al. (2008) argue that interviews are the 
most common method used in qualitative research, as they help to generate stories 
concerning beliefs, views and experiences of individuals. In this research, conducting 
interviews has therefore been chosen as the principal method through which to explore the 
beliefs and views of Egyptians in the UK regarding their political participation, belonging and 
identity. Therefore, this study is interested in the interviewee’s personal views.  
Gill et al. (2008, p. 291) differentiate between structured, unstructured and semi-
structured interviews: (i) structured interviews are those which have a set of questions with 
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no follow up questions. Structured interviews are not a commonly used method because 
triggering information from participants is limited (Gill et al. 2008); (ii) unstructured 
interviews do not have a specific scope or set of questions but start with a broad question 
and then progress from there. Gill et al. (2008, p. 292) claim that unstructured interviews are 
time-consuming and hard to manage. Additionally, because of the lack of an organised set of 
questions to ask in the interview, the interview may last for hours and lack guidance in terms 
of what to ask next. Unstructured interviews would be more likely to be ‘chatting’ about 
several topics. Finally, (iii) Gill et al. (2008) discuss semi-structured interviews in more depth, 
by explaining their importance in research. Semi-structured interviews are significant because 
the questions are more specific. This means that the interviewer will be guided by a better 
organised interview which would be more successful for both the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Additionally, a significant feature of semi-structured interviews is flexibility, 
unlike structured and unstructured interviews. The flexibility of semi-structured interviews 
also allows for dealing with new topics that might arise during the interviews, an explanation 
of them, and to elaborate on new findings in the research (Gill et al. 2008, p. 293).  
To summarise, semi-structured interviews are perfectly suitable for this project, seeing as 
they are preferable when researching a topic involving emotions and memories. Surveys and 
questionnaires can be used but are not considered appropriate for this project. The 
interviewer must follow certain regulations, such as timing, tone of voice, body language and 
scheduling. Small-scale research consequently requires interviews, rather than 
questionnaires or surveys which would be more appropriate for large-scale research projects.  
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Recruitment 
Participants were chosen to be interviewed according to specific criteria: first, they should 
be of Egyptian descent, either born in Egypt or the UK; second, the age of participants should 
be between 18 and 40 and 41+; third, they must have witnessed the 2011 revolution, either 
from the UK or personally in Egypt; and finally, they must have lived in the UK since 2011. The 
above criteria were stated in the social media post and leaflet.  
To access participants for this study, Egyptians living in the UK were found on social 
networking groups (Facebook and Meetup –Meetup.com) and by distributing leaflets calling 
for participation in the project (see Appendix 1.1). The total number of respondents was 119. 
Out of these respondents, only 22 successfully completed the interview. Table 2 presents 
basic information regarding each participant. The rest either withdrew for various reasons 
including personal circumstances, scheduling and logistical reasons, or as they were leaving 
the UK, or were excluded as they did not meet the criteria. The number of respondents from 
Facebook was 90 and from Meetup was 28, whilst one respondent was obtained by way of 
distributing leaflets. Table 3 illustrates the sources of recruitment and numbers of participants 
recruited from each source.  
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Table 2 List of participants in alphabetical order 
 
Participant 
Name 
Gender Age 
Place 
of birth 
Stay in UK 
(Yr) 
Generation Passport 
Relationship 
status 
Dina F  22 Kuwait  20 1.75 Dual  Single  
Ehab M 43 Egypt  23 1st (Mid adulthood)  Dual Divorced  
Eslam  M 35 E 2 1st (Young adulthood)  Egyptian  Single  
Hani M 35 E 3 1st (Mid adulthood) Egyptian  Single  
Issam  M 36 E 2 1st (Mid adulthood) Egyptian  Single  
Karim  M 26 E 5 1st (Early adulthood) Egyptian  Single  
Khouloud  F 45 E 15 1st (Young adulthood)  Dual  Divorced  
Maher  M 38 UAE  10 1st (Young adulthood)  Egyptian  Single  
Majed  M 24 E 2 1st (Early adulthood)  Egyptian  Single  
Mazen  M 20 E 2 1st (Early adulthood) Egyptian  Single  
Michael  M 31 E 24 1.50 (Came to UK aged 7)  Dual  In a relationship  
Mohamed  M 32 E 4 1st (Young adulthood) Dual  Married  
Mohammed  M 37 E 34 1.75 Dual  Single  
Muhammad  M 18 UK Since birth 2nd  British Single  
Nevine  F 50 E 25 1st (Young adulthood) Dual  Divorced  
Rami M 36 UK Since birth 2nd Dual  Single  
Rana  F 20 E 4 1.25 Dual  Single  
Salim  M 32 E 10 1st (Early adulthood)  Egyptian  Married  
Sama F 24 U.S. 2 2nd  Dual  Single  
Shabaan  M 50 E 10 1st (Mid adulthood) Dual  Married  
Shereen  F 31 E 5 1st (Young adulthood) Egyptian  Married  
Sherif  M 33 UK Since birth 2nd  British  Single  
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Table 3 Sources of recruitment 
Source of recruitment 
Respondents who contacted 
the researcher to express an 
interest in being interviewed  
People that participated 
Facebook 90 18 
Meetup 28 4 
Leaflet 1 0 
Total 119 22 
 
On Facebook respondents were contacted and a message sent to them explaining the 
details of project and asking them whether they would be willing to participate. Participants 
from the selected groups were: Egyptians living in London and other areas in the UK; belonged 
to Egyptian student associations in the UK; participated in events and activities concerning 
Egypt and Egyptian political groups in the UK. Potential participants were contacted by 
‘private message’. Several potential participants on Facebook and Meetup did not reply, 
whilst the wishes were respected of those who did reply and stated that they were not 
interested in the topic. The procedure was as follows: when people replied and agreed to 
participate in the project, an information sheet was sent to them to read and to give them a 
chance to ask questions related to the project (see Appendix four); secondly, arrangements 
were made for face-to-face interviews, date, time and place. Interviewees were sent an 
information sheet and a consent form to sign for interviews, with the intention of protecting 
the interviewer’s and the interviewees’ rights (see Appendix 3).  
The admins of several Egyptian groups on Facebook were contacted for two reasons: one 
was to look for participants for the project and the other was to ascertain if there were any 
upcoming events organised by the group. A search for Egyptian and Arab groups and pages 
(see Figure 3) resulted in contacting potential participants.  
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Figure 3 Egyptian groups on Facebook used to find potential participants 
 
The second website used to recruit Egyptians was Meetup.com. Meetup is a social 
networking website aimed at gathering people together and introducing them to new people. 
There are many groups on Meetup and several Arab and Egyptian groups were found. For 
example, a group named ‘London’s Arab Circle’ was contacted to access Egyptians who are 
members of this group. The reason that there were only a few replies from the Meetup 
website is that it is not very popular and not many people check the website. Nevertheless, it 
was a successful technique in this case, as some respondents were found on the website. A 
few members of the Meetup website agreed to be interviewed. However, one of the Meetup 
members, Eslam, read the post on the website and contacted me. He stated, ‘Your PhD topic 
is very interesting, I am very interested in participating and reading the final report’. 
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Figure 4 Screenshot of an Arabic social group on meetup.com – second recruitment source 
 
The final way to recruit participants was through distributing project leaflets (see 
Appendix 1.1). Leaflets were written in both English and Arabic to enable those participants 
who do not read or speak English to understand the details of the project. The leaflets were 
distributed in different universities, such as the universities of Bedfordshire, Sussex, Brighton, 
Queen Mary University of London and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). In 
addition, shopping malls such as ‘The Mall’ in Luton, and ‘Churchill Square Mall’ in Brighton 
were also used as venues to distribute leaflets. Nonetheless, this way to recruit participants 
was ineffective. This way of attempting to recruit participants was unsuccessful for security 
reasons; some potential respondents did not show an interest in participating because of the 
nature of the project tackling political participation. Although the focus of the project is not 
purely Egyptian politics, Egyptians fear such topics because they discuss people’s political 
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activities. Most Egyptians, especially those who used to live in Egypt, still believe in conspiracy 
theories and the sense of being spied upon is common. Consequently, many Egyptians were 
anxious and fearful of participating in the project. Only one person expressed an interest in 
participating and directly contacted me after reading the leaflet. This one potential 
respondent then apologised and informed me that they would not be participating in the 
project for personal circumstances.  
Participants, gender, nationality and religion  
As mentioned previously, 22 interviewees participated in the study: 16 were male, while 
only 6 were female. More males participated than females for many reasons. The first reason 
is that out of politeness and a willingness to help, as I am not Egyptian, the male respondents 
wished to assist with the project. Additionally, it is also my personal opinion that males are 
more willing to help foreign, female researchers whom they feel are more attractive, by being 
helpful and polite. This is shown by the number of males who participated in contrast to 
females. The other reason is that I am not Egyptian, Iraqi. Although the interviewees were 
suspicious regarding non-Egyptians intervening and asking questions related to Egypt, many 
of the Egyptians in the UK have a sense of helping Arabs studying the country’s affairs and 
benefiting Egypt in a positive way. As I lived in Egypt for ten years and speak Arabic (in the 
Egyptian dialect), I believe that this enabled me to communicate more easily with 
participants. Regarding religion, there was a question about religion in the demographic 
questions. Among the 22 interviewees, there was one Christian and 21 Muslims. As the 
sample is random, plus religion is not the main topic of the thesis, I could not pick a specific 
religion. Therefore, I could not draw a comparison between Muslims and Coptic-Christians.  
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Process of conducting the interviews  
The first stage of building a rapport with participants begins long before face-to-face 
interviews take place. I, firstly, exchange many instant messages and calls via phone, 
Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Skype. This communication helps in building a rapport, 
explaining more about what to expect in the interviews and finalising the logistics of the 
meetings. On the day of the interview, I met the participant in a public place for the semi-
structured interview. It began by explaining the consent form that had to be signed and 
gaining the individual’s permission to record the interview. Afterwards, the first ten minutes 
are dedicated to building a rapport and making participants feel comfortable.  
Subsequently, the next 45 minutes were spent discussing the 2011 Egyptian revolution in 
relation to their life. The semi-structured interview focused on learning more about choosing 
to live in the UK, as well as their relationship with Egypt and the UK. It also explored their 
Egypt-related political activities in the UK and their ways to stay informed about the recent 
events and news in Egypt. In addition, another important question ascertained what 
passport(s) the participant holds. This question was asked to both those born in Egypt and in 
the UK and was included in the section about passports: whether they are ‘useful’ or merely 
‘a piece of paper’ and the significance of holding multiple identities. Some interviewees were 
suspicious about why the researcher (a non-Egyptian) is studying such a topic. Even if such 
comments were made as a joke, some interviewees believed in the notion that I could be a 
spy. Though such a notion was overwhelming, some Egyptians agreed to contribute and 
endeavour to answer the interview questions. Moreover, to keep a detailed record of the 
interviews, I kept a diary of each separate interview by taking notes before, during and after 
the interviews. Burgees (2006) explains the importance of keeping a diary in research. The 
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research diary keeps a record of minute details the researcher might forget after the interview 
or event has occurred. For that reason, keeping a diary is exceedingly beneficial.  
The face-to-face interview locations were in public places such as cafes, restaurants, or 
railway stations in London. The location was chosen according to the preference of the 
participants. Most interviews were conducted in London, as previously mentioned, apart from 
Eslam and Shabaan, whose interviews were conducted on the phone and Skype because 
Eslam resides in Scotland and Shabaan lives and works in Newcastle.  
Ethical considerations  
Attention was paid to ethical considerations regarding this project. Consideration was 
given to ethical issues such as confidentiality – the most important aspect – information 
sheets and consent forms to sign to protect the rights of the participants and the researcher. 
This section explains some of the ethical considerations that were considered during the 
research project.  
Researcher’s positioning  
A part of ethical considerations is to acknowledge the position of the researcher in the 
project. The researcher in this project is an Arab herself which can be challenging. One aspect 
is that, the researcher needs to be extremely careful about having unbiased or neutral 
opinions. It was easier to access the Arabs, mainly Egyptians, given the fact that the 
researcher lived in Egypt for many years and speaks Arabic. Nonetheless, this is, once again, 
problematic for several reasons: first, being an Arab and not Egyptian may have made some 
participants suspicious as to why a non-Egyptian would be interested in Egypt; second, a few 
participants felt that non-Egyptians might be spying on them by asking questions, especially 
regarding political activities. This could be the reason for some potential participants refusing 
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to participate in the project (see Figure 5 – a screenshot of the reply from a potential 
participant who was not interested in politics). Regarding the objectivity of the researcher, 
being an Arab and close to Egyptian culture, some interviewees asked me for an opinion or 
which political group I support. However, I was not able to do give a personal viewpoint 
because I had to maintain neutrality and objectivity. This issue was challenging when striving 
to build a rapport with the interviewees; therefore, an explanation had to be given to the 
participants that researchers must be objective and always remain neutral and that they 
cannot influence research with their personal opinions.  
Confidentiality  
According to Wiles, Crow, Heath and Charles (2006), confidentiality in research is an 
essential aspect. Six interviewees out of the 22 Egyptians preferred not to use their real names 
in the final thesis. After asking for their permission to use their first names, Issam, Mazen, 
Salim, Majed, Maher and Sama refused to use their actual first names. Mazen’s reason for 
not wishing to use his genuine first name was the instability and lack of security in Egypt. 
Therefore, a pseudonym is used in the analysis and findings chapters. Additionally, using false 
names is better than using the technique of employing numbers for participants, as it not only 
helps readers to follow the stories presented to avoid any confusion but will also help 
participants to follow their own stories.  
Salim preferred not to use his real name for security reasons, although he did not explain 
why he did not wish his genuine name to be revealed. It is worth mentioning that Maher also 
did not wish to use his actual first name. This was the same in relation to three more 
participants, Issam, Sama and Majed, who did not want to reveal their real names. 
Additionally, some interviewees only agreed for their first names to be used but requested 
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that their contact details were not revealed. To protect the interviewees’ privacy, all these 
conditions were respected.  
 
Figure 5 A potential participant showing no interest in the project 
 
The period of recruiting and interviewing participants lasted one and a half years – from 
July 2014 until January 2016. To save participants’ information, data was securely kept in 
locked folders with a password. I as the researcher am the only one aware of the password, 
to protect the data. Data is only shared by me with the supervisory team. Furthermore, after 
the submission of the thesis, the data will be destroyed. It is also worth stating that the ages 
of the participants in the analysis chapters are their ages according to the year the interviews 
were conducted.  
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Consent form  
A consent form was presented to each interviewee to sign at every interview. The form 
consists of sections regarding the consent of interviewees to be interviewed, the recording of 
the interview and the use (or not) of the interviewee’s first name during the analysis. The 
other section is to make sure that the interviewees have read the information sheet and to 
ask questions if necessary, which the participants have a right to do (a consent form sample 
is attached in Appendix 3).  
Information sheet  
An information sheet was sent to each interviewee to read carefully and to encourage 
them ask any questions related to the project. The information sheet allows the participants 
to read details about the thesis topic and to be completely aware of the topic and what types 
of questions will be asked during the interviews. The information sheet makes sure that both 
interviewees and interviewers’ rights are protected. Moreover, it also gives the right to 
participants to withdraw from the project at any time, without giving any reason (information 
sheet sample attached in Appendix 4).  
Saturation  
The saturation concept is related to qualitative research. Mason (2010) claims that 
saturation is a factor that can affect the sample size in research. Additionally, saturation can 
control sample size and how many interviews, for instance, each project requires. Mason 
(2010, p. 2) claims that in his examination of a sample size of more than 500 PhD theses using 
interviews (in Theses.com), the mean sample size was 31 interviews; however, the size might 
vary from one PhD thesis to another. Ritchie et al. (2003) argue that sample size in qualitative 
research does not require too many interviews and that additional data does not mean new 
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information, as qualitative research is concerned with meaning and not the amount of data 
collected. The number of interviews conducted in this interview is 22. The reason why this 
number was selected was because of the concept of saturation. Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
state that a saturation point is reached when no new data is generated by new interviews.  
Data Analysis  
The thematic analysis method has been chosen in terms of analysing the data collected 
from the interviews. Thematic analysis is a way of observing something (Boyatzis 1998, p. 1). 
Thematic analysis is a process beginning with investigating a thing and then seeing that thing 
as something which has a meaning. Finally, it leads to the interpretation which establishes a 
meaning for that thing (p. 1). Boyatzis adds that if a group of people observe the same 
phenomenon, the analysis might differ from one person to another. The final step is to 
determine the correct interpretation of that thing which makes sense (Boyatzis 1998). 
Furthermore, to use thematic analysis, the researcher must sense themes, as described by 
Boyatzis (1998). Consistency is essential regarding using thematic analysis. For instance, to 
achieve consistency, the researcher needs to obtain the same results from coding today, 
tomorrow or in a year. The researcher will achieve this by consistently and accurately 
encoding data. Coding of the data must not reflect the researcher’s personal point of view or 
perception of the world and will thus result in accurate coding and findings.  
According to Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p. 27), coding is a way of relating the data 
collected with our ideas and creates a meaning for them. According to Saldaña (2012), coding 
is a short phrase which combines a group of statements concerning a certain topic. There are 
two cycles of coding. Saldaña (2012) claims that during the first cycle, coding can include a 
single word or paragraph. The most important point is to ascertain one idea which unites all 
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statements under one code; whereas the second cycle includes developing the results of the 
first cycle. Boyatzis (1998) identifies several advantages by using thematic analysis. One 
advantage is that thematic analysis allows researchers to gather qualitative information 
which, in turn, allows communication with the wider population of scholars and researchers 
in the same field. Additionally, thematic analysis helps to make knowledge available to many.  
Formulating themes  
The first theme formulated from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK is their 
political participation and how effective it has been for Egypt. The first sub-category of this 
theme is the effectiveness of participation in the UK compared to that in Egypt. The second 
sub-category is the effect place of birth has on whether to be politically active, either in the 
UK or in Egypt. The third sub-category is a comparison between political participation among 
Egyptians in the UK before, during and after the 2011 Egyptian uprising. The fourth sub-
category is the difference in political participation among various generations of Egyptians in 
the UK. The final sub-category is an investigation of the revolution’s effects on Egyptians 
regarding political participation.  
Analysing data has revealed differences among generations of Egyptians. Rumbaut (2004) 
conducted a study on immigrants in the United States and established different types of 
immigrants. First, he differentiates between two main generations, first and second 
generations. There are different categories of first generation according to age and age at 
emigration. Generations are grouped as first generation, including all those who were born in 
Egypt, but differ in age with regards to when they left the home country. The first category in 
the first generation is those who left Egypt in their early adulthood – aged 18 to 24. The 
second category regarding the first generation is those who left their home country in their 
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young adulthood years aged between 24 and 34, having completed their education in their 
home country. The third category related to the first generation is immigrants who left their 
home country aged between 34 and 54. The fourth category is those immigrants who left 
their home country aged 54 and above. This last category pertaining to the first generation is 
those who are unlikely to leave their home country unless it is essential, or are following their 
children (Rumbaut 2004). Rumbaut (2004) has termed those who can neither be classified as 
first generation nor second generation as 1.25, 1.50 and 1.75 generations. It is my view that 
they should be grouped as part of the second generation.  
The next generation of immigrants is children of immigrants leaving their home country 
aged between 0 and 5 years. This group is known as the ‘1.75 generation’. Rumbaut (2004) 
contends that these immigrants share virtually the same experience as second generation 
immigrants born in host countries; however, they cannot be classified as the second 
generation, as they arrived in the host countries at a very early age and are therefore, not 
pure first generation. The adaptation outcomes and experience of the 1.75 generation differ 
from those who emigrated when they were older. The 1.50 generation is those who 
emigrated to host countries aged between 6 and 12. Rumbaut (2004) calls immigrants who 
left their home country aged 13–17, the ‘1.25 generation’. This generation is characterised as 
sharing similar experiences with first generation immigrants, although it differs in the level of 
adaptation to the host society and work or social experiences. This group of immigrants is 
classified as the 1.25 generation, seeing as it is neither pure first generation nor native-born 
second generation.  
The last category of generations is the second generation of immigrants: children born to 
immigrants in host countries, having either one immigrant parent or both, are classified as 
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second generation. The interviewees in this thesis belong to different generations. For 
instance, 14 interviewees belong to the first generation, including four who left their home 
country in their early adulthood years, six from the young adulthood age group and four from 
the mid-adulthood group. Eight interviewees are from the second generation, of which only 
one is from the 1.25 age group, another from the 1.50 age group, two from the 1.75 
generation, while the four remaining interviewees are from the second generation.  
The process of coding and formulating themes is discussed here. According to Khandkar 
(2009), open coding is one of the key processes of data analysis in qualitative research. Open 
coding involves three principal stages: noticing, collecting and making sense of what has been 
collected to link this process to theories and to formulate interesting themes (p. 1). Open 
coding allows the examination of data and thinking of the relationships between every 
transcript and linking one interview to another. The researchers starts to generate themes 
from these data, and these become clear through noting and considering the data 
relationships. Colour coding has been used to highlight each theme with a specific colour in 
all the transcripts. For instance, green has been used to mark the political participation 
activities of the interviewee. Moreover, pink was used to mark belonging and identity 
sections, while yellow was employed to refer to everything related to media (see Appendices 
2.1 and 2.2).  
Reflexivity and validity 
Reflexivity is how the researcher positions themself in the process of research and the 
outcomes (Haynes 2012). In terms of reflexivity, the researcher conducting the project must 
be aware of themself as a researcher and how this can affect the project. A researcher’s 
reflexivity is related to one’s thinking about specific things and how research can change such 
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thinking and understanding of things. Additionally, it is also related to how such 
understanding affects the way research is conducted (Haynes 2012). Reflexivity is significant 
in terms of relating the researcher to the topic and how this can affect the process of research, 
negatively, positively or neutrally. Hibbert et al. (2010) imply that reflexivity is not just about 
considering the position of the researcher, but also linking the researcher’s experience and 
ways of analysing things according to the way the researcher deals with such experience, as 
well as how it might affect the research. Alvesson and Skoldburg (2000) claim that the two 
main elements of reflexivity are interpretation and reflection. Interpretation is not a 
reflection of reality but a reflection of the researcher’s values and political position on the 
reflection of things regarding research.  
Cunliffe (2003) states that researchers should not just depend on their way of questioning 
the truth mentioned by interviewees, but also need to question their own ability to construct 
the truth from participants’ claims, and how such truth is constructed. The truth according to 
the researcher’s perspective can affect how the truth is created by participants. Validity in 
qualitative research differs from quantitative research wherein validity is based on statistics 
and variables. Validity in qualitative research, in contrast, is based on people’s points of view 
and how they are interpreted by the researcher. Altheide and Johnson (1994) have dealt with 
the notion of ‘validity-as-reflexive-accounting’; it primarily regards the process of interaction 
between the researcher and the topic and making sense of it.  
There are various ways of achieving validity. Triangulation is the first type of validity in 
which researchers search for relationships between participants’ stories to form themes and 
categories (Creswell and Miller 2000). According to Creswell and Miller (2000), the other type 
of validity is member checking. Validity is back in the hands of the participants because the 
 
 
106 
researcher sends the analysis to participants for approval. This is a good chance for 
participants to validate the project by approving what they have mentioned and explained to 
the researcher. Validity can also follow another procedure, such as ‘prolonged engagement 
in the field’. This procedure involves researchers spending time in the field to build rapport 
and trust with the participants, making participants feel safe when they tell the researcher 
personal stories and share their experiences (Creswell and Miller 2000).  
An audit trail is required to make the research credible. An audit trail is principally about 
documenting every stage of the project, including interviews, observations and other details. 
(Creswell and Miller 2000). An audit trail presents readers and external auditors with 
confirmation that the data are credible and have not been fabricated. It should also be 
mentioned that collaboration is another way of validating research by involving participants 
in the research process. For instance, participants might become co-researchers by helping to 
form research questions and even helping in the analysis process (Creswell and Miller 2000). 
This could be challenging, however. Even if this may add credibility to the research, how can 
the researcher be sure that data would not be biased, seeing as they may depend on the 
specific ideologies of the participants. Creswell and Miller (2000) add that peer debriefing is 
another lens through which to achieve credibility and validity concerning research. Peer 
debriefing predominantly allows an external peer to look at the completed work and ask 
questions about the narrative and themes. Moreover, an alternative validation procedure is 
the rich and thick description of the project, given that this will give the impression that the 
researcher is knowledgeable in the field and in relation to the project (Creswell and Miller 
2000).  
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Ethnographic work  
The second method chosen is ethnographic research. Ethnographic research for this thesis 
is about attending Egyptian events organised by the Egyptian community in the UK. 
Ethnographic research has been beneficial in terms of accessing Egyptians in the UK who are 
not on Facebook. Participant observation is a method which can be used in almost all studies 
examining human existence (Jorgensens 1989, p. 10). Jorgensens (1989) implies that 
participant observation is unique in measuring relationships among people and how they deal 
with each other.  
Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that the qualitative approach requires using more 
than one method. For example, when investigating a research problem, participant 
observation would be used to reveal the type of questions that should be asked to tackle the 
research problem. Participant observation does not, however, answer the problem of how 
many questions should be asked to solve the research problem. Therefore, interviews were 
needed to complement the participant observation method and to ask interviewees 
questions which answer the research phenomenon or problem (p. 105).  
According to Marshall and Rossman (2014), participant observation allows the researcher 
to first observe the sample studied in its natural environment. Secondly, participant 
observation offers the researcher the opportunity to observe events which participants 
attend but cannot report. As a result, the researcher needs to personally attend such events 
to take notes. Moreover, researchers occasionally note things which participants do not, as 
they may feel that they are not that important to mention. Researchers would consequently 
interpret some events in a different way or in an academic way, about which participants 
might not care. Third, participant observation is valuable in terms of describing events which 
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have been revealed in interviews. The researcher needs to take notes and interpret them (p. 
103). Additionally, participant observation requires the researcher to have checklists of 
detailed events and to compare those events attended at the analysis stage (p. 79).  
A part of participant observation is ethnographic interviewing. According to Marshall and 
Rossman (2014), ethnographic interviews are used to gather cultural data (p. 83). 
Ethnographic interviews are useful in research in terms of collecting data regarding 
participants’ views relating to specific events or behaviour (p. 82). The weakness of this 
method depends again on the ethnographer. For instance, if the ethnographer chooses to 
observe a specific culture or event, these do not represent the entire culture (p. 82). 
An interview, as described by Kahn and Cannell (1957), is ‘a conversation with a purpose’ 
(p. 149). Interviews can be divided into three types, according to Patton (1990). The first type 
is the informal conversational interview, the second sort is the general interview guide, while 
the final type is standardised, open-ended interview questions (Marshall and Rossman 2014, 
p. 80). Kumar and Phrommathed (2005) explain how choosing the correct sample to study is 
essential. 
To choose the appropriate sample, Kumar and Phrommathed (2005) set two significant 
principles to follow, according to sampling theory. The first principle is to avoid bias when 
selecting a sample to study and the second is realisation of the maximum accuracy of the 
available resources (p. 19). There are three types of sampling; specifically, random or 
probability sampling, non-random or probability sampling and finally, mixed sampling (p. 19).  
 
 
109 
Table 4 List of events I attended as part of ethnographic work and planned events to attend but got postponed and 
cancelled 
Event Date Location 
Rabaa – 1st Anniversary march. 16/8/2014 Egyptian Embassy in 
London. 
4th Anniversary of the Revolution.  25-01-2015 Egyptian Embassy in 
London.  
Solidarity with students and academics (A 
protest opposing the visit of President El-
Sisi to London).  
4/11/2015  10 Downing Street, 
London. 
A protest in favour of the visit of President 
El-Sisi to London.  
5/11/2015 10 Downing Street, 
London.  
Freedom and dignity to our people back 
home. Organised by 25th Jan. (This is a 
group of Egyptians in the UK based on 
Facebook). 
Originally 19/10/2014. 
Subsequently 
postponed 4 times and 
then cancelled.  
 
The current situation in Egypt ةظحللا ةنهارلا 
  
 
ف  صم  Zyad Elelaimy a member of the 
Revolutionary Youth Coalition after the 
25th of Jan Revolution will be the speaker 
to talk about the current situation in 
Egypt. 
First organised for April 
2015. Postponed 4 
times. The event is still 
to be confirmed.  
 
 
Research process model  
This section describes the process of the entire project and comprises the steps from the 
commencement of the project until the date of submission of the thesis. The first stage 
involved choosing broad topics such as Egyptians in the UK and the Egyptian revolution. 
Another topic was the Egyptian revolution and coverage of social vs. mainstream media. The 
subsequent stage was to conduct a search on those broad topics in the available literature to 
ascertain what has already been written. After consulting the supervisory team, the topics 
were narrowed down to study Egyptians in the UK and the effects of the Egyptian Revolution.  
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When the project topic was established, research questions were formulated. It was 
important to carefully formulate the research questions because they set out the foundation 
with regards to the aims and objectives of the entire PhD project. The ensuing step was 
deciding on the most appropriate methodology to adopt in researching Egyptians in the UK 
and 2011 Egyptian revolution. Interviews and ethnographic work were selected as the 
methods to adopt in this research.  
Conducting interviews requires recruiting participants to be interviewed. As a result, 
social media websites, such as Facebook and Meetup were chosen to search for Egyptians in 
the UK, with described specific inclusion criteria. Looking for participants on Facebook and 
Meetup involved searching for Egyptian and Arabic groups and subsequently, posting a 
message to members of those groups requesting interested participants. A sample of the 
message posted to potential interviewees is attached in the appendices (Appendix 1.2). The 
other approach used to recruit potential Egyptian interviewees in the UK was distributing 
project leaflets to recruit Egyptians who are not on social media (see Appendix 1.1 for leaflet 
sample). Additionally, leaflets were distributed at universities across the UK, such as the 
universities of Bedfordshire, Brighton, Sussex, in addition to Queen Mary University London 
and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The process of distributing leaflets 
included requesting permission from each university to post the leaflet in various locations at 
the universities. It is worth mentioning that distributing leaflets for the project was limited to 
the selected universities due to the limited budget.  
The second method used in this project is ethnographic work. This work covered attending 
political events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK, such as protests or marches which 
were advertised predominantly on Facebook. Observational notes were made on these 
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events and subsequently analysed in response to the research questions. The first event I 
attended coincided with the first anniversary of Rabia and took place in London on 16/8/2014. 
The second protest was held on 04/11/2015 and consisted of students and academics 
standing in solidarity to express their concern about the visit of the Egyptian President El-Sisi 
to the UK. The protest took place outside Downing Street, London. The other event attended 
was held the following day (05/11/2015) and involved protesters welcoming the visit of 
President El-Sisi to London (see Table 4 and Appendices 5.1.2 and 5.1.3). There were more 
events which were postponed or cancelled and as a result, could not be included in the work.  
Other steps accomplished with respect to this project involved conducting interviews with 
the 22 participants, transcribing the interviews and analysing data using colour coding. The 
on-going process throughout the project was preparing and writing up parts of the thesis. This 
process included presenting parts of the work in conferences organised at different 
universities, including Bedfordshire, Leicester, Canterbury and Cardiff (Figure 5 elaborates on 
the research process model).  
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Figure 6 The research process  
 
Summary  
The main methods used in this thesis have been discussed in this chapter. Interviews and 
ethnographic research have been used to answer the proposed research questions. The 
chapter has been divided into several sections, starting with the research problem and 
choosing an appropriate topic for the research project. This chapter also focuses on the 
ethical considerations regarding conducting interviews and ethnographic research. The 
principal importance of this chapter is to elaborate on the methods used in this thesis and the 
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reasons for selecting specific methods in contrast to others. The focus has been on adopting 
the qualitative approach rather than the quantitative approach.  
This chapter has been a platform for the justification of this choice. The qualitative 
approach includes conducting interviews and participant observation, in order to examine the 
effects, the 2011 revolution had (if any), on first and second generation Egyptians in the UK 
relating to belonging, political participation and the effects the media had on the entire 
process. An important angle discussed in this chapter is the examination of the position of the 
researcher in the thesis and how to avoid any bias.  
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Chapter Six: Belonging and Identity  
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the first theme formulated from conducting interviews with 
Egyptians in the United Kingdom. This chapter attempts to find answers to the first proposed 
question regarding the 2011 revolution and its effects on Egyptian identity and belonging 
among Egyptian diaspora in the UK. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first 
section is regarding the first generation of interviewees. The second section is concerned with 
second generation Egyptians and an examination of their belonging to Egypt and Egyptian 
identity. The focus of this thesis is the Egyptian case and the narrative that Egyptians have 
used to express themselves regarding their identity and sense of belonging, both prior to, and 
after, the 2011 revolution, and what effect this had on their perceptions and attitudes.  
This chapter attempts to answer the proposed research question: to what extent have 
belonging, identity and sense of pride been affected by the 2011 uprising? This chapter has 
divided the Egyptians in the UK into first and second generations. Fourteen interviews were 
conducted with first generation participants and eight interviews with second generation 
participants. The analysis of these two groups of the Egyptian diaspora in the UK has revealed 
a significant difference between the first and second generations, and the impact that the 
2011 uprising had on their Egyptian identity. The most important issue this chapter deals with 
is the impacts of the 2011 uprising on belonging, Egyptian identity and being proud to be 
Egyptian among Egyptians from the first and second generations and how the 2011 uprising 
has impacted upon these feelings. Table 5 presents more information about the interviewees 
to remind readers about each interviewee regarding place of birth, which generation they 
belong to and the political activities of each participant, specifically with regard to the 
Egyptian uprising.  
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Table 5 Additional information about interviewees 
Participant  Place of birth  Generation  Political activities  
Dina  Born in Kuwait. Came 
to the UK when she 
was 3  
1.75 generation Participated in 2011 
uprising in the UK and did 
not go to Egypt.  
Ehab  Egypt. Came to UK 23 
years ago  
Left Egypt in his 20s. 
Rumbaut (2008), considers 
him to be from the 1st 
generation. Migrating in 
their mid-adulthood 
Not interested in politics  
Issam  Egypt. Came to the 
UK 2 years ago 
1st generation. Left Egypt 
when he was 34. Migrating 
in his mid-adulthood  
Active in Egypt and the UK  
Mazen Egypt. Came to the 
UK 2 years ago  
1st generation. Left Egypt 
when he was 18. 
Considered 1st generation. 
Migrating in his early 
adulthood.  
Politically active in Egypt  
Nevine Egypt. Came to the 
UK 25 years ago  
1st generation. Left Egypt 
in her 20s. Considered to 
be from 1st generation. 
Migrated in their young-
adulthood 
Active in political activities 
in the UK 
Sama  US. Came to the UK 2 
years ago  
2nd generation  Active in political activities 
in the UK 
Shereen Egypt. Came to the 
UK 5 years ago  
1st generation. Left Egypt 
in her 20s. Migrated in her 
young adulthood  
Active in political activities 
in the UK 
Sherif UK  2nd generation  Active in political activities 
in the UK  
Eslam  Egypt  1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 20s. Migrated in his 
young adulthood  
Active in online and offline 
activities in the UK 
Hani  Egypt  1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 30s Migrated in mid 
adulthood  
Active in political activities 
in Egypt and online 
activities such as blogging  
Karim  Egypt 1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 20s. Migrated in early 
adulthood 
Not interested in political 
activities just studying 
politics  
Khouloud  Egypt 1st generation. Left Egypt 
in her 20s. Migrated in 
young adulthood  
Active in political activities 
in Egypt and the UK 
Maher Egypt 1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 20s. Migrated in 
young adulthood  
Active in political activities 
in the UK and Egypt (when 
convenient) plus online 
activities on Facebook  
Majed Egypt  1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his teens. Migrated in 
early adulthood  
Online activities and 
sometimes in Egypt  
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Mohamed  Egypt  1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 20s. Migrated in 
young adulthood  
Active in Egypt  
Mohammed  Egypt. Came to the 
UK when he was 3 
1.75 generation  Active in Egypt and the UK 
and online activities  
Muhammad UK 2nd generation  In the UK and Egypt  
Rami UK 2nd generation Not interested in politics  
Rana Egypt followed by 
Kuwait. Subsequently 
came to the UK when 
she was 16  
1.25 generation  Active in the UK 
Salim Egypt 1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his teens. Migrated in 
early adulthood  
Used to be active in Egypt 
but not politically active 
anymore  
Shabaan Egypt 1st generation. Left Egypt 
in his 40s. Migrated in mid 
adulthood  
Not interested  
Michael  Egypt followed by 
Saudi Arabia. 
Subsequently came to 
the UK when he was 7 
1.50 generation  In the UK but not politically 
active anymore  
 
First generation  
This section focuses on the first generation of Egyptians and how they have felt towards 
their sense of belonging and their Egyptian identity, prior to, and after, the 2011 uprising. 
Defining homeland for Egyptians from the first generation has demonstrated how strongly 
they feel about their sense of belonging to Egypt. Kaplan (2003) argues that the word 
‘homeland’ has many meanings; some dictionaries describe homeland as ‘native land’ or 
‘country of origin’, ‘fatherland’ or ‘motherland’. This demonstrates that homeland for some 
depends on their parents’ country of origin. The term ‘homeland’ for Egyptians in the UK can 
be defined in various ways. Issam (M, aged, Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood. 
He was born in Egypt and eft in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for 
instance, explains how he considers Egypt as his homeland, regardless of whether he holds 
other passports. There are many factors that might affect the sense of belonging to a country, 
and the most obvious ones are place of birth, and the period spent in that country. Issam was 
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born in Egypt and moved to the UK in his mid-adulthood (see Chapter Five for more details); 
his belonging would obviously be to Egypt, and Egypt would therefore be his homeland.  
Egyptians in the UK found the question of ‘homeland’ difficult to answer. Hani (M, aged 
35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and 
blogging) defined it as ‘the place where I grew up and the place which has major factors which 
made me [are my make-up]’. He was asked if his point of view would have been different if 
he had been born in the UK but his parents were originally from Egypt. Hani replied that in 
that case, he would have two homelands. The result is that place of birth and the period spent 
in that country would make a difference in deciding which country is the homeland for that 
person. The notion that people who live in a multicultural world nowadays, would not limit 
themselves to one homeland, as Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so 
middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) argues. There are some 
Egyptians, in contrast, who feel so strongly about being Egyptian, that they regard ‘homeland’ 
as being linked to the sense of one’s own identity: ‘I am Egyptian whatever happens’, Mazen 
(M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is 
politically active in Egypt) said.  
Egyptian identity among first generation Egyptians in the UK is somehow built on taking 
into consideration the fact that first generation Egyptians have spent their youth and 
adulthood in Egypt. Consequently, the sense of a strong identity is an undeniable fact. This 
has appeared obvious through the interviews conducted with Egyptians in the UK, especially 
when first generation Egyptians were asked about which country they considered to be their 
‘homeland’. The sense of identity and ‘belonging’ to Egypt among first generation Egyptians 
in the UK is strong, and the 2011 Egyptian revolution has made a slight contribution to the 
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enforcement of identity and belonging. The 2011 uprising, among second generation 
Egyptians, however, provided the chance for them to express their sense of belonging and 
identity.  
The concept of homeland is typically linked to the notion of belonging. Nevine (F, aged 50, 
1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK 
and was active during the 2011 revolution) expresses how she is still connected to Egypt and 
‘belongs’ there: ‘I consider Egypt as my homeland as I am still attached to Egypt and feel its 
home for me’. Nevine also explains how belonging to a country is not only about the period 
spent in that country but it is more than that. For instance, Nevine was born in Egypt and lived 
there until she was twenty years old. This period is very important in terms of building a 
relationship with a country. She states: ‘I have spent more years in the UK than in Egypt; 
however, I still believe Egypt is my homeland and I can’t say that I am British’. The years spent 
in a country, in this sense, does not mean ‘belonging’ to that country or having a sense of 
loyalty to the country in which one has spent the most years – the sense of belonging is 
measured by how a person feels towards a country, as Nevine illustrates.  
Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he 
is politically active in Egypt) explains how he believes that ‘homeland’ is the place where a 
person was born. Mohamed believes that ‘homeland’ is the place towards which people feel 
homesick, and where family and friends live. Several interviewees believe that that a country 
that does not offer anything for its citizens – a stable life, such as a good education, 
healthcare, job opportunities and security – cannot be called a ‘homeland’. 
Moreover, a reasonable standard of living should be available to all citizens. Mohamed 
went on to say, ‘I have started to love this country – the UK – and feel that Britain is my 
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homeland, as, when I first came to the UK, I found a decent job, and people here are equal, 
unlike Egypt where you cannot find that. As a result, I feel obliged to offer something back to 
this country’. This demonstrates that if a country offers its citizens a decent standard of living, 
they will appreciate the benefits and even feel a sense of loyalty and belonging.  
Egyptians from the first generation are happy to live within two cultures, Egyptian and 
British, despite the negative or positive effect of the 2011 revolution. Issam (M, aged 36, Issam 
belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood. He was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is 
politically active in Egypt and the UK) expresses how holders of a British passport are 
protected by the State: ‘If I have the British passport, this will help me and my family to live 
decently’. According to Issam, a British passport gives people a sense of protection. However, 
in terms of belonging, Egyptians in the UK still feel their homeland is Egypt, even if they do 
hold a British passport – the British passport is just a piece of paper which provides a sense of 
protection for its holders. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st 
generation early adulthood. Mazen is politically active in Egypt) explains how having a British 
passport will encourage him to participate in politics, especially Egyptian politics, as he will be 
protected by British law: ‘If I get a British passport I will be more involved in politics in Egypt 
as the [British] passport will protect me’.  
The notion of protection is not only for travelling or obtaining employment, but freedom 
of expression, as Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so is considered 1st generation- 
early adulthood. Politically active in Egypt) has demonstrated. Egyptian citizens who only hold 
an Egyptian passport do not feel protected, unlike British citizens who are safeguarded by the 
British authorities across the world. Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-
young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the 
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UK) states that the idea of obtaining a British passport is merely to guarantee protection in 
terms of residing in a safe place and not having to obtain a permit to stay in Britain. Egyptians 
who are multinational – in possession of dual nationality (Egyptian and British, in this case) 
were asked which one they preferred; the answer was ‘Egyptian’. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st 
generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK 
or Egypt) confirmed this, by saying that he is Egyptian, although he holds a British passport; 
this demonstrates that Egyptians in the UK feel they are Egyptian in spite of holding a British 
passport.  
Interviews with Egyptians in the UK revealed the importance of belonging to both 
countries – the UK and Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left 
Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution), 
for example, expresses how crucial it is to feel a sense of belonging to both Egypt and the UK, 
especially regarding children: ‘It would be good to teach them to belong to Egypt in addition 
to the UK.’ Teaching children the sense of belonging to both countries – home country and 
host country – is essential, particularly in the case of immigrants and their offspring born in 
host countries.  
Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 
1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) states how he preferred his 
children by his former wife to focus on the country in which they were born and raised and 
are currently resident (the UK) and not Egypt, as after the divorce, Ehab’s former wife 
preferred to live in Egypt with their children instead of the UK. The notion is to keep links with 
one’s roots (Egypt) but, at the same time, this should not ruin immigrants’ progress and 
integration in the host country: ‘I want my kids to stick to British-Arab cultural roots. I want 
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them to understand reality, here in the UK as European Muslims’. The notion is that people 
should remain linked to their original culture and identity but should also integrate with the 
host culture. Ehab (aged 43 and belongs to 1st generation as he left Egypt in his 20s so 
considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. He is not interested in politics) adds that: 
‘Whenever we are connected to the past and our Arab roots in our home country, this keeps 
dragging us down’. Ehab adds how he wants his children and all European Muslims to focus 
on the difficulties and complications [facing] European Muslims here in the UK, not the affairs 
of [their] home country as this will not help them to progress at all and will drag them down.  
There are some Egyptians who hold the notion of belonging to Britain because of human 
rights, and how they are respected in the UK more so than in Egypt. In this sense, Egyptians 
feel more secure living in the UK. Their sense of belonging is towards Britain, for the high 
standard of living they enjoy, but their homeland is still Egypt. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st 
generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK 
or Egypt) feels that Egypt is his homeland but, at the same time, he respects Britain because 
of how he is treated as a human being. 
There are other interviewees from the first generation who have shown their sense of 
belonging is to Egypt, and how this sense has been developed due to being born in Egypt and 
having spent a long period there. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid 
adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the 
UK), for instance, argues that his sense of belonging is towards Egypt: ‘I belong to Egypt as my 
family and friends are in Egypt’. Issam feels that his stronger links are with Egypt as he was 
born there and is only temporarily living in the UK for study purposes. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st 
generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and 
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was active during the 2011 revolution) argues that her sense of belonging is to Egypt, rather 
than the UK because she spent her childhood and most of her adulthood in Egypt. This shows 
that where people are born has a big influence on the level of the sense of belonging.  
The desire to return to their homeland for some first generation Egyptians, such as 
Nevine, has strengthened – especially after the revolution – in the hope of finding a better, 
more stable, Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50. Left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st 
generation from young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 
revolution), felt that she could have considered going back to Egypt after the revolution, but 
the country was still unstable (and possibly dangerous) in the aftermath; moreover, her family 
objected to her returning due to the lack of job opportunities. This reveals that once more, 
the volatile political situation in Egypt has prevented many from returning, which 
consequently weakens their sense of belonging. There are some Egyptians from the first 
generation, however, who remain optimistic regarding the situation in Egypt, such as Eslam 
(M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active 
in online and offline activities in the UK). He would like to contribute to the future of Egypt 
despite the bad situation: ‘For sure, I would like to return to Egypt and be an active member 
in rebuilding Egypt’. This confirms that although the 2011 revolution has had a negative 
impact on the sense of belonging to the country among the first generation and has stopped 
them from returning to Egypt after the revolution, the sense of belonging remains strong. 
The effects of the 2011 Egyptian revolution have been quite significant for the first 
generation of Egyptians in the UK. This has not diminished the powerful sense of belonging 
for first generation Egyptians, on the one hand, due to several factors such as family ties, 
friends’ networks and place of birth; but, conversely, the 2011 uprising has not resulted in the 
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anticipated improvement of the political and economic situation, either. Several interviewees 
expressed their wish to return to Egypt, but the situation after the revolution, especially after 
2013, has prevented them from doing so. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young 
adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 
‘when convenient’ plus online activities on Facebook) for instance, indicated how he does not 
wish to return to Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising, because of the deterioration in the 
state of affairs: ‘The problem nowadays is with people in Egypt being impolite and lacking 
morals […]. Maher adds that some Egyptians nowadays even laugh when people are being 
killed and hate you if your opinion disagrees with theirs. Maher believes Egyptians lack the 
basics of being human nowadays […] and corruption in Egypt is everywhere. The 2011 uprising 
has left a negative feeling among the first generation and many no longer wish to return to 
Egypt at present. This was confirmed by Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left 
Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt).  
There were many first generation Egyptians who felt optimistic regarding a better Egypt, 
after the 2011 revolution and hoped to return to Egypt. This desire has changed since then. 
For example, Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s 
and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online 
activities on Facebook) states that he would like to go back to Egypt after finishing his 
education in the UK, but if there is a job opportunity available here in the UK he would not 
return to Egypt, especially as the situation appears to be getting worse, after the uprising. The 
notion of returning to Egypt has become less attractive after the uprising, as people feel that 
the situation regarding the insecurity, the economic crisis and poor resources has 
deteriorated, and there is very little hope of achieving their dreams. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st 
generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online activities 
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and sometimes in Egypt), for instance, explains that, being a scientist in Egypt is not possible 
because of the lack of resources. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as 
he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) remarks that his feelings of 
‘belonging’ to Egypt, after the revolution, have turned to hate because of the continuous 
unfairness Egyptians experience, even after the changes in 2011: ‘I have reached the point 
where I hate Egypt as it’s unfair to its people’, Mohamed added.  
Regarding Egypt before the uprising, it was considered ‘unfair’ in terms of the killings, 
kidnappings and torturing of innocent Egyptians. Mohamed continues by explaining how 
things changed during the uprising and straight after, although only temporarily. On the other 
hand, during Mohamed’s visits to Egypt after the uprising, Egyptians hate each other, 
according to him, and they even consider anyone who disagrees with them as enemies. The 
start of the uprising gave a sense of hope to the Egyptians, but this hope soon turned to 
despair and hate. Mohamed does not want to settle down in a country where his human 
rights are not respected, for example, and he also does not want his children to endure such 
an experience.  
The 2011 revolution and its aftermath have not only affected the desire to return to Egypt, 
but it has also affected the personal Egyptian identity. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st 
generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active 
in Egypt and the UK) explains how his identity as an Egyptian has not been positive because 
of the present in Egypt: ‘To be honest, with the current situation in Egypt, I do not say I am 
Egyptian, as of the violation of human rights in Egypt’, Issam stated. Moreover, Issam adds 
that he might regain his sense of pride in being Egyptian ‘if free and fair elections are held’. 
But Issam believes that after the military coup in 2013, everything has been ruined. There are 
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a few interviewees such as Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left 
Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution), 
who remain optimistic about the future of Egypt, and moreover, how Egypt is mentioned in 
the Qur’an and that it would be protected by God. The main theme that emerged was that 
almost all the interviewees agreed on the notion of the revolution being effective for change 
in Egypt, in the beginning. The current situation in Egypt is unsatisfactory for many, however, 
because of the army’s 2013 coup.  
Almost all Egyptians agree that the 2011 revolution was a turning point in Egyptian 
history: ‘I am happy about what happened in Egypt, and what will happen, as it proves that 
we Egyptians can adapt to any change’, Nevine said. What has united the Egyptians is the 
sense of pride during the 2011 uprising: ‘I was really proud during 2011, and even saw that 
pride in the eyes of non-Egyptians’, as Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st generation-mid 
adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the 
UK) stated.  
This sense of pride and euphoria has been shared by many Egyptians. Eslam (M, aged 35, 
1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and 
offline activities in the UK) shared this sense of pride with Issam by stating how Egyptians can 
do anything and can change a bad situation, which makes them feel proud. Mohamed (M, 
aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active 
in Egypt) observed that the Egyptian revolution has taught Egyptians and others how to start 
a peaceful revolution, which makes not only Egyptians but the world proud. Majed (M, aged 
24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online 
activities and sometimes in Egypt) has shared this sense of pride with his fellow Egyptians. 
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This shows that a sense of pride and euphoria have also been shared among Egyptians in the 
UK. This sense of pride has, however, been somehow negatively affected, after the 2011 
revolution and additionally, it has also had an impact on sense of belonging and identity. 
Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and 
left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) declared that he does not wish to 
be called Egyptian, because of the current events in Egypt: ‘To be honest, I do not wish to be 
Egyptian, if the system is going to be the same, as I feel the revolution has done nothing, and 
it is getting worse, not better’.  
To conclude, Egyptians experienced a strong sense of belonging, identity and pride, 
straight after the 2011 uprising, but, they now feel hopeless regarding the situation in Egypt. 
The consensus is that the situation in Egypt is heading in the wrong direction, as many 
interviewees have said. This has had a detrimental effect on their identity and sense of 
belonging and pride in their homeland. For instance, when Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation 
as he left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation-early adulthood. He is politically 
active in Egypt) was asked about his reflections on the Egyptian situation and how the 
revolution has changed him, he replied: ‘I feel sad about the situation in Egypt, and the 
revolution has made me realise how I hate the police and the army’. The first generation 
Egyptians in the UK experienced the euphoria during and immediately after the 2011 
revolution, which has temporarily affected their sense of belonging, identity and pride. They 
now feel that the country is back to zero – the stage before the 2011 revolution. Egyptians 
from the first generation still enjoy a strong sense of belonging to Egypt and their Egyptian 
identity, although 2011 and its aftermath has had a negative effect on their sense of 
belonging. 
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Second generation  
The main findings revealed by the interviews conducted with Egyptians from the second 
generation in the UK are that the sense of belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity and sense of 
pride in the country were temporarily reinforced by the 2011 uprising. Second generation 
Egyptians found the 2011 uprising a good opportunity to express their feelings of belonging 
to Egypt, their Egyptian identity and their sense of pride in being Egyptian. Their sense of 
belonging might vary between Egypt, their parents’ country of origin, and their place of birth 
(the UK).  
The meaning of ‘homeland’ to second generation Egyptians varies, but has not changed 
that much since the 2011 uprising. For instance, Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd 
generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) believes that his 
homeland is Egypt although he was born in the UK. This demonstrates that there is a strong 
affiliation to Egypt, confirmed by Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation 
as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt), in spite of the 
2011 revolution. According to Muhammad, ‘homeland is the place [to which] you feel 
affiliated. Rana (F, aged 20, 1.25 generation as she came to the UK at the age of 16 and she is 
politically active in the UK) states that ‘homeland is Egypt forever’. This reveals that the 
concept of homeland is always associated with Egypt despite living abroad. To conclude this 
point, Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 
2011 revolution) has defined homeland as ‘wherever you feel comfortable’ and this is the 
sense that second generation Egyptians have.  
Second generation Egyptians have made use of the 2011 uprising to reinforce their sense 
of belonging and Egyptian identity, as previously mentioned. Muhammad (M, aged 18, 
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belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in 
the UK and Egypt) stated that the 2011 revolution was a turning point regarding his Egyptian 
identity: ‘I was more certain after the revolution that I am Egyptian, unlike before, when I was 
thinking of my parents as being Egyptian and maybe I am Egyptian-British’. The sense of 
belonging to a country as being that of the parents’ country of origin is common among 
second generation immigrants; however, according to the sample of interviewees for this 
thesis, the 2011 uprising has contributed to strengthening the sense of Egyptian identity 
among second generation Egyptians such as Muhammad. Moreover, not only has the 
revolution been effective in terms of reinforcing Egyptian identity, but it has also encouraged 
second generation Egyptians to feel more Egyptian and be part of political life, according to 
Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 
revolution). In contrast, some interviewees such as Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 
1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. 
Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) feel that his Egyptian 
identity has been negatively affected: ‘I did not feel […that I was…] Egyptian during President 
Morsi’s era between 2012 and 2013’.  
The sense of pride felt among second generation Egyptians is another valuable point that 
arose from the 2011 revolution. All eight second generation interviewees agreed that they 
felt extremely satisfied with what happened during the 2011 uprising. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd 
generation) states how proud she felt regarding the peaceful nature of the revolution and 
how it attracted recognition worldwide. Nonetheless, prior to the 2011 revolution, being 
Egyptian for Sama was just a nationality, and there was nothing of which to be proud. The 
2011 revolution, in this sense, has dramatically affected the sense of pride. Dina (F, aged 22, 
belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years 
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old) adds that the revolution provided everyone, not just Egyptians, with a sense of pride in 
how it was conducted. She believes that it even made Egyptians very proud of being Egyptian. 
The 2011 uprising has consequently given Egyptians the chance to talk positively about Egypt. 
Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then 
came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not 
anymore) mentioned that the 2011 revolution was the beginning of democracy, which made 
Egyptians proud of what they have done.  
According to Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt to go 
Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active 
in the UK but is not anymore), the question of identity depends on the context, as one can be 
British in some instances and Egyptian in others. This raises the notion of having a 
multinational identity: ‘I believe my identity is mixed, I would like to […consider myself as…] 
Egyptian-British’. The advantage of being multinational is that these people can take what 
they like from both cultures: ‘I take good things from both Egyptian and British cultures. I feel 
strongly about both cultures, but I always care about Egypt, as I have roots […there…] and 
that’s why I […was…] motivated to participate in Egypt’s politics’, Michael added. This 
discussion began with second generation Egyptians, as the idea is that they are not 
particularly interested in the identity of the country of origin, according to their responses.  
Egyptians from the second generation are divided in relation to the notion of return. Sama 
(F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 
revolution), for instance, has shown how she is enthusiastic about going back to Egypt as soon 
as she finishes her Master’s in the UK. Sama adds that the main motivation for her returning 
to Egypt is to be politically active in Egyptian affairs. The 2011 revolt has reinforced the sense 
 
 
130 
of belonging and identity among some second-generation Egyptians. As a result, the desire to 
return is appealing for Sama, especially after the changes that occurred after the Egyptian 
uprising. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. 
He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) shares the same idea with Sama 
regarding returning to Egypt: ‘Once I graduate and reach the level which allows me to go back 
to Egypt, I will go back’. The notion of returning to Egypt has not been considered by some 
second-generation Egyptians living in the UK, contrary to what happened to the first 
generation of Egyptians, due to 2011 uprising.  
Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia 
then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but 
is not anymore), for example, has stated that the notion of return to Egypt is unlikely, as he 
has family members who left Egypt after the revolution, due to the difficult economic and 
social situation there: ‘My cousins left Egypt after the revolution, as the lifestyle was not 
comfortable and […they…] went to Canada and developed many skills’. Mohammed (M, aged 
37, 1.75 generation as he came to the UK when he was 3, he is politically active in Egypt and 
the UK and online activities) shares the idea of not being able to return to Egypt, as many of 
his friends left Egypt after the uprising, to work elsewhere. This has consequently discouraged 
Mohammed from going back to Egypt, especially with the bad economic situation. Besides, 
he also feels settled in the UK, as he has been here for a long time. Mohammed adds that 
second generation Egyptians are settled here, especially those born in the UK or those who 
came to the UK at a very young age, such as Mohammed and Dina. Regarding Dina (F, aged 
22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 
3 years old), she mentions that although she feels connected to Egypt, this does not mean 
she would abandon her life in the UK to settle down there. The lack of opportunities and the 
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difficulty associated with living as an independent woman in Egypt, discourage Dina from 
considering this option. The notion of return among second generation Egyptians does vary, 
but what unites them are the visits to Egypt to see members of their families, and to 
personally witness events.  
According to Rumbaut (1994), immigrants to the United States tend to stick more to their 
national identity (their country of origin). Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as 
she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), demonstrates how 
strongly she feels about her Egyptian identity by stating that although she does not look 
‘British’, whenever people ask her where she is from, she replies Egypt, not Britain or England; 
even though she loves Britain, and does not intend to leave. She feels connected to Britain 
because she grew up here and ‘it’s where I study and know how things work’, Dina says. Dina 
feels Egyptian, regarding her identity, but, at the same, the connection to Britain, where she 
grew up and has lived almost all her life, is also part of her identity. This is what is meant by 
‘multiple belonging’ and being happy about living in two different worlds.  
Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is 
interested in politics in the UK) agrees with Dina (F, aged 22 years old, belonging to 1.75 
generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), in terms 
of being affected by both Egyptian and British cultures: ‘I am lucky to have got two cultures 
as I can take good things from both cultures and leave the bad stuff in each culture’. Rami (M, 
aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not 
interested in politics) also expresses how fortunate he is to belong to both cultures: ‘I feel 
lucky to have two cultures as I get the best […from…] each culture’. The notion of acquiring 
the positive aspects from both cultures is common among Egyptians, especially those who 
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are second generation living in the UK. This concludes this section by showing how second 
generation Egyptians living in the UK are happy with the combination of living in both cultures 
– especially belonging to two cultures – due to the place of birth and belonging to their 
parents’ country of origin.  
A discussion of some of the theories that have been adopted in each chapter to back up 
the findings of this thesis, appear at the end of each section. The definitions of ‘diaspora’ are 
dealt with in this chapter regarding identity and belonging. Theories on identity and sense of 
belonging in diasporic groups by Safran, Clifford, Sheffer, Armstrong and Hirji, for instance, 
are examined, in order to uncover the possible similarities that these groups may or may not 
have. Safran’s characteristics of diaspora (see Chapter Five for more details) cannot be 
applied to all diasporic groups, as his definition of diaspora does not include other generations 
such as the second and third, although they are part of the diasporic groups. Sheffer (1986) 
conversely, comes up with a new definition of diaspora, which refers to diasporic groups 
which have no connection with either their countries of origin or their host countries. Sheffer 
to an extent, builds on Safran’s definition of diaspora, however, some critics refute Safran and 
Sheffer’s explanations of diaspora. Armstrong and Hirji for example, deal with diasporic 
groups as those which include all diasporic groups, such as second and third generations.  
The focus of this chapter has been on first and second generations within the Egyptian 
diaspora. The findings have shown that through conducting interviews with Egyptians in the 
UK, the Egyptian diaspora is involved in the activities of both the country of origin (Egypt) and 
the host country (the UK). This demonstrates a strong identity and sense of belonging to each 
country; moreover, not only are Egyptians in the UK involved in the politics of both Egypt and 
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the UK, but the majority of interviewees belong to both countries to different degrees, which 
contradicts both Safran’s and Sheffer’s definitions of diaspora.  
Safran’s idea of diaspora characteristics, illustrates one of the key features of diaspora: 
the notion of returning to the homeland (Egypt, in this case). The findings in this thesis 
indicate that this notion in the case of Egyptians from first and second generations is divided. 
For instance, Egyptians from the first generation have been negatively affected by the 
uprising, while the desire to return to Egypt among the second generation has been 
reinforced, for a while. This demonstrates that the return to one’s home country can be 
affected by important events such as revolutions.  
Summary  
The 2011 uprising in Egypt has contributed somewhat to the social lives of Egyptians from 
first and second generations. Interviews with Egyptians from first and second generations 
have revealed that each respondent has had a different experience pertaining to the 2011 
revolution. The first generation has been negatively affected by the uprising, as they no longer 
wish to go back to Egypt to settle down, principally for economic and security reasons. The 
only time when identity was reinforced during the 2011 revolution, was when the first 
generation Egyptians’ sense of pride in the peaceful demonstrations was overwhelming. 
Recently however, most of the first generation has abandoned the sense of pride in their 
homeland, due to the chaos and uncertainty. The second generation are also divided in terms 
of the sense of belonging and identity but are united in terms of a strong sense of pride and 
being happy to live within two cultures.  
In this section, I present some of my reflections on belonging, identity and if the 2011 
uprising has had any impact. Initially, an interesting fact revealed in this project is the strong 
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attachment of second generation Egyptians in the UK to Egypt, in terms of Egyptian identity 
and belonging to Egypt. I had the assumption that Egyptians who were born outside Egypt or 
have lived away from Egypt for a long period would not be interested in their parents’ country 
of origin. Furthermore, that those who left Egypt for a long time are assumed to be 
disconnected from their country of birth. The other fascinating fact interviewing Egyptians in 
the UK, is the unifying sense of pride in relation to the first and second generation Egyptians 
in the UK. This confirms how the 2011 uprising has been the reason for such a unifying feeling 
among Egyptians in Egypt and abroad, specifically in the UK. Then again, the 2011 revolution 
has had a profound effect on Egyptians but for not long. Nowadays, Egyptians do not 
experience the sense of pride and interest in returning to Egypt unlike during and immediately 
after the uprising back in 2011.  
Such points raise the notion of how an event such as the revolution can impact on 
personal lives of citizens either positively or negatively. Moreover, the impact of some 
revolutions might last for decades, considering the effect that the 2011 uprising has had on 
Egyptians. Even if the effects of the uprising have had temporary positive impacts on 
Egyptians in terms of sense of pride and the notion of return to Egypt, the negative effects 
such as the disinterest in settling down in Egypt permanently and the sense of not having an 
Egyptian identity anymore will most probably last a long time. The notion of return has been 
made conditional among Egyptian interviewees by significant and radical changes in their 
homeland or their parents’ homeland for some Egyptians, especially those who were not born 
in Egypt. Moreover, changes in homeland invoke an imaginary picture of the homeland as a 
better society. Citizens become hopeful that the homeland can be a good place to settle in, 
thanks to a revolution or any other type of change. In other words, if Egypt did not witness 
major change such as the revolution, the notion of return would not be a common idea among 
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many Egyptians, especially during and straight after the uprising. Finally, this chapter has 
shown how the 2011 revolution was an extraordinary event affecting Egyptians in the UK 
(more details in Chapter Nine).   
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Chapter Seven: Political Participation and the Egyptian Diaspora in the 
UK  
Introduction  
The report produced by the House of Commons (2014) focuses on the political 
participation of ethnic minorities in the UK, how politically apathetic they are and how the 
2011 uprising contributes to this factor. Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014) agree with other scholars 
and the House of Commons report that diasporic communities are not interested in politics.  
This chapter attempts to examine the political engagement of diasporic communities and 
how involved they are in the politics of their homeland, by answering the following research 
questions: 1(a) to what extent has the 2011 revolution seen a great change in terms of the 
political activities of the Egyptian diaspora in the UK? And, 1(b) if the 2011 uprising in Egypt 
has had an impact on Egyptians in the UK, has this been temporary, or is it on-going? 2(a) 
have there been any changes regarding the notion that diasporic communities are politically 
apathetic, as the report of the House of Commons asserts?  
This chapter is divided into two main sections according to which generation interviewees 
belong to and political engagement among different generations. The interviewees have been 
categorised according to first and second generations, as I have ascertained that a difference 
exists between the Egyptians from these generations. The first main section deals with 
political participation and the first generation, which includes those who were born in Egypt 
and are currently residing in the UK. The second section is regarding second generation 
Egyptians, primarily those born in the UK, as well as those who belong to the 1.25, 1.50 and 
1.75 generations (see Chapter Five). Additionally, type of political participation is dealt with 
in this specific section, including voting, protesting, and online and offline participation among 
each generation. Table 6 presents general information concerning participants; specifically, 
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the percentages of females and males among the interviewees, besides the percentage of 
political activities and religion. Such percentages give readers an idea of the type of 
participants in this study and to which religion, gender and political group they belong.  
Table 6 Number and percentage of participants in terms of gender, religion and political participation 
Category  Participants  Number  Percentage  
Gender Females  6 27% 
Males  16 73% 
Religion  Muslims  21 95%  
Christians  1 5% 
Political participation  Active in political activities in 
Egypt  
5 22%  
Active in political activities in the 
UK 
14 64% 
Not interested in politics  3 14%  
Total  Participants  22 100% 
 
Online vs. offline participation 
First generation  
The main finding regarding political participation and the first generation is that Egyptian 
participants from the first generation are not interested in protesting or becoming involved 
in Egyptian politics. Being politically apathetic among the first generation has emerged due to 
many factors; one of them being the sense of hopelessness felt by the participants from the 
first generation, particularly regarding the situation in Egypt during Mubarak’s regime. 
Scepticism was also common among the first generation during 2011. There were many 
Egyptians, including Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he 
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was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), who were 
surprised by the fact that the revolution succeeded so quickly and peacefully. Issam states 
that he believed nothing would happen in Egypt. Nonetheless, this unexpected and surprising 
conduct during the uprising was one of the factors which helped the revolution succeed. 
Though most Egyptians under forty and their parents’ generation did not anticipate any 
changes occurring in Egypt, young Egyptians decided to fight until the government responded 
to their demands.  
The participants felt that their voices were not heard by the Egyptian authorities. 
According to the Egyptian interviewees involved in this study, the feelings of hopelessness 
among Egyptians was a consequence of the corrupt government in Egypt, the mainstream 
media, residing in the Gulf prior to moving to the UK, and the futility in protesting, voting and 
participating in political activities. The other notion which discouraged Egyptians from 
protesting was the lack of freedom of expression in Egypt, compared to the UK. Eslam (M, 
aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in 
online and offline activities in the UK) expresses how Egyptians living in the UK have the 
chance to join peaceful protests, as they are considered part of freedom of expression. 
Moreover, no one can force Egyptians to join any protests in the UK. The Egyptian media, 
conversely, encourages people by means of propaganda to participate in protests.  
The role that the media played in the uprising of Egyptians in the UK is discussed in detail 
in Chapter Eight. First generation participants indicated that their voices did not make any 
difference in decision-making prior to 2011. They had a sense of hopelessness, because 
nothing was going to change, whether they were politically active or not. However, this 
changed during the uprising. Participants started to feel that they could make a difference by 
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engaging in politics after the 2011 revolution. They believed that if they do not participate in 
Egypt’s politics, they would lose their country, and moreover, Egypt would not be a good place 
in which to live. It should be noted that the participants from all generations felt a sense of 
euphoria during the 2011 uprising.  
The other factor which contributed to the participants being politically apathetic is 
residing in other countries which banned protests regarding Egypt, prior to living in the UK. 
Egyptians living or working in Gulf countries, for instance, were prevented from protesting, 
even if they had wanted to do so. This has underpinned the lack of interest in any political 
activities. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born 
in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, used to 
reside in Kuwait for a while and explains how he and other Egyptians were not permitted to 
engage in any political activities relating to Egypt, which discouraged many Egyptians from 
becoming involved in politics, prior to and during the uprising.  
Egyptians living in Gulf countries who wished to engage in political activities, such as 
protests, to support Egypt faced two options: the first was to travel back to Egypt to protest 
and share their demands with fellow Egyptians; the second was to protest online. However, 
online activities were also monitored by the governments of certain Gulf countries, according 
to Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt 
and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK). It is worth mentioning that 
Issam chose to travel to Egypt from Kuwait to participate in the revolt in 2011, although a lot 
of Egyptian families attempted to discourage and even ban their sons and daughters from 
protesting. Subsequently, he decided to leave Kuwait and move to the UK, where he has 
participated in political activities organised by various Egyptian groups in the country, for 
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instance, Egyptians Anti-Coup and Rabia-London, to express his opinion. Issam (M, aged 36, 
belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He 
is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that political activities in the UK are important 
and are better than protests being banned, as in some Gulf countries. Issam and his friends 
were politically active online, primarily through Facebook, even though protests were illegal 
and online political activities were monitored in Gulf countries. Protesters used online 
platforms to organise sessions to raise awareness of the events taking place in Egypt, and how 
Egyptians abroad could stand against the dictatorship. Online activities have somehow 
replaced physical activities, for example, protesting in the streets, for those who cannot 
physically protest or who feel that physical protests will not be effective. According to Issam, 
online activities were effective in terms of applying mechanisms that would benefit Egypt: 
‘We held sessions [… to think about…] how we, as Egyptians abroad, could do something for 
Egypt’; Issam adds that the most important task is how Egyptians abroad can contribute 
[…towards…] achieving change in Egypt.  
The mainstream media in Egypt is another factor contributing to the sense of 
hopelessness felt among first generation Egyptians. Issam was asked about the techniques 
used by the media to force Egyptians to protest, he replied: ‘by lies and propaganda’. It is true 
[…that…] every media […outlet…] has its own agenda and uses propaganda, but the Egyptian 
media played a major role in leading Egyptians to join protests by means of their programmes 
and propaganda. This has led to mistrust of the mainstream media among Egyptians. 
Egyptians protesting in the UK back in 2011 were sending messages to the Egyptian 
government and media saying that they could be effective regarding decision making and that 
Egyptians abroad are in solidarity with Egyptians ‘at home’.  
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Participants from the first generation are not interested in protesting in the UK, seeing as 
they believe that their role would be more influential if they participated with their friends 
and relatives in Egypt itself, not in the UK. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so 
considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), for instance, 
states: ‘if there is going to be a second revolution in Egypt – which is coming soon – I would 
prefer to be in Egypt with my friends and family’. Goffman’s (1959) notion is that an 
individual’s performance is socialised according to what society expects from him or her. 
Egyptian society expects Egyptians from the first generation to protest in Egypt among family 
and friends, as illustrated by Mazen’s statement. That is why some Egyptians travelled back 
to Egypt during the revolution, to reinforce their Egyptian identity and to meet expectations. 
My question to Mazen was: ‘Do you not think your role here in the UK can be more effective 
than protesting in Egypt?’ Mazen’s answer was that the effects of protesting here in the UK 
are limited, while in Egypt one can sense that one is doing something for one’s country; 
however, Mazen adds that this does not deny the fact that the role of Egyptians abroad is 
crucial, as it shows their solidarity with their fellow Egyptians at home, by sharing their 
demands and suffering.  
Egyptian groups on Facebook, such as ‘25th of January Egyptians in the UK’ had organised 
the event ‘Freedom and dignity to our people back home’ on 21st of October 2014 to display 
their support for Egyptians in Egypt. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his 
mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) shares the same 
opinion with Mazen, in terms of the limited role Egyptians in the UK have. Shabaan states: ‘I 
do not believe in protests here in the UK as they are ineffective’. This is the reason for Shabaan 
not participating in any protest organised in the UK regarding the revolution. There are many 
participants who agree with the notion that political activities, such as protesting in the UK, 
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are symbolic, but have a psychological effect on Egyptians. Egyptians feel that their protests 
in the UK symbolically contribute to Egypt by displaying solidarity. Issam (M, aged 36, 
belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He 
is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that protesting in the UK has a mental and 
emotional effect: ‘Protesting in the UK is psychological and symbolic, as there are very few 
protests’. Moreover, some people believe that the voices of Egyptians abroad would not 
make any difference, nor [would it] put pressure on […the…] government. The reasons 
mentioned above reveal that first-generation Egyptians in the UK do not protest in their host 
country but believe more in online participation.  
Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not 
interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), believes that protesting in the UK is not as 
effective as becoming politically involved in Egypt. He believes that his role and that of his 
fellow Egyptians in the UK is futile: ‘I don’t believe in protests in the UK about Egypt, as they 
are ineffective and that’s why I didn’t participate in […any…] protests regarding the uprising’. 
Shabaan adds that even protests in Europe are unproductive, as they achieve very little, unlike 
protesting in Egypt, or a place where protesting might be effective. Nonetheless, there are 
still certain interviewees, such as Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-
young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the 
UK) and Issam who believe Egyptians in the UK do have a role to play, such as raising 
awareness and showing solidarity with fellow Egyptians to demonstrate to the world that 
Egyptians abroad are there and that they can make their voices heard. 
In contrast, there are other participants who still believe that the role of Egyptians abroad 
is limited and that they cannot change anything. The notion of a physical presence in the ‘hot 
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spot’ is valid, as some Egyptians, such as Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so 
considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), believe being 
present in the protests among their friends and family, is the most important thing, and much 
better than wasting time by protesting in the UK. Mazen adds: ‘What I am doing here in the 
UK? Protesting or posting on Facebook cannot be compared with what some do in Egypt. I 
just want to satisfy myself, my conscience, that I am at least doing something for Egypt. That 
is the least I can do’. Mazen basically summarises what many Egyptians feel regarding living 
abroad and how they feel towards their home country. However, Mazen also states that 
protesting in the UK can have some positive results regarding informing the world of the 
events in Egypt. He added, ‘I heard how the role of Egyptians in the UK was effective during 
the 2011 uprising by informing people in the UK about what was going on in Egypt’. He was 
asked whether he had experienced that during 2011, and replied ‘yes’, as he had been able 
to share updates on Egypt with his colleagues at university. Ehab (M, aged 43, 1st generation), 
conversely, believes political participation is a waste of time: ‘I do not think political 
participation in the UK is useful, as I live in the UK currently and I want to be integrated into 
international society […], the country I live in, and be useful to the whole world’.  
Egyptian interviewees from the first generation are often reluctant to protest in the 
streets. Consequently, interviewees decided to look for alternatives with which to support 
Egypt. Based on interviews with fourteen first generation Egyptians residing in the UK they 
have been divided into two groups: (i) those who believe that the role of Egyptians in the UK 
can be effective in terms of raising awareness of the situation in Egypt as Egyptians living in 
the UK and (ii) the second group of first generation Egyptians comprised of those who believe 
their role in the UK is limited and protesting in Egypt is more effective than protesting in the 
UK.  
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Role of the Egyptians in the UK 
Raising awareness of events in Egypt has been the mission of many Egyptians living 
abroad, since the uprising in 2011. According to Issam, (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st 
generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active 
in Egypt and the UK) the role of Egyptians abroad is to show the world that Egyptians still have 
issues that they wish to address: ‘It’s just to show people outside Egypt that we, as Egyptians, 
have a […duty…] to raise awareness, as the media do not cover such issues’. Consequently, 
the mission of Egyptians overseas is to raise awareness of several activists and ordinary 
people being killed and kidnapped. According to Issam, raising awareness of the situation in 
Egypt should not only have occurred at the time of the uprising, but even now during current 
events, five years after the revolution. There are many issues that should be raised after 2011. 
For instance, Egyptians are still suffering from kidnappings, killings and torture. Nevine (F, 
aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active 
in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) argues that the role played by Egyptians 
abroad is essential, in terms of showing the world that Egypt is still going through challenging 
times. Nevine was asked if she believes the role played by Egyptians abroad would have any 
positive effect. She replied that ‘It would make a difference to tell the world about what was 
happening in the country at the time of the uprising, just like the Egyptians in Europe did’. 
This shows that the part played by Egyptians abroad is as vital as protesting in Egypt.  
Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt 
and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that the participation 
of Egyptians in the UK can be effective by raising awareness of what is happening in Egypt. 
For example, when Issam travelled to Egypt to witness the revolution, he joined his friends as 
members of a movement, known as ‘Taghyeer’ (meaning ‘change’ in English) by distributing 
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fliers. In addition, when Issam was residing in Kuwait, he started to collaborate with his fellow 
movement members in his homeland, to let people in Kuwait know what was happening in 
Egypt. Moreover, Issam and other Egyptians in the UK therefore raised awareness, and 
informed people of the ‘truth’. The role of Egyptians living outside the country is to distribute 
accurate news about Egypt, as the media can rarely be trusted to do this. Issam adds: 
‘With the collaboration of friends in Egypt, we are able, as Egyptians abroad, […not only…] 
to tell the world what’s going on in Egypt, […but…] and, at the same time, tell the Egyptian 
authorities that we, as Egyptians abroad, are not passive’.  
Furthermore, Issam adds that Egyptians overseas can send a message by means of their 
political activities to the Egyptian authorities that they are knowledgeable of what’s going on, 
such as killings without any reason, and […that…] Egyptians abroad haven’t forgotten such 
events in Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 
20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) also shares 
Issam’s view that Egyptians should still be involved and raise awareness of Egyptian affairs. 
She believes the notion of leaving Egypt to the Egyptians to decide what they want to do to 
change Egypt is mistaken: ‘I am still Egyptian […although I live in the UK….] and have the right 
to interfere in Egypt’s politics, as I might return to live in Egypt someday’. The notion of 
interfering in Egypt’s affairs for some such as Nevine, is a matter of identity and a sense of 
belonging to Egypt. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 
20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), 
alternatively, believes that once someone leaves Egypt, he or she should start a new life in 
the host country, and should concentrate on building a future there. He prefers to focus on 
his life in the UK rather than protesting or becoming involved in any political activities: ‘I want 
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to build a good life for me in the UK and stop thinking about Egypt […] and leave Egypt to the 
Egyptians who live in Egypt […], as I left Egypt. That’s it’. It is perfectly acceptable to think 
about building a good life for oneself, especially in one’s host country; however, the idea of 
leaving Egypt to the Egyptians who live there, might appear to be passive and politically 
apathetic to others.  
Shereen (F, aged 31, 1st generation), in contrast was active by organising sessions in 
different universities in the UK to talk about the situation in Egypt, as opposed to Ehab. 
Shereen argues that everything in Egypt, especially in 2011, happened suddenly, and people 
needed some explanations, especially during the uprising. Shereen also mentions that she 
and her friends started a campaign on the streets of Sheffield during the 2011 unrest (where 
she was studying) entitled ‘Ask about Egypt’ to answer any questions that passers-by might 
have had regarding the revolution. Shereen adds that the best people who can answer 
questions about Egypt are Egyptians living in the UK. Shereen says that she held a banner 
saying ‘Ask about Egypt’ during the campaign, and people in the street actively engaged with 
questions. British people had some queries about Egypt for which they could not find answers 
from the media. Shereen adds that holding a campaign like ‘Ask about Egypt’ is the least 
Egyptians abroad can do.  
Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is 
politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online activities on 
Facebook) claims that if the role of Egyptians in the UK is limited, the only option available is 
to raise awareness of the events in Egypt for those who are interested in knowing more. For 
instance, obtaining the news from people who have networks in Egypt, besides family and 
friends, would be a reliable and credible source: Maher adds: ‘People outside Egypt depend 
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on news about Egypt from specific sources, primarily the media’. According to Maher, Such 
sources might be biased and misleading, unlike those who are based in Egypt and witness 
events personally. Those people cannot be biased, and their pieces of news are genuine. 
There are many participants in this research who depended on friends and family based 
in Egypt for their information; however, what Maher says is not strictly true. These people 
might also be biased, according to their personal agenda and own point of view. The fact that 
Egyptians in the UK felt helpless about improving the situation in Egypt prior to 2011 and 
believed nothing would change, meant some decided to protest for other reasons.  
One of the main reasons Egyptians participated in political protests in the UK was to 
support the Palestinians in their on-going conflict with Israel. Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen 
belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She 
is politically active in the UK) claims that because protesting in support of Egypt was useless, 
participating in protests supporting Palestine was the alternative. There were some Egyptians 
in the UK who were politically active but for different reasons. Maher did not join the street 
protests in 2011, as he was not aware of the protests happening around him and took on the 
responsibility to raise awareness of the current situation in Egypt among his colleagues by 
depending on his source of information, his family and friends. The argument here could be 
that friends and family can also be biased, depending on their ideologies and in what they 
believe, but they would deliver news as it is, according to what they witnessed. To receive 
news from people who have witnessed events, is still better than receiving news from the 
media, with their own ideology, and methods of presenting the news, by reporting some 
events and purposely disregarding others.  
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People who live outside the country, and who only have access to Western media or a 
limited news source which is selective in its coverage, have the chance to make up their own 
minds by obtaining their news from different sources. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st 
generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active 
in Egypt and the UK) states that: ‘I personally experienced something like that, informally with 
my colleagues at work’. Issam started raising awareness about the situation in Egypt as the 
news on TV did not report the truth: ‘Being an Egyptian abroad, I have a responsibility to make 
things clearer to people worldwide’. Issam’s statement demonstrates how Egyptians abroad 
can play a vital role in raising awareness and show the world the true image of the events in 
Egypt. Raising awareness is as crucial as protesting in the streets, and it might be effective, to 
a certain degree. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 
20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online 
activities on Facebook) also participated in the protest organised in London during the official 
visit of Egypt’s President El-Sisi. The protest was organised on the 4th of November 2015, in 
front of 10 Downing Street, by those who oppose President El-Sisi, to demonstrate their 
disapproval of his visit to London. The protesters wanted to show that El-Sisi was not welcome 
in London, and that he is an illegitimate leader of the country. Maher’s participation in the 
protest is another sign that a group of Egyptians still believe protesting on the streets is 
beneficial, despite the opposition of other Egyptian groups.  
The other alternative that Egyptians from the first generation, especially those above 
forty, have considered is online protests or activities. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. 
Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or 
Egypt) says that he participates in online activities, for example online protests, as it is his best 
option, considering that he is a medical doctor and has a busy life. This confirms, once again, 
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that online protesting had replaced physical street protests for Egyptians in the UK. There are 
many Egyptians residing in the UK who believe posting events, in relation to the uprising, 
online (Facebook, for instance), is the best option, given the fact that they live away from the 
‘hotspot’.  
According to the first-generation Egyptians, there is another choice which involves 
obtaining a higher academic degree in the UK. There are some Egyptians who believe that 
studying for a higher degree, rather than being active in political activities, will benefit Egypt 
more: ‘If I study here in the UK, this will benefit Egypt in the future’, Mazen (M, aged 20. Left 
Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in 
Egypt) claims. To be useful to Egypt, he says, is being successful in one’s studies – obtaining a 
higher degree is the solution. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left 
Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) 
also believes in the same idea. He considers that people who leave their home country and 
settle down in another one, should be encouraged to engage in further studies. To be 
successful, they should work towards being useful citizens, wherever they live: 
Ehab adds ‘Egyptians must conduct themselves, according to the place they live in 
[…]. They should be productive in the country they live in […Britain…]. They should 
not be negative and just be productive in their home country but be productive in 
their host country as well’. 
Karim (M, aged 26, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is not 
interested in politics) agrees with Ehab, asserting that it would be more beneficial for 
Egyptians to be well-educated, rather than engaging in protests. Karim’s thoughts show that 
he is in the UK to succeed in obtaining a degree for his studies, rather than protesting. The 
second group of Egyptians from the first generation on the other hand believes protesting is 
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futile and a waste of time. A group of participants, especially those aged forty and above, 
believes that the role that Egyptians can play in the UK is limited, and moreover, that protests 
in the UK are ineffective, but may help to make Egyptians ‘feel good’ about having contributed 
something to Egypt.  
Participation by permission 
This section discusses the authority that parents have over their adult children, and how 
this authority affects the decisions related to be politically active. This parental control has 
discouraged many young Egyptians from protesting. Al Rub and Majedh (2007) conducted a 
study on parenting styles among immigrant parents in the US. The study focuses on the 
methods parents adopt to deal with their children in the host country. The study revealed 
that the most common one that parents assume among immigrants from Arab backgrounds 
in the US is the authoritarian style. The study demonstrates that parenting styles differ among 
parents in home countries and in host countries. Parents from an Arab background would be 
much stricter and more controlling in their home countries than in host countries, where their 
approach would be more permissive and more indulgent (Al Rub and Majedh 2007). Children 
of immigrants face difficulties in expressing their opinions to their parents. Their desire to 
participate in protests (or their actual participation in protests) and involvement in political 
activities, is not always met with approval. According to Dwairy (2004), parents residing in a 
host country tend to stick to their cultural habits and traditions with respect to raising their 
children, but also attempt to adapt to the culture of the host country. Parents who keep their 
home country’s culture rooted in their children, whilst at the same time endeavouring to 
integrate into the host country’s culture, could confuse their young children. 
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Parents of Egyptian interviewees in the UK adopt an authoritarian style with their children, 
by preventing them from protesting and being involved in political activities. Young Egyptians 
who wished to go back to Egypt to participate in the protests organised there were banned 
from going by their parents, whilst parental authority has also been used on those young 
Egyptians who wished to participate in protests in the UK. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 
the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically 
active in Egypt and the UK), for example, claims that his parents’ generation was the main 
problem preventing the younger generation from engaging in revolutionary activities in 
Egypt. The parental ban was due to various reasons; apart from disagreeing with the change 
and uprising, parents were also concerned about safety issues and the dangerous 
environment that protestors had witnessed, especially in Egypt.  
Families can also impact on their children’s political participation. Maccoby and Martin 
(1983) categorised parenting behaviour as ‘controlling’ and ‘permissive’ (cited in Baumrind 
1991). The control over young children’s decisions has been associated with specific groups 
of individuals, such as Hispanic and African-Americans. The parenting style that some 
Egyptians in the UK have adopted is the controlling one (Zahran 2011). Johnson and Kelley 
(2011) believe that children raised under the permissive parenting style, enjoy freedom of 
expression and choice. Moreover, children are not controlled by permissive parents. As a 
result, children would have the choice to become involved in various activities. In addition, 
Johnson and Kelley (2011) demonstrate that children raised under the permissive parenting 
style tend to enjoy a warm and welcoming environment at home. However, this parenting 
style might have a negative impact on children, given that they may not receive proper 
guidance from their parents, as they are free to do anything.  
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Baumrind (1971), in contrast, identifies parenting styles as authoritarian, authoritative 
and permissive. The authoritarian style affects children not only in the early stages of their 
lives but also into adulthood. According to parental acceptance–rejection theory, children and 
later adults, might develop aggression, passive aggression, besides many other problems 
(Rohner 1986). Parents from a Middle Eastern background tend to adopt the authoritarian 
style, which may cause difficulties for children, such as making their own decisions and how 
to integrate into the society in which they reside. The nature of an authoritarian parenting 
style involves explaining reasons for rejecting some values and actions; however, some 
authoritarian parents might explain reasons for rejecting something but always force their 
children to follow their orders (Rohner 1986). Parenting styles vary, and each style has its 
advantages and disadvantages. According to Zahran (2011), parents do not always stick to the 
culture inherited from their parents but create their own culture. Creating a special culture 
by combining many factors from various cultures could be beneficial to children. Second 
generation immigrants, for example, would benefit from this approach, seeing as they would 
be able to adapt to home as well as host societies.  
The study conducted by Dwairy et al. (2006) focuses on parenting styles in Arab societies 
and consists of three patterns. The first style is controlling and is also termed ‘authoritarian 
and authoritative’ (see also Baumrind 1971). This style is associated with not allowing children 
to express their opinions and feelings and involves rejecting many actions and attitudes 
without giving any reasons. The interviews in this study show that many Egyptians in the UK 
experienced the same parental style during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The second style is 
inconsistent, authoritarian and permissive, whereas the final style is flexible, combining both 
authoritative and permissive attitudes. Parenting styles are important to children regarding 
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their psycho-social development. Permissive parents allow their children to make their own 
decisions and prepare them to face various activities in later life (Dwairy et al. 2006).  
The most common parenting styles in Arab societies are permissive and authoritarian 
(Dwairy et al. 2006). Parents residing in the US have benefited from living there by not 
adopting the same strategies of discipline their parents used with them. Parents in the US 
who are from Arab backgrounds started to research new ways of disciplining their children, 
such as open discussions. These parents are aware that old-fashioned techniques, for instance 
spanking and hitting their children are not allowed in the US; consequently, new disciplinary 
methods are required. Parenting styles have affected the political participation of young 
people: as a result, some young people are not interested in politics. 
The question would then be: what about protesting in the UK, where it is claimed most 
protests are safe? Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation 
early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) explains that his mother objected to his 
becoming involved in politics: 
‘Personally, I would so love to get involved in politics, but the problem is my mother 
[…]. She is so concerned about me getting involved in politics, especially when I go 
to Egypt, given the fact that she realises that my point of view is against the army 
ruling Egypt’. 
Mazen adds: ‘My mother thought I would get arrested the last time I visited Egypt, 
because I posted [… comments…] against the Egyptian army’. This point shows how parents, 
especially from Middle Eastern societies, have powerful authority over their adult children. 
Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is 
politically active in Egypt) states how his family was extremely worried about him protesting 
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in Alexandria, Egypt, during the uprising. However, Mohamed was not prevented from 
protesting, but the idea that families opposed protesting, was common. Consequently, the 
safety of protesters is a significant factor, especially for mothers. Protesting outside of Egypt 
may be safer, but some people are not interested in political activities, while others may be 
prevented from participating by their parents, and so on.  
Egyptian interviewees in the UK agree that young Egyptians were the reason for the 
rebellion and success of the 2011 the revolution: ‘Mostly those who were in Tahrir Square are 
the young and middle-class people’, Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so 
middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) says. According to Hani, the 
younger generation of Egyptians are more likely to take risks, unlike their parents’ generation, 
which is reluctant to welcome change. This is the key difference between the young Egyptians 
and their parents’ generation: ‘The 2011 revolution was mobilised by young Egyptians, while 
the older generation opposed what was happening in Egypt, as their businesses had been 
negatively affected, so they view the term ‘change’ differently to the younger generation’, 
Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt 
and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) added. Hani’s statement 
illustrates the different viewpoint that these two generations had.  
The young generation of participants blame their parents’ generation for delaying the 
revolution until 2011: ‘I think we must ask my parents’ generation why they hadn’t done 
anything about the corruption and poor situation in Egypt’. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in 
his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) 
added that the young should ask their parents’ generation if they were satisfied with the 
situation in Egypt. This demonstrates how the younger generation ‘welcomed risks’, as Hani 
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says. The young Egyptians are revolutionary and want to change everything wrong with 
society: ‘The younger generation is not going to be silent anymore, unlike […their…] parents’ 
generation: Mubarak would have stayed for another forty years, if it was up to […our…] 
parents’ generation – the young want change’, Mazen asserts. Mazen was asked whether the 
parents’ generation participated in the uprising. His answer was that the Egyptian army strove 
to convince the older generation that the uprising was bad, by showing the negative side of 
change – how Egypt would be ruined if those ‘bad guys’, the Muslim Brotherhood, were in 
charge. Mazen says 
‘I don’t deny that the older generation did participate in the revolution, but […it 
was…] the older generation who brought President El-Sisi to power on the 30th of 
June 2013 – the coup – when President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate 
for the presidential election, was removed by the army’. 
This suggests that the older generation played a negative role in the uprising, according 
to many Egyptians. The level of negativity was generally high among Egyptians, whether in 
terms of Mubarak resigning or concerning any change in the country. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 
1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) 
states that he did not expect President Mubarak to resign: ‘I never thought Mubarak would 
leave, at all’. There were many Egyptians, including those residing in the UK, who had the 
feeling of hopelessness and negativity, as previously stated. However, when the 2011 
revolution erupted, the sense of positivity ‘went viral’, especially with the younger 
generation, encouraging each other to revolt. The slogan among Egyptians, as Mohammed 
(M, aged 37, 1.75 generation as he came to the UK when he was 3, he is politically active in 
Egypt and the UK and online activities) states, was: ‘It is a chance that comes once in a 
lifetime’. Once again, the younger generation took on the responsibility to first encourage 
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each other, and then urge other generations to revolt and say no to the circumstances in 
Egypt.  
Mohamed adds that the younger generation’s encouragement of others to support the 
revolution was vital, as many had had negative feelings about the revolution in terms of its 
effectiveness and success. According to them, it would achieve nothing, though the young 
people were determined to meet the revolution’s goals. According to Mohamed, the main 
motivation for fellow Egyptians to support the protests of 2011 was the large number of 
Egyptians on the streets endorsing the uprising. A further reason for Egyptians to join the 
protests was because the Egyptian police had acted aggressively and violently towards the 
protestors, causing the deaths of countless Egyptians. This situation created widespread 
anger among the families of those who had died or had been injured. This resulted in 
Egyptians deciding to join these families to seek justice for those killed and injured, and 
consequently, encouraged millions to join the protests on the country’s streets.  
The notion of negativity was more common among the older generation, and those aged 
forty and over: ‘The parents’ generation is very negative, as they just don’t want to change 
anything. They are used to a specific lifestyle and don’t want anything disturbing this lifestyle’, 
Mohamed adds. Egyptians over the age of forty did not want any change, as, throughout 
Egyptian history, nothing had been changed, even when Egypt went through testing economic 
and social periods. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 
20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) analyses 
the issue by stating: ‘The main problem among Egyptians is that they want the president to 
solve their problems, and they expect that if you don’t find a job, the president is responsible’. 
Ehab’s comment includes all Egyptians, not just the older generation, as some young people 
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also believe in the status quo. Ehab was asked about Egyptians revolting against the Egyptian 
regime in 2011. He replied that this uprising was wrong from the beginning, as the reason for 
it occurring had not been clearly stated. According to him, the problem lay with all Egyptians, 
despite their age. Ehab’s principal notion is that the former government in Egypt did well for 
Egyptians, and it was a serious mistake to revolt against the governing body. This illustrates 
that Egyptians over forty years believe in the notion that the revolution and protesting were 
not good ideas.  
Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he 
is politically active in Egypt) continues: ‘Our parents’ generation not only acted negatively 
towards the uprising, but they used their strong authority as parents to prevent us, the young 
people, from protesting’. The idea not to support the unrest is an individual decision, but 
parents who used their authority to affect the decisions that young people wished to take, 
was the thing which many interviewees hated, as previously explained. Mohamed claims: 
‘Our parents’ generation used its authority as parents to prevent young people from 
protesting […], as they are aware […that…] that in Arab societies, including Egyptian society, 
parents have strong authority over their children’. Maged (M, aged 24, 1st generation) is 
indifferent towards the idea of preventing young Egyptians from protesting by stating: ‘It 
happened with my friends, as their parents stopped them from protesting, although it didn’t 
happen to me, as I was not that active’. 
This demonstrates that the authority of parents is effective among Middle Eastern and 
Muslim societies, even with their grown-up children. The Arab saying in which the parents’ 
generation believes is: ‘ سيرلا   للا هوفرعت نسحا نم سيرلا   لا شوفرعتام ’. The translation means ‘The 
president you know is better than the president you don’t know anything about’. According 
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to Mohamed, this saying has been used by many Egyptians over forty, to discourage young 
people from protesting and aiming to bring change to Egypt. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st 
generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities 
in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online activities on Facebook) mentions how 
many Egyptians over forty believe in this saying. There are other sayings, for instance ‘ كيلخ 
كلاحب’ (‘mind your own business’) which Egyptians have adopted, especially the forty-plus 
generation, with respect to not interfering in politics. This saying encourages negativity about 
things: when someone merely cares about their own business, without becoming involved in 
politics, and is a form of protection. This is a typical sign of negativity which young Egyptians 
refused to accept, despite the killings, opposition by the older generation, and other social 
obstacles, such as expressing an opinion against their wishes and choosing who to marry. 
Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is 
politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online activities on 
Facebook) went on to explain the second most popular saying in which the older generation 
believes: ‘ خكيل   
 شام بنج 'طيحلا ’ (‘don’t interfere in anything’). This means the acceptance of 
the current situation in Egypt and living in the country without arguing about it, whether it is 
satisfactory or not.  
The parents’ generation not only had a negative opinion of the uprising, they also strove 
to label the young as ‘bad’ and accused them of being promiscuous by saying that the ‘men 
and women were having sexual intercourse’ in Tahrir Square. Mohamed refuted these 
accusations by explaining that the attitude of protesters was appropriate and cooperative, 
according to what he himself witnessed. The allegations that the youth were being ‘bad boys 
and girls’ had been generated by the pro-Mubarak media: ‘Our parents’ generation was trying 
to force us to accept the situation we were living in’, Mohamed adds. The notion is that the 
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parents’ generation was seeking to convince young Egyptians that the situation in Egypt was 
not that bad, and they should live and accept life as it is. Young Egyptians were not satisfied 
with the situation in Egypt, so they decided to do something about it by revolting. For 
instance, Maher experienced his parents’ authority by always disagreeing with them, to the 
extent that they sought to prevent him from protesting during the 2011 uprising.  
The notion of being sceptical about events, particularly regarding the Egyptian unrest, has 
been common among first generation Egyptians over forty, living in the U.K. Shabaan (M, aged 
50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics 
either in the UK or Egypt) believes that nothing was going to happen in Egypt, and President 
Mubarak would not leave the presidency easily. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young 
adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during 
the 2011 revolution) also shares the notion with Shabaan. ‘I didn’t participate in the protests 
organised in the UK to be honest, as I thought Mubarak would not quit. I still believe Mubarak 
is not in jail, but still in power’ Nevine says. The notion of scepticism among Egyptians from 
the first generation has led them to be negative about the uprising. This has resulted in the 
parents’ generation encouraging their sons and daughters not to participate in such 
‘delusions’, as some people describe them.  
Egyptian interviewees from the first generation revealed little or no desire to go to the 
elections prior to the revolution. The reason for the lack of interest in voting was that the 
results were obvious from the beginning, in favour of President Mubarak: ‘I didn’t see that 
the elections would have any effect, that’s why the revolution evolved’, Hani (M, aged 35, 1st 
generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online 
blogging) declared. This demonstrates that the 2011 revolution was built upon the failure of 
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the previous regime to provide Egyptians with freedom of expression, dignity, free elections 
and democracy. Egyptians who were eligible to vote did not do so because of the 
hopelessness of the situation: ‘Before 2011, I was not eligible to vote. Even if I […had been…], 
the elections, in my opinion, […would be…] ineffective and my vote would not have changed 
anything, as Mubarak would have won anyway’, Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens 
so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) argues. 
Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt 
and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) adds that he had not participated 
in any elections in Egypt prior to 2011.  
The sense of despair concerning any change, was common among all Egyptians, especially 
those residing in the UK. The 2011 revolution, alternatively, has changed the minds of 
Egyptians regarding voting in Egyptian elections, and faith in Egyptian elections has been 
restored among Egyptians from the first generation after 2011. Issam expresses his feelings 
towards Egypt after 2011 by stating that: ‘Egypt is our country, once again’. Egyptians from 
the first generation have started to lose the sense of hopelessness and feel they need to 
participate in political activities to support their country. Voting in elections was one option 
for Egyptians from the first generation to express their loyalty to their country, once more. 
Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is 
politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ plus online activities on 
Facebook) says the elections before 2011 cannot be called ‘proper presidential elections’ 
because there were no real candidates, only one, President Mubarak, and he would obviously 
win the election. According to Maher, the only time Egypt had a real election was in 2012 
when President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the elections. However, 
Maher argues that democracy was destroyed by the military coup in 2013, when El-Sisi, 
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formerly the defence minister, took over and became president of Egypt. Egypt has returned 
to the point prior to 2011, as the 2011 revolt has not changed anything, according to many 
Egyptians from the first generation.  
Second generation  
This section examines the political participation of the second generation of Egyptians, 
and what effect, if any, the 2011 revolution has had on their political activities. The key finding 
is that the 2011 uprising has had an effect, to some degree, on this group of Egyptians. The 
first part deals with the status of political participation among the second generation, prior 
to, during and after 2011. Egyptians from the second generation have also experienced the 
sense of hopelessness as the first generation has. They also felt that their voice would not 
make any difference in Egypt. Additionally, Egyptians living abroad from the second 
generation have been as politically apathetic as the first generation. This section addresses 
the concept of protesting, voting, the status of diaspora Egyptians as being politically 
apathetic, and the effect of the 2011 revolution among the second-generation Egyptians.  
Egyptians were not politically active before the 2011 uprising. Egyptians living abroad, 
specifically those living in the UK and many Egyptians living in Egypt, had the sense of 
hopelessness, and many interviewees from the second generation express how despondent 
they felt towards the situation in Egypt, prior to 2011. Second generation Egyptians shared 
the sense that their voices were not heard by the Egyptian authorities together with the first 
generation. Both groups felt that their contributions would not make any difference in 
decision-making. The sense of hopelessness was common among most Egyptians, because 
they believed nothing was going to change, whether they were politically active or not; 
besides, the risks would be high and there would be no positive outcome. Egyptians began to 
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feel that they could make a difference after the 2011 revolt, and, if they did not participate in 
Egypt’s politics, they would lose Egypt and it would not be a good place in which to live one 
day. Dina (F, aged 22, 1.75 generation, came to the UK when she was 3 and interested in 
political activities in the UK), for instance, states that she was not involved in political activities 
regarding Egypt, because she felt that such protests were futile. The Egyptian revolution in 
2011 is a substantial landmark in Egyptian history. Nevertheless, when the uprising unfolded 
in 2011, everything changed for the Egyptians in terms of political participation, and the sense 
of hope for a better Egypt was restored. Egypt made headlines with peaceful protests 
organised by young Egyptians. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities 
in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) says that she knew nothing about Egypt before 
2011 – she did not even know who the Egyptian president was. However, everything changed 
in 2011 when the idea of protesting was generated, and Egyptians started to pay attention to 
the news. This indicates that the idea of becoming involved in Egypt’s politics had not been 
common among Egyptians abroad, until the 2011 uprising.  
The Egyptian rebellion reinforced solidarity among Egyptians, both in Egypt and abroad. 
Dina expresses how she feels more connected to her Egyptian roots, nowadays, thanks to the 
2011 Egyptian revolution: ‘I did not feel […that…] I was part of […the…] Egyptian diaspora, 
until the revolution, as I […now…] participate with my fellow Egyptians in protests’. Dina also 
explains how the revolution allowed her to be up-to-date with the events in Egypt: 
‘The revolution gave me the chance to participate in what’s going on in my country 
[…] as before, you sense the detachment from what’s going on in Egypt, as you live 
in the UK and you do not have a say in what’s going on in Egypt’. 
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Dina’s quote has raised the issue of the ‘sense of detachment’ diaspora Egyptians felt 
before the revolution. Egyptians living abroad have been viewed as ‘aliens’. Nonetheless, the 
2011 revolution has restored the sense of attachment to Egypt once again by encouraging 
Egyptians abroad to protest and be part of building Egypt’s future. Sherif (M, aged 33, 
belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the 
UK) raises an important issue which is how Egyptians living in Egypt and abroad can help Egypt 
progress towards being a better country.  
Protesting, according to Sherif, could be merely to show solidarity with various issues 
regarding Egypt: 
‘The only demonstration I had been in was about cutting off connections with Egypt. 
I joined the protest, although I live in London, not Cairo, just to show solidarity with 
the Egyptians, and to show the world how horrible it is to cut connections off’. 
Moreover, Sherif believes protests were not that effective in terms of the uprising in 
Egypt: ‘Things happened in Egypt so quickly – the revolution lasted only 18 days – and, despite 
all that, I believe protests have not been successful weapons in the uprising’. The sense of 
political participation among Egyptians abroad has not been that strong. According to Dina 
(F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she 
was 3 years old), the only thing which can unite Egyptians is an Egyptian national team football 
match: 
‘I remember when there was a match between England and Egypt, I felt that the 
medium connecting Egyptians to Egypt is football, and I remember there were many 
Egyptians in the stadium supporting Egypt. Suddenly, after 2011 – the revolution – 
everyone started to be interested in politics and to speak about it […] and I felt – 
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Egyptians are more connected to Egypt than previously, […] as before, you would 
rarely know that someone was Egyptian’.  
Regarding the desire that second generation Egyptians felt about participating in protests 
supporting the uprising in Egypt, Egyptian parents used their authority to ban their children 
from protesting. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the 
UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), for instance, states how he wanted to go to Egypt 
to help the sick and injured, but his parents were against that idea: 
‘I wanted to go to Egypt, back in 2011, to help as a doctor, but my family banned me 
from doing so, as it was dangerous and many people had been shot for no reason 
[…]. I wanted to go to help people medically, but my parents said you will go there 
and be killed’. 
The fact that it was an unsafe environment prevented many Egyptians from going to Egypt 
to participate in the uprising. Parents had used their authority over their adult children to 
prevent them from protesting in Egypt’, conversely, second generation Egyptians could 
protest in the UK as illustrated by Sherif and Dina. The parents’ argument was all about 
security and the risks involved in going to Egypt to protest. Dina agrees with Sherif’s parents 
by stating: ‘I only go protesting, if I feel I am going to be safe and it is worth it’.  
The authority parents have over their adult children, especially Egyptians, has been 
powerful. There were some Interviewees who were not allowed to have any political activities 
relating to Egypt, because their parents believed that their children were naïve, and did not 
know anything about Egyptian politics. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political 
activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution), for instance, claims that her family, 
primarily her parents, did not encourage her to protest and said: ‘you don’t need to protest, 
and it has nothing to do with you – You can leave Egypt anytime, if you want’. Sama was asked 
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about her reflections on her family’s argument. She said that protesting had nothing to do 
with nationality, but that it was the right thing to do. Sama suffered from the notion that 
those who do not live in the country, should not protest. Parental authority plays a significant 
role in deciding what their children can or cannot do, on their behalf, without consulting 
them: ‘I even had my family urging me to leave Egypt, at the time of revolution. But I was 
…like, no, I would love to stay to do the right thing’. Authoritarian parents always believe they 
know better than their children; consequently, they are responsible for making decisions in 
the interests of their children.  
Sama also agrees with the fact that young people are motivated to engage in politics, but 
their parents are against the idea: 
‘I wanted to participate in protests, but I was not allowed to, as my family is so 
protective and wouldn’t allow me to participate […]. I tried once by going to Tahrir 
Square, as I was in Egypt during the 2011 uprising’. 
Sama thinks that, although her family was against protesting, she was happy that she 
could do something for Egypt. Sama’s family was concerned about her safety, and even asked 
her to go back to the US where she used to live. The ideology of families would affect the 
decision to protest or not. Sama’s family supported the army, and consequently, were against 
the revolution, especially the older generation: ‘My family thought that things cannot be 
solved by protesting […]. The younger generation is trying to revolt, so we don’t end up like 
the older generation’, Sama added. The idea of the younger generation wanting change arises 
again, and how they do not want to be like the older generation who accept everything, 
regardless of whether it is right or wrong.  
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There are some young Egyptians such as Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd 
generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) who agree 
with the idea of the negative role that the parents’ generation plays – Rami says: ‘Our parents’ 
generation – and my father is one of them – thought President Mubarak was the right one to 
rule Egypt, and, if Mubarak went down, chaos would happen. To be honest, I thought the 
same something during 2011’. There are some families of young Egyptians living in the UK 
who have been supportive of their sons or daughters. Rana (F, aged 20, 1.25 generation as 
she came to the UK at the age of 16 and she is politically active in the UK) states how her 
family felt when she participated in the protests in support of Egypt: ‘My family was proud of 
me participating in protests, in London’. The argument would again be the safety of protesters 
in the UK compared to their safety in Egypt. The approval of Rana’s family with regards to 
protesting meant she did not participate in the protests in Egypt in 2011, as she claims it 
depends on personalities. There were several interviewees, in contrast, who positively viewed 
the role of their parents’ generation. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation 
as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to 
be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), for instance, paid attention to his parents’ 
opinion regarding the revolution: ‘I listened to my parents, for example, my dad is politically 
involved, as he was working for the military, but he is retired now'. Listening to one’s parents’ 
point of view may be sensible, but this does not mean it should affect young peoples’ 
opinions, as many interviewees stated.  
It is not only first-generation Egyptians over forty who are negative concerning the 
situation in Egypt. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born 
in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) does not feel positive about 
what happened, and what is happening, in Egypt. He describes his experience in the 
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revolution as ‘chaotic’ and not a real revolution: ‘I went to Egypt with my parents during 2011 
to spend Christmas […there…], but the situation was bad – no electricity or water – and my 
parents did not feel comfortable, so they booked a flight back to the UK’. Muhammad 
protested in Tahrir Square on the 27th of January: ‘In the beginning it was fun to be 
surrounded by Egyptians from different religions and backgrounds, but later, it became more 
violent and perilous for us’. Hence, Muhammad decided not to participate in protests 
anymore.  
The notion of being at risk was a great concern for Egyptians, especially for those who 
lived abroad and went back to Egypt to witness the revolution. Post-2013 has been a turning 
point regarding the political participation of the Egyptians living in Egypt and abroad. The 
‘military coup’ – as some people call it – in 2013 was the end of democracy in Egypt, and the 
beginning of disunity among Egyptians. Egypt is back to ‘square one’, as many argue, that is, 
to the Egypt that existed prior to the 2011 uprising. Political participation, especially in the 
UK, is practically non-existent, as some interviewees have argued. Rami (M, aged 36. He 
belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in 
politics) expresses his despair: ‘I feel something has passed away, nowadays, regarding 
protesting and other political activities in the UK’. There are some political activities that exist 
in the UK, such as protests, although people are no longer interested in joining them anymore. 
Rami states that the purpose of protesting is obscure and pointless, and that therefore he is 
not protesting.  
The comparison of political participation by Egyptians in the UK in the 2011 uprising and 
the current activities, conducting interviews with Egyptians residing in the UK and conducting 
ethnographic work, have shown that Egyptians are less enthusiastic about protesting and 
 
 
168 
becoming involved in political activities, today. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation 
as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) states the following: ‘In 
2011, I was eager to participate in protests; however, nowadays I do not participate, as people 
have started to be[come] divided, and there is a lot of trouble’. This lack of enthusiasm to 
protest is shared among many interviewees. It seems that the 2011 revolution created a sense 
of solidarity among Egyptians both in Egypt and abroad. The notion of solidarity among 
Egyptians during the 2011 uprising has been mentioned by many interviewees. Dina, for 
instance, states that during the 2011 uprising Egyptians were united and had one goal, which 
was to be rid of President Mubarak and achieve justice; however, after 2011, Egyptians have 
become divided and even hate each other. Dina had the same feeling that ‘something has 
died away’: ‘After 2011, I only participated online and did not go on the streets to protest’.  
The second point discussed in this section is voting, and how Egyptians from the second 
generation have dealt with it, in relation to the 2011 revolution. The sense of the effectiveness 
of votes by Egyptians abroad has been reinforced after the 2011 revolt, although some 
Egyptians remain confused and moreover, their vision regarding whom to vote for is still 
blurred. Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in 
the UK. He is not interested in politics) states that he did not vote in the Egyptian elections, 
due to the lack of advertising – he was unaware of the nominees: 
‘I did not vote in the Egyptian elections after the 2011 revolution, and I really feel 
bad about that, but it was because I did not know who to vote for […]. If I get the 
chance again, I would participate, as I believe my vote now counts’. 
It is worth mentioning that Rami did not vote in the UK elections, either. This indicates 
that Rami is politically inactive regarding both Egypt and the UK. The reason Rami and others 
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are being politically inactive is that voters are not convinced by any candidates. This has been 
the case for many Egyptians from various generations.  
The sense of duty of Egyptians to vote after 2011 has been strengthened: Egyptian 
second-generation interviewees such as Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was 
born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) believed in the importance of 
voting to rebuild Egypt after the revolution. There was more involvement in political activities 
during 2011 and immediately after the uprising by Egyptians abroad. The process of voting 
was easy for Egyptians in the UK. The first step of the voting process was to register online; 
secondly, the embassy would send a voting form via the post: ‘I participated in three elections 
after the revolution’, Dina added: ‘I registered with the Egyptian embassy in London and voted 
although some Egyptians did not vote as they were not registered’. Dina was happy that she 
had voted in the elections, despite the difficulties she had faced. The main difficulty was 
completing the voting form in Arabic. Although Dina speaks and reads Arabic, she found it 
hard to follow the Arabic instructions. The point of writing the form only in Arabic would cause 
complications among many Egyptians, who do not speak and read Arabic, even though they 
might have been interested in participating and being part of Egypt’s future. This might 
indicate how Egyptians abroad are still alienated. There may be two reasons why Egyptians 
are not registered with the Egyptian embassy: either some Egyptians are not interested in 
politics, or, as claimed by the UK Census Centre (2015), in response to the email enquiry I 
sent, many Egyptians are not registered with the British government. As a result, the number 
of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate.  
Dina’s difficulties with reading the form written in Arabic are common among many 
Egyptians. Dina understands and speaks Arabic, but found the form was difficult to 
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understand, as it was written in modern Standard Arabic. The spoken language among 
immigrants is usually their dialect which differs from modern Standard Arabic. Dina had to 
ask her parents to help her to vote. It would have been better if The form is written in both 
Arabic and English, to make it easier for those who reside abroad to vote. This demonstrates 
that Egyptians abroad are excluded from the process, to a certain extent, and their votes are 
not significant. It is worth mentioning that Egyptians abroad did not have the right to vote for 
a long time, especially prior to the 2011 revolution. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 
1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. 
Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), conversely, does not see 
the point of voting in the Egyptian elections, as, he says: ‘We don’t live in Egypt – I should 
vote for things that are going to affect me in the country I live in’. This demonstrates that the 
notion of belonging to a country cannot be drawn from voting.  
The physical presence in a country is crucial, according to Michael (M, aged 31, belonging 
to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he 
was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), as he believes that 
he will be affected by the environment in which he lives, and not what will affect people who 
live somewhere else by participating in voting for that specific place. It is worth mentioning 
that Michael participated in the Egyptian election, but, again, he believes his vote will not 
make any difference to Egyptians living in Egypt. People should vote in elections which are 
going to be of direct benefit to them, not those that will have no influence on their lives. Dina 
(F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she 
was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) disagrees with this notion, as she 
believes that voting in the Egyptian election gives her the chance to practise her right as an 
Egyptian citizen, even though she does live abroad: 
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‘Although no one I have voted for succeeded, of course I felt I had the chance to have 
a say in what’s going on in Egypt. It was the first time I voted for anything in Egypt. It 
was a big and great thing for Egyptians abroad’. 
According to Dina, after 2011, Egyptians felt they had a national duty to participate in 
Egyptian politics, including protests and elections, to have their voices heard. 
The last point to discuss is around several difficulties participants face, particularly from 
their families, when trying to intervene in Egypt’s politics while living abroad. For example, 
Dina (F, aged 24, 1.75 generation) is regularly reminded by her family that she is not living in 
Egypt, and does not know much about what is happening in Egypt. Therefore, they believe 
that she should not get involved in political activities related to the country. Dina says: ‘I 
always hear this argument within my family; when I say my opinion, they say: you don’t 
understand anything; you live abroad, and you just watch Western media. You know nothing’. 
Dina feels it is frustrating to think like that, just because she does not live in Egypt, given the 
fact that Dina studied political science, as part of her undergraduate degree, and her 
dissertation was on the Egyptian military.  
Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia 
then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but 
is not anymore), in contrast, agrees to some extent with his family, which has a similar opinion 
to Dina’s family. ‘I have been told that I am not able to interfere in Egypt’s business, as I don’t 
live in Egypt. Nonetheless, I can give my opinion, but my aunt, who left Egypt recently, told 
me, you don’t live in Egypt, so you don’t know what’s going on in the country, and can’t talk 
about it’, Michael said. He still believes that he is free to voice his opinion concerning issues 
relating to Egypt. He argues that a physical presence is essential to feel what people are 
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experiencing: ‘I believe in the idea of not interfering in a country’s business, to a certain 
degree, and I understand peoples’ frustration, as we don’t understand what people living in 
Egypt are going through, from an outsider’s point of view’.  
Summary  
This chapter has dealt with political participation among Egyptians in the UK. In this 
section, I present my reflections on the chapter. Participating in online vs offline activities is 
the main difference between Egyptians from the first and second generations. Egyptians from 
the first generation prefer to be politically active online, I think, as it is easier to join in due to 
busy careers and to show support, while the second generation has chosen to be active both 
offline and online. Offline activities have included protesting in different cities in the UK and 
being involved in Egyptian politics, especially during 2011, with the aim of expressing their 
‘Egyptianness’ via online activities on Facebook and other platforms. Egyptians from the first 
generation do not need to prove their ‘Egyptianness’. However, those Egyptians who have 
been residing overseas for a long time need to prove to others that they are still Egyptian by 
protesting and posting pictures online, as a few interviewees, such as Khouloud (F, aged 45, 
1st generation and considered 1st generation-young adulthood as she Left Egypt in her 20s, 
she is active in political activities in Egypt and the UK), have done. This confirms that Egyptians 
from the second generation must prove themselves as Egyptians, by protesting and being 
politically active, both online and offline, while Egyptians from the first generation prefer to 
prove their ‘Egyptianness’ online. In my opinion, both first and second-generation Egyptians 
agree on the significance of political participation, especially after the 2011 revolution. 
Nevertheless, the tools used to express ‘political contribution’ among different generations 
differ. This of course applies to Egyptians who are interested in politics (see Table 5).  
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For the first generation, alternatives such as raising awareness and sending money back 
home are preferred over protesting or going back to Egypt to protest among Egyptians in 
Tahrir Square to contribute to rebuilding Egypt. Alternatively, the second generation have 
preferred to express their support for Egypt by protesting on the streets of the UK. Second 
generation Egyptians have protested in streets to achieve two things; the first one is to show 
support to Egyptian uprising and the second one is to prove they are Egyptian and still belong 
to Egypt. The 2011 revolution has given Egyptians abroad, specifically the second generation, 
the chance to contribute to Egypt and to strengthen their relationship with their ‘homeland’ 
or their parents’ homeland. Moreover, the other point unifying both generations of Egyptians 
is that the euphoria related to the 2011 revolution and political participation has faded, and 
furthermore, Egyptians abroad are not interested in protesting or participating in any political 
activities nowadays. In other words, Egyptians in the UK have become active in political 
protests because of the 2011 uprising. Thus, this project has revealed how effective the 2011 
uprising has been, even if only for a short period.  
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Chapter Eight: The Media as a Tool for Identity Performance and 
Political Participation  
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the third theme formulated from conducting interviews with 
Egyptians in the UK and ethnographic work. The chapter is divided in the same way as the 
previous chapters, into first and second generations. In addition, among the two main groups, 
use of mainstream and social media is discussed in relation to the 2011 uprising. Moreover, 
the sense of trust in both the mainstream Arabic and Western media among first and second-
generation Egyptians is discussed. At the end of the chapter, a summary of the main findings 
is presented, whilst my own reflections on the chapter are also provided.  
Howard et al. (2011) argue that the media, especially social media, have played a crucial 
role in spreading democratic ideas in Arab countries, essentially Egypt and Tunisia, where 
social media have helped young Tunisians and Egyptians to spread this concept. Howard et 
al. (2011) state in their report regarding social media during the Arab Spring, by analysing the 
Tweets on Twitter and other social media websites, that social media gave ordinary people 
the chance to be in control of their future by starting peaceful revolutions using social media 
to change regimes and be influential in the future of their countries. In addition, social media 
websites have been a successful tool for forcing dictatorships in many Arab countries to step 
down. Most of the population in Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, is young (under the age of 
34). Young people are the most common users of social media and therefore, social media 
was heavily used in Tunisia and Egypt (Howard et al. 2011). Howard et al. (2011) add that 
urban, young and well-educated people in Egypt and Tunisia used social media to start 
political debates and conversations online. It was not only young Egyptians and Tunisians who 
used social media to be politically active regarding enhancing the situation in their countries, 
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though social media were used to put pressure on governments of these countries to make 
changes.  
This chapter examines the general role the media played in the uprising among Egyptians 
in the UK. According to Egyptians in the UK, the media were used as a tool to show their 
political participation, to prove their sense of belonging to Egypt and to generate a strong 
Egyptian identity. An attempt is made to find answers to the research question regarding 
media use among Egyptians in the UK during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. An examination 
of the different media uses Egyptians in the UK adopted will hopefully reveal how the media 
have contributed to Egyptians’ engagement in the revolution.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with first generation 
Egyptians, whereas the other section deals with the second generation, and how these two 
groups have used the media. The first issue that is addressed is the notion of mistrust of the 
mainstream media among Egyptians in the UK, while the second is how Egyptians from both 
the first and second generations view social media regarding news about Egypt. The final 
matter is an examination of the sources of information for both generations.  
Mainstream media vs. social media 
As this section deals with the mainstream media and social media among Egyptians in the 
UK, definitions of both are presented. According to Ofcom – the UK communications regulator 
– (2017), the definition of mainstream media is any traditional media, such as TV channels 
(the BBC, newspapers, radio. Furthermore, it is the opposite to alternative media, principally 
social media. In contrast, social media or alternative media are media associated with the 
Internet, for instance social networking websites including blogs, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube (Ofcom 2017).  
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First generation  
The first generation of Egyptians agree in terms of the notion that social media has played 
an essential role in the uprising, while mainstream media is viewed as having played a 
negative role. The sense of mistrust in the mainstream media was common, both during the 
2011 uprising and currently, among the first generation of Egyptians living in the UK. Ehab (M, 
aged 43. Ehab belongs to 1st generation as he left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st 
generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), for instance, demonstrates how 
the mainstream media, Arab media, and specifically the Egyptian media, played a negative 
role in the uprising, by misrepresenting the news to Egyptians, regarding the situation in Egypt 
during the uprising: ‘The mainstream media in general have imagined and deceived Egyptians 
with regard to their reality about being poor, and made them believe they are brilliant and 
great, which is not the case’. Ehab believes Egyptians live in denial about their reality, and 
that the mainstream media, primarily the Egyptian, are to blame. There are many Egyptians, 
including Ehab, who have lost faith and trust in the mainstream media. This lack of trust and 
credibility means that several interviewees in this study have decided not to watch the 
mainstream media, anymore.  
Ali and Fahmy (2013) tackled the issue of bias and the Arab media when they conducted 
a study on the coverage of AlArabiya news and events in Egypt. The study reveals that 
AlArabiya news channel is biased. The bias was identified through the types of news 
broadcast about Egypt in accordance with the Saudi government, given the fact the AlArabiya 
channel is Saudi owned. This proves that the Arab media, predominantly the mainstream 
media, are biased and have a hidden agenda. Moreover, this illustrates why some 
interviewees in this study do not trust the Arab media in general because of their hidden 
agenda. One example of that is Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in 
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his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), who lost trust in 
the mainstream media because of their hidden agenda and propaganda.  
Alalam (2013) conducted a study focusing on the role of the media in the democratisation 
process in Egypt after 2011. The study established that people started to trust social media 
more than the mainstream media; after 2011, and that Egyptians began to trust the non-
Egyptian mainstream media. Issam (M, aged 36. Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid 
adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the 
UK), however, disagrees with this notion. He believes that some Arab media, such as 
AlArabiya, also have their own agenda and cannot be wholly trusted: ‘I watch the mainstream 
media, such as Al-Jazeera, (Qatari-owned), but not AlArabiya […] and, of course, I would be 
picky, as I don’t believe everything broadcast’. It is worth mentioning that the level of trust 
can be measured according to the ideology and point of view of the person watching. The 
proof lies in what Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation 
early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) says, in terms of freedom of expression 
during President Morsi’s regime from 2012 to 2013: 
‘We had freedom of speech and the press, but now we don’t have any, and, whether 
you agree or disagree with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, you have to 
admit that we had freedom [of expression] during Morsi’s regime’. 
According to Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early 
adulthood. He is politically active in Egypt), this was the case, which illustrates his personal 
beliefs.  
Shereen (F, aged 31, belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt 
and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) states that the mainstream media are no 
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longer informative: ‘In terms of the mainstream media, before 2011, there were some events 
in Egypt which I knew about via Twitter, before […they were broadcast on…] TV’. This 
demonstrates how people are being updated through social media and not the mainstream 
media. The mainstream media, including television and newspapers, have become secondary 
sources of information for some, especially the young generation of Egyptians in the UK. 
There are some programmes on television, for instance, that would not be watched on screen, 
but are when posted on YouTube.  
Egyptian interviewees of the first generation in the UK believe that they are not credible 
as the Western mainstream media do not cover all events concerning Egypt. According to 
Issam (M, aged 36, belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left 
in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), there was a demonstration in London 
and almost 150,000 participants were on the streets of London in solidarity with Gaza, which 
Issam attended himself: ‘There was not a hint of such a huge demonstration in London – on 
the BBC, for example’. This is just one example mentioned by one of the interviewees about 
the lack of credibility of the Western media, which led many Arabs, including Egyptians, not 
only to lose faith in and trust of the Western media, but also the mainstream media, in 
general. The mainstream media, especially the Western media’s well-known names still 
attract audiences and have credibility, unlike some other channels which promote 
propaganda and have a hidden agenda: ‘Although I don’t trust the mainstream media, both 
Arabic and Western, the Western media, such as Reuters still have credibility somehow, so I 
watch. But again, I don’t rely on it’. 
Regarding social media and the first generation of Egyptians in the UK, the participants 
have been divided into two groups: those who trust social media and those who still doubt 
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its credibility. Those who trust social media are first generation Egyptians, aged below forty, 
and those who mistrust social media are aged above forty. To the first generation of Egyptian 
interviewees aged below forty, social media played a crucial role in the revolution – without 
social media, the revolution would not have been successful. There is a sense of trust present 
among this group of first generation Egyptians, and the voices of the young would not have 
been heard without the help of social media. Issam (M, aged 36. He belongs to 1st generation-
mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and 
the UK) demonstrates how social media gave Egyptians the chance to voice their demands: 
‘In Egypt, we have no voice at all […] even if we vote for a candidate, we don’t see 
actions from that candidate […] as a result, social media has played a significant role 
in terms of making our voices heard’. 
People use social media as a platform to freely express their demands, without being 
censored by governments.  
That is why social media websites are trusted among young Egyptians in the UK. According 
to Mazen (M, aged 20. He left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. 
Politically active in Egypt), social media had played the role of the facilitator in the 2011 
revolution: ‘Via discussions and pieces of advice we were getting from Tunisia, via social 
media, we managed to deal with how to resist tear gas and […receive…] other instructions’. 
This shows that without social media people would not have benefited from Tunisia’s prior 
experience, and understand how to have a successful revolution. Mazen adds that the 
previous Egyptian government had sensed the danger of social media regarding revolting 
against Mubarak’s regime, and, as a result, the Internet was shut down in Egypt during the 
uprising, as social media had not been under government control, until that point. Hani (M, 
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aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt 
and online blogging) mentioned how social media played the role of being the medium to 
achieve democracy, although social media was not the cause of the uprising: ‘The use of social 
media is a channel for a democratic process’, Hani says. A study undertaken by Ali et al. (2013) 
agrees with the interviewees that Facebook, for example, was merely a tool in publicising the 
revolution; it was not the reason that the revolution unfolded. Herrera (2011) also argues that 
Facebook was not the principal reason for the success of the Egyptian revolution, but it was 
the people who were on the streets demanding that Mubarak should step down. This view is 
shared by most of the participants in this study.  
Was social media the key reason for the revolution in 2011? The findings reveal that most 
participants agree on the notion that social media had been an important and powerful tool 
for monitoring the revolution, but it was not the reason for the uprising and not the only tool: 
‘The 2011 revolution could have happened without social media and technology’, Hani says. 
Social media therefore helped in the success of the 2011 revolution, but it was not the only 
reason for the revolt. Participants of this study mentioned many factors that sparked the 
revolution, such as poverty and unemployment during President Mubarak’s era. Singer and 
Ashman (2009) challenge the credibility and accountability of news published on social media 
posted by ordinary people, after the Guardian in London allowed the public to contribute to 
the news, as an experiment.  
Regarding how social media had contributed to the success of the revolution, Shereen (F, 
aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and 
left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) raises the issue of how Arab revolutions in 
the Middle East played a major part in promoting social media: ‘The revolutions in the Arab 
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world have made social media more popular and have helped in the publicity of social media’. 
Shereen also states that before the Arab Spring, the use of social media was exclusively for 
social reasons; nonetheless, the name ‘social media’ is linked to the Arab Spring. According 
to Howard et al. (2011), without social media stories like the self-immolation of Bouazizi, a 
Tunisian vegetable seller, would not have been made public in 2010. There are many other 
cases of self-immolation of ordinary people in the Middle East; however, social media helped 
to shine a light on such incidents, unlike pre-social media. Social media has thus encouraged 
many in the Arab world to revolt against injustice and unfairness.  
Shereen also identifies how social media exposed the news: ‘Social media allowed 
countless people to hear about events worldwide, especially events such as the brutal death 
of Khaled Said, and Bouazizi in Tunisia’, as the mainstream media were not telling the truth. 
Shereen (F, aged 31. Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in 
Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK), argues that without revolutions 
in the Arab world, Arabs would not have used social media so much: ‘The truth is […found…] 
on social media and not on mainstream media, as people have started to use social media 
more’. This illustrates that people these days trust social media more than the mainstream 
media. The role of social media in the 2011 uprising encouraged some participants in this 
study to use it to publicise the revolution. Shereen mentions that her role during the uprising 
was to encourage people to join the protests through social media: ‘I knew about the 
revolution through social media and a published video. My role then was to encourage 
Egyptians to participate in the protests via social media’. Ali and Fahmi (2013) stressed this 
point by mentioning how influential social media had been in the uprising. Shereen can 
therefore be called a ‘a citizen journalist’ as she shared photographs and videos, and even 
encouraged Egyptians to protest via Facebook (Goode 2009).  
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According to Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was 
born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), social media freed 
people worldwide in terms of being able to freely contribute: ‘Via social media, you can 
express your opinion without fear of being caught or put in prison’. Social media, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, are considered as a source of ‘true’ information, especially 
for young people. Young people found the platform on which they could express themselves 
without fear of being imprisoned, as was the case during Mubarak’s regime. Issam and Mazen 
(M, aged 20. He left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. Politically 
active in Egypt), agree that social media is the main source of information about Egypt and in 
general.  
News on Facebook, for instance, can be accurate when the source is credible. Hani (M, 
aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt 
and online blogging) claims that social media can be a good source of information, especially 
for those living away from their home country: ‘You can get accurate information from social 
media, especially when you are away […]. It is tricky, but you can get accurate information 
from social media, especially news from people living in Egypt and witnessing events 
themselves’. The mainstream media employs correspondents, whereas ordinary people can 
act as ‘voluntary correspondents’. People will generally believe news from those witnessing 
events, especially if they are friends or relatives. This demonstrates that the news reported 
by citizen journalists is more believable than that reported via the mainstream media.  
Shereen (F, aged 31. Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born 
in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) claims that social media can be 
trusted as a source of information, but some news verification skills are required: a person 
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working in the media industry, for instance. Trust in social media has been generated by 
freedom of use, in addition to news distribution and credibility. One of the reasons for trusting 
social media is the combination of news. To prove the powerfulness of social media in the 
uprising, Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was 
born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) mentions that a large part 
of what happened in 2011 would have been silenced, without social media. Social media was 
significant regarding making Egyptian voices heard, and without social media the revolution 
would probably have failed. It is worth mentioning that social media is easy to access on smart 
phones, unlike mainstream media.  
Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically 
active in Egypt and online blogging) argues that social media was significant, especially during 
the 2011 uprising, as it provided information regarding where events were being held, and 
how to become involved. Hani adds that without social media the source of information 
would have been limited if it had to depend only on mainstream media. Social media was 
used as a platform for Egyptians to stay connected with what was happening in Egypt, 
especially for Egyptians abroad, principally in the UK. Social media is trusted, to some extent, 
by Egyptians aged below forty, although its credibility is also questioned. There are some first-
generation Egyptians under forty in the UK who do not fully rely on social media news; 
although Egyptians abroad rely on news published on social media, but only if they believe 
that the source of that news is credible, if it is also reported in newspapers or on TV channels. 
According to Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. 
Politically active in Egypt and online blogging): ‘Social media is not the magical weapon which 
can lead to […making…] dictatorships […step…] down, but social media websites are a 
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powerful tool’. Hani’s comment could be a good summary of the role of social media 
according to Egyptians in the UK. But can it be wholly trusted?  
According to many participants in this study, the answer is no: the content on social media 
should be monitored, and the monitoring should be neutral and independent. Monitoring is 
important because everyone in the world has the right to use social media and publish 
whatever they wish. The credibility of the content of social media remains doubtful. 
Conversely, the debate is that if social media is monitored, the democracy of publishing would 
be at risk, as in the case of the mainstream media. However, responsible, unbiased monitoring 
would go a long way in preventing the publishing of ‘fake news’. The sense of trust in social 
media is common among the first generation aged above forty. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st 
generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in 
the UK or Egypt) tends to mistrust social media for its hidden agenda (although he does not 
explain what he means by ‘hidden agenda’) even on social media: ‘Personally, I use social 
media to spread the word, but news on social media is not guaranteed news, and I would 
never ever trust news on Facebook as news on social media has agenda’. This indicates that 
there are hidden agenda or hidden motives in both social media and the mainstream media.  
The question is: from where do the first generation, mainly over forty, obtain their 
information? Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, 
she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) says her source 
of information is her family in Egypt, as they are the ones who can be trusted as witnesses of 
the events in the country, unlike the media which often provides ‘fake’ news. Nevine adds 
that when she reads or hears any piece of news relevant to Egypt, she immediately refers it 
to her family in Egypt to make sure that it is genuine and not fake. This is the same point 
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raised by Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was 
born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK): ‘I always research news 
from the TV or on the Internet to make sure it is credible’. Nevine adds that she does not 
often believe anything her friends tell her. But, in addition to researching online, she calls her 
family residing in Egypt, specifically her brother, to ask about the credibility of the news: ‘Why 
wouldn’t I believe people who witness events live, in Egypt? […] as a result, these are my 
sources of information’.  
There are ordinary people who are being used as a source of information, called 'citizen 
journalists’. Goode (2009) defines citizen journalism as ordinary people acting like journalists 
when reporting the news by sharing photographs and videos and by blogging. This method of 
journalism allows ordinary people to share those photographs or news, and to participate in 
discussions around that piece of news. Furthermore, this type of journalism is interactive, 
unlike the mainstream media where the audience is unable to interact with the news on TV 
for instance. Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. 
Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) agrees with this point by observing how social 
media today is powerful and being interactive means that people can be a part of creating 
news and distributing it, unlike the passive role audiences have in the mainstream media.  
First generation Egyptians both under and above forty tend to search for an alternative as 
a source of information to social and mainstream media, for instance, stories written by 
ordinary people. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his 
teens and he is active in online activities and sometimes in Egypt) expressed his trust in what 
people post online, as most news online is credible, especially if the people posting are known 
to the reader: ‘I do trust people’s posts, but not everything of course. I would believe my best 
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friends stories posted on social media, as social media gives everyone the chance and the 
opportunity to report incidents’. Singer et al. (2011) referred to citizen journalism as 
‘participatory journalism’; that is, citizen journalism indicates its collaborative nature, such as 
participatory journalism on social networking sites.  
Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically 
active in Egypt and online blogging) says: ‘My source of information would be my own 
personal network, social media and TV, but the trick is that I would differentiate between 
what I am reading and eventually I would create my own truth’. Hani thus demonstrates how 
some people, especially Egyptians in the UK, have decided to depend on their ability to 
differentiate between fake and true news that comes from various sources. The interesting 
point raised from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK, is that after losing faith in 
the mainstream media and having little trust in social media, they believe in real people’s 
news as their source of information, Issam (M, aged. Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid 
adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the 
UK) explains how he relies on people witnessing events in Egypt for information: ‘I trust 
people who publish on social media, unlike the news on TV, as news on TV can be fake, and I 
can’t trust […it…], unlike news published on social media by trusted people, or friends of 
mine’. This demonstrates that some Egyptians trust people who publish online more than the 
mainstream media which can broadcast fake news, or people are unable to make sure 
whether the news on television is credible or not. Sources of news on social media can be 
investigated to determine where news items originate from.  
The sense of belonging to Egypt is enhanced through social media. Egyptians in the UK 
feel that they are more linked to Egypt through social media. They can contribute to Egypt 
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through social media from the news extracted from the postings and videos, unlike the 
mainstream media which is not helpful. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so 
considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), as a migrant 
living in the UK, describes how social media has been playing an important role, and how his 
life cannot be defined without its existence. As an Egyptian living abroad, social media is not 
just a source of information for Mazen; it is a lifestyle.  
The reason that people who publish news on social media are seen as being more credible 
is because of the ‘fake’ or biased news the mainstream media broadcast. Nevine (F, aged 50, 
1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK 
and was active during the 2011 revolution) explains how one day she called her family and 
told them a story she had heard on television about Egypt, and how worried she was about 
her family. It turned out that the piece of news was in fact ‘fake’ and there was nothing of 
that nature happening in Egypt at that time. This demonstrates how news on the mainstream 
media can be fake or misleading. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as 
he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) expresses how he does not doubt 
people he knows such as his family and friends: ‘I believe news from people I trust, as I believe 
the mainstream media, either Arabic or Western, have a hidden agenda’. The lack of trust 
among Egyptians, especially diaspora groups, means they tend to believe real people who are 
live witnesses to events in Egypt.  
The main finding in this thesis is Egyptians in the UK believe more in real people as a source 
of information than mainstream and social media. According to Gillmor (2004), citizen 
journalism has become popular nowadays with the rise in the use of social media and 
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blogging. The benefit that citizen journalism offers people is more freedom to report news 
the way they see it – unbiased and credible.  
Second generation  
The use of the media as an enforcer of the sense of belonging, identity and political 
engagement among second generation Egyptians in the UK, differs among this group. 
Regarding the mainstream media, Arabic and Western, first and second-generation Egyptians 
share the sense of mistrust, whereas in terms of social media the level of trust varies from 
one to another. The findings that have emerged by way of discussing the effects of both the 
mainstream and social media on second generation Egyptians are considered in this section. 
The concluding section is a discussion on some of the findings that have emerged through 
conducting ethnographic observations, and how the media have been used by Egyptians 
during and after the 2011 uprising to enforce their sense of belonging, identity and political 
engagement.  
The question about whether the mainstream media has been effective or not for 
Egyptians from the second generation is addressed here. They believe the mainstream media 
has lost its significant role and cannot be trusted anymore: ‘I believe the mainstream media 
have no effects in Egypt, and that’s why social media, including Facebook and Twitter are the 
only medium where our voice, as young people, can be heard’, says Dina (F, aged 22, 
belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3). 
Dina raises an important issue which is about how social media is taking over the role of the 
mainstream media, as young people rely more on social media in contrast to the mainstream 
media. Second generation Egyptians tend to believe more in their ability to differentiate 
between news on the mainstream media and social media, and, as a result, second generation 
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Egyptians do not trust the mainstream media to be a tool to express their identity and sense 
of belonging on their behalf and become involved in political activities.  
The reason for the second generation depending on social media more than the 
mainstream media is because social media websites are interactive rather than passive. This 
raises the idea of ‘citizen journalism’ and how interactive social media can be. Singer et al. 
(2011) defines citizen journalism as ‘user-generated content’, in which ordinary people 
contribute to news broadcasts. Singer et al. (2011) also state that the advantage of citizen 
journalism is that people play an active role in the process of distributing news and 
information to other people. This suggests that people believe such news more than 
‘suspicious’ news on the mainstream media. The preferred name for ordinary people 
contributing to the news process is ‘participatory journalism’, according to Singer et al. (2011). 
According to Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the 
UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), the problem with the mainstream media is not only 
the lack of credibility, but also that the mainstream media helped to add additional problems 
to the Egyptian situation, during the uprising. The mainstream media, especially the Western 
media, created more division between Egyptians by broadcasting biased news. The point 
raised by Sherif is important, as biased news can create serious discord in a nation, as it did 
in Egypt. The aftermath of the uprising, as Sherif demonstrates, has left Egyptians divided, to 
the extent that they cannot tolerate anyone who disagrees with them. Mohamed (M, aged 
32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in 
Egypt) agrees with Sherif regarding this division among Egyptians and how the mainstream 
media played a role in it. The fact is that the Western mainstream media played a negative 
role in the Egyptian uprising, and, for that reason Egyptians have lost trust in Western new 
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organisations. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came 
to the UK when she was 3) claims that Western media coverage was biased according to its 
own agenda: ‘The Western media has its own agenda and propaganda, and you have to be 
careful and picky in what you believe and […what you don’t…]’. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd 
generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) agrees 
with Dina and argues that the Western media did not remain neutral regarding reporting on 
the Egyptian revolution. According to Sama, the reason for the Western media being against 
the uprising in Egypt is fiscal: ‘The Western media were against the revolution for economic 
reasons, and, I guess, even until now’.  
A further significant point about the Western media is that some participants prefer to 
watch and trust the Western media because of language barriers. Michael (M, aged 31, 
belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK 
when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) prefers to 
watch the Western media as it is in English, which is more comfortable than watching news 
in Arabic. This illustrates that the Western media have not won audiences because of their 
credibility, but for the language in which they broadcast. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation), 
also prefers to watch the Western media because of the language barrier: ‘I don’t watch 
Egyptian channels that much, as they are in Arabic, and I also believe they are biased’. This 
demonstrates that some Western media are watched by Egyptians, especially from the 
second generation, or those who do not speak fluent Arabic. A language barrier is created for 
second generation Egyptians because of broadcasting in a language that they have difficulty 
in understanding. 
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It is worth mentioning that in terms of trusting the mainstream media, most interviewees 
neither trust the Western nor the Arabic media. Consequently, the mainstream media were 
not used as a tool to express their feelings of belonging to Egypt or to be politically active. 
Sama argues that the Arab media was also biased, each according to its own agenda: ‘I don’t 
watch Arabic channels, as Egyptian channels are in Arabic, but despite that, the Arab media 
are also biased’. This demonstrates that in addition to the language barrier mentioned above, 
both the Western and Arab media were biased.  
Egyptian interviewees from the second generation tend to trust social media more than 
the mainstream media. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born 
in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) considers social media as the main source of 
information with regard to Egypt. Social media is considered more trustworthy and credible 
than the mainstream media; because the mainstream media has somehow lost credibility. 
The alternative is social media: ‘I use and watch both, but I take my information from social 
media, as social media is more democratic, and you can’t trust the national mainstream 
media, anymore’, Sherif added. Rami (M, aged 36, he belongs to the 2nd generation of 
Egyptians as he was born in the UK and he is not interested in politics) agrees with Sherif, in 
that he is inclined to believe what people publish on social media, more than the mainstream 
media: ‘Social media is spontaneous, and can’t really be […as…] corrupt as the mainstream 
media’. This shows that as social media is operated by ordinary people, they cannot be as 
easily corrupted as the mainstream media, led by corporations which have a specific agenda. 
The interviewees have raised an important reason for the mainstream media losing its 
credibility, which is that the mainstream media require a medium to follow such as television, 
radio, or buying actual newspapers. Conversely, social media merely requires an Internet 
connection on a laptop or smart phone to follow the news. This is one of the reasons for the 
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popularity of social media in comparison to mainstream media. Rami (M, aged 36, he belongs 
to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics), 
in contrast, explains how he started to watch the mainstream media after moving to stay with 
his mother and sister, who have satellite channels at home.  
To return to the point of relying on real people in Egypt, Rami trusts his father, who resides 
in both the UK and Egypt, as a trustful source of information about Egypt. This suggests that 
real people can be trusted more than mainstream media for the news, and, to some extent, 
social media. It is worth mentioning that people can also trust some mainstream media, 
depending on the broadcasting channel and the newsreaders: ‘To a certain degree, I trust 
people bringing news from social media, and it really depends on what kind of channel I am 
watching on TV’, Rami says. Trust can be built again on the mainstream media, depending on 
the broadcasting channel, and the ethics of the channel. There are some Egyptians who do 
not completely rely on real peoples’ posts on social media; Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 
generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) confirms that she 
cannot rely on these posts as a source of information, and says that peoples’ posts can just 
be read to know other peoples’ points of view, but may not be news, as such. Dina argues 
that her parents’ generation do often rely on peoples’ posts, but the younger generation do 
not, as mentioned previously: ‘I do not take peoples’ stories as news, but my mother would 
take peoples’ stories as news […] but I tend to believe stories published by people which 
[…have been…] taken from newspaper links or even TV channel websites’. This once again, 
shows the difference between the ideologies of the younger and their parents’ generations, 
and how both think differently about sources of information regarding Egypt.  
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Concerning social media and gatekeeping, a decision is taken when the mainstream media 
use content from social media, termed gatekeeping, which accepts or rejects the publication 
of certain pieces of news. Ali et al. (2013) claim that user-generated content (UGC) is 
predominantly used in social media and is also subject to gatekeeping. The traditional media 
tend to pick which pieces of news they will publish from social media. The question is, what 
about news published on social media itself, and how could news on social media be 
monitored by gatekeepers?  
The role of social media among Egyptians living in the UK had been to support fellow 
Egyptians in their demands. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was 
born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) demonstrates how social media had been 
useful in terms of gathering Egyptians together, worldwide, and uniting them in their 
demands about toppling the authoritarian, Mubarak regime. Social media, such as Facebook, 
had also been used by Egyptians abroad to raise money, to support the revolution: ‘We 
created events on Facebook to raise money supporting Egypt, entitled ‘Egyptians in the UK’, 
as it is easier to send money via Facebook and gather fundraisers’, Sherif says. Sherif claims 
that fundraisers would find it easier to contribute to Egypt by sending money there to support 
the revolts. This reveals how social media can be powerful in connecting Egyptians abroad 
with their country of origin and their roots.  
Social media cannot be fully trusted, on the other hand. For that reason, people tend to 
read and watch news online, but make sure the news is accurate by checking newspaper 
websites and people they can trust: ‘I investigate news on social media and look for where 
the source news is coming from’, Dina says. This shows that people obtain news from social 
media and check its reliability from other traditional sources. People would read news via 
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social media and then check that piece of news in the mainstream media, such as in 
newspapers or television, to make sure the news is reliable and not fabricated. Social media 
cannot take over the role of traditional media, however, even if people have lost trust and 
faith in the mainstream media regarding their source of information.  
Social media have won large audiences because of the notion that they are owned by 
ordinary people. The interviews conducted with Egyptians in the UK have shown that the idea 
of social media being run by ordinary people, who are like everyone else, is common among 
Egyptians in the UK. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in 
the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) describes how he feels social media represents 
people and not the specific agenda that the mainstream media adopt: ‘All social media were 
against Mubarak, as they are […the same as…] us, and were helpful in terms of gathering 
people, and encouraging them to protest and to go out into the streets’. Social media is 
therefore trusted, because ordinary people are in control of what to broadcast, unlike the 
gatekeepers in the mainstream media.  
Egyptians in the UK consider social media play an effective role in their social lives, in 
addition to their political activities and anything related to Egypt. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging 
to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) argues 
that social media have given her more freedom than the mainstream media with regard to 
reading and watching news or programmes, at times that are convenient for her: 
‘I believe social media is more effective, as I can access it any time I want, as [it is …] 
faster to access, and you can be informed of the latest updates when they happen. I 
don’t have to watch the whole programme or the news to be informed’. 
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Mohammed (M, aged 37, 1.75 generation), describes social media as being a ‘2-in-1’ 
platform: ‘Social media websites are like having TV with different channels, and you tend to 
choose from and differentiate between wrong and right news’. Mohammed raised a 
significant point: how social media perform the dual role of mainstream and other media 
platforms. Moreover, social media has given people the opportunity to be in control of the 
news they read and what to believe.  
Howard et al. (2011) have researched the role of social media during the Arab Spring. 
Their findings revealed that social media played a central role in spreading democracy in the 
Arab world. Their research demonstrated that social media have been used by the youth to 
freely connect with each other, without the censorship of governments. This proves the point 
that Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically 
active in Egypt and online blogging) raised in terms of freeing the youth in the Arab world via 
social media. Hani claims that social media have taught young people how to practise 
freedom of speech and democracy, which were missing during the Mubarak era. Howard et 
al. (2011) argue that democracy was introduced in the Arab world by means of the Arab Spring 
and the effective use of social media.  
Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) claim that social media in the Arab revolutions, also known as 
the Arab Spring, had a vital role in the success of these revolutions in many Arab countries. 
Moreover, social media and other technological devices, for example SMS and telephones 
were the weapons used to organise protesters and run successful social movements. Social 
media has been used as an organising tool since 2003. For instance, in the anti-Iraq war 
movement in 2003, social media was comprehensively used by activists to raise awareness 
and to encourage people to protest in streets against the war (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011).  
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The following part deals with the findings that have emerged from conducting 
ethnographic work, participant observation and attending events and protests organised by 
Egyptian groups in the UK. Egyptians in the UK, including first and second generations, as 
previously stated, have used the media, especially social media, to demonstrate their sense 
of belonging and solidarity with fellow Egyptians in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. 
Additionally, participant observation has shown that social media and Facebook were used by 
Egyptian groups to capture the attention of Egyptians to participate in political activities. The 
Egyptians lost interest, however, after the uprising, as revealed in Chapter Seven regarding 
political participation. The events discussed here consequently illustrate that Egyptians in the 
UK are interested in events, but only online, not offline, in terms of going on the streets to 
protest. By observing some Egyptian groups on Facebook, there are many activities regarding 
Egyptian affairs.  
The first group observed is ‘25th of January’ (Egyptians in the UK    ييصم 25  رياني    يف ايناطيرب .). 
This group was created after the 2011 Egyptian revolution. It was chosen for this study 
because it is particularly for Egyptians in the UK and the activities held in London and the rest 
of the UK. The group aims to be ‘the voice of Egyptians in the UK’, according to the group’s 
description. The page in 2015 has 79,179 ‘likes’. Most of the posts in this group oppose the 
military rule of President El-Sisi and the group always supports activists fighting for freedom 
under El-Sisi’s regime. The Rabia incident is one of the major ones this group supports. The 
Rabia incident, or as some describe it, the massacre that happened in August 2013, was when 
protesters were killed by Egyptian forces primarily led by President El-Sisi’s forces. Protesters 
in Rabia Square were against the coup led by El-Sisi, as some called it, back in June 2013. 
Moreover, protesters were in support of President Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood 
candidate, the elected Egyptian president from 2012 to 2013 (Kingsley 2013). This group – 
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'25th of January Egyptians in the UK’ – organised a protest on the 16th of August 2014 in 
collaboration with the R4BIA-London group to commemorate the first anniversary of the 
Rabia incident. The group frequently organises events to support Rabia and oppose the 
current Egyptian government led by President El-Sisi.  
 
Figure 7 Screenshot of the Facebook group: ‘25th of January Egyptians in the UK نييرصم 25 رياني يف ايناطيرب  
Observation of this group and the interview conducted with the group’s admin, revealed 
that although activities are organised by this group for Egyptians living in the UK, events and 
protests do not attract the attendance of many Egyptians. One of the events was called ‘The 
current moment in Egypt ةظحللا ةنهارلا   
 
ف صم ’. This event was supposed to host Zyad El-elaimy, 
a member of the revolutionary youth coalition of the 25th of January revolution, to talk to 
Egyptians in the UK about the current situation in Egypt. The event was originally supposed 
to be held in April 2015 but was postponed six times. Even now the event is still pending, and 
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was supposed to be held in March 2016, although there is no guarantee that this event will 
ever be held. I contacted the organiser of the event and asked why. He said that the reason 
the event was postponed on two separate occasions was due to Zyad El-elaimy’s personal 
circumstances. In 2015, there are some eighty-two people interested in attending this event. 
The admin of the group claims that the Egyptians have lost interest in participating in any 
activities after 2011.  
The division among Egyptians has led them, especially those living in the UK, to lose faith 
in protests organised in the UK. For that reason, events are being postponed frequently and 
even cancelled. The event ‘Freedom and dignity to our people back home’ was originally due 
to be held in October 2014. However, it was postponed five times between October 2014 and 
January 2015. It was eventually cancelled. The postponement of events was inconvenient for 
me. I tried to attend one of the proposed event days, but it was postponed on the same day, 
without any advance notice. When I contacted the admin of the event, the reply was ‘people 
are busy and not attending’. According to the admin of ‘25th of January Egyptians in the UK’, 
the main reason for people giving up on protests and events regarding Egypt, is that they are 
too busy with their social lives. I believe postponing and cancelling events would dispirit 
anyone, especially many Egyptians whose intention to protest is present. There were many 
Egyptians who posted on the group’s Facebook timeline, asking about the date and time of 
the event. Moreover, they also wondered why the event had been postponed. One of the 
group’s members was urging the organisers to arrange more events regarding Egypt so that 
he could attend.  
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Figure 8 A screenshot showing a member urging organisers to arrange more events (the member’s name was removed to 
protect his/her confidentiality) 
The observation of events organised online has revealed that there is another reason why 
Egyptians do not attend events organised in the UK. Most events are organised or held in 
London, therefore some Egyptians living in Wales, Scotland or in other cities in England find 
it hard to attend. The concentration of most events in London makes it difficult, if not almost 
impossible for many Egyptians. One of the posts of ‘25th of January Egyptians in the UK’ was 
urging the organisers not to postpone their events, and to announce them well in advance, 
so that members would be able to travel from Scotland and other cities in the UK. This 
demonstrates that some Egyptians are still interested in participating in political activities, but 
the events are not well organised and do not attract all Egyptians in the UK. The organisers of 
such events claim that people are not interested in attending protests or events arranged in 
the UK, but many Egyptian interviewees in this research feel it is important to organise such 
events in the country. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK 
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especially during 2011 revolution) declared that encouraging Egyptians to arrange political 
activities in the UK once again is essential: ‘I really want to generate some motivation again 
about the situation in Egypt, as I think motivation after 2011 died down’.  
The second group I observed is called: ‘Egyptians abroad are all coming back to rebuild 
Egypt’. This group was created in February 2011 after the resignation of President Mubarak. 
This group was chosen group because, firstly, it is related to Egyptians abroad and the 
rebuilding of Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising and the huge change in Egypt; and 
secondly, this group did not attract much attention or many ‘likes’ (it only has eleven ‘likes’).  
The admin of the page was interviewed and said that the main purpose of the group is to 
encourage Egyptians to participate in political protests and events, once again, in order to 
restore the spirit of the 2011 uprising. Asser, the group’s admin claims that almost all 
Egyptians were hopeful about rebuilding Egypt once more, immediately after President 
Mubarak stepped down as president in Feb 2011: 
‘Many Egyptians shared the dream of being part of rebuilding Egypt, and that’s why 
I created this group. In retrospect, it was such a naïve way to look at it, and now I 
guess we all realised that countries don't just become better in a few days or 
months’. 
Asser also adds that he organised rallies for Egyptians abroad to meet and discuss what 
to do regarding Egypt; although these meetings were successful immediately after the 
revolution, but not afterwards. This once more emphasises that Egyptians abroad shared the 
sense of euphoria (as previously mentioned) during the 2011 uprising. However, these days, 
the spirit of protesting and participating in political activities has died down as Sama (F, aged 
24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) 
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and Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the 
UK. He is not interested in politics) say.  
There was a definite sense of division among Egyptians during the ethnographic work I 
conducted, when I attended protests organised by Egyptians in the UK. For example, one of 
the protests organised in London to reject the visit of President El-Sisi to London, was 
organised online, mainly on Facebook, to be held on the 4th of November 2015. The protest 
was predominantly organised by those who supported the Muslim Brotherhood, not 
President El-Sisi. The sense of division was strong, as attendees were all against President El-
Sisi and those who supported the president were not welcome. There is further proof of the 
division between Egyptians. The next day, the 5th of November, supporters of President El-
Sisi had organised their own protest to welcome him. In response to that, the anti-El-Sisi 
group organised another protest on the same day to demonstrate how strong they were to 
their rivals (Shenker 2015).  
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Figure 9 A screenshot of a Facebook group named: ‘Egyptians abroad are all coming back to rebuild Egypt’ 
As a non-Egyptian, an outsider endeavouring to be neutral by not supporting either side, 
I felt quite unwelcome. The protest organised by the Muslim Brotherhood had slogans and 
banners that were ‘bloody’, including pictures of El-Sisi covered by blood and furthermore, 
used strong language such as ‘butcher’ and ‘killer’. There were many police officers present 
that day, in case any conflict arose between the pro-El-Sisi groups and those against. The 
atmosphere in both protests was tense, especially as people in each group had strong 
opinions regarding the situation in Egypt.  
It is worth mentioning that there was an obvious difference between the protests. The 
one I attended on the 4th of November 2015, the number of attendees estimated at 200. It 
was the first time that a protest had been arranged in front of 10 Downing Street and there 
were lots of police present. The atmosphere was tense and I could not speak to any of the 
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protesters, for several reasons. First, as an outsider, I do not look like a protester, according 
to the primarily conservative or Muslim Brotherhood members, as Elmasry Elyoum claims 
(Hosni 2015). And second, it was crowded and noisy to the extent that it was hard to talk to 
anyone. However, I managed to speak to one of the attendees of the 4th of November protest 
by meeting in the protest. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left 
Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt ‘when convenient’ 
plus online activities on Facebook) subsequently agreed to be interviewed online and 
reflected on his participation. He was happy to participate in the protest, in order to display 
his rejection of the El-Sisi visit.  
It is essential to state that what the protester explained was different from the 
observation points I had collected. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation) mentioned how 
organised the protest was, yet what I noticed was how chaotic the protest was, especially the 
timing. The protester claimed that several protesters were not respecting speeches by 
cheering during the speeches, which disturbed many. This demonstrates how an insider and 
outsider observe the same event.  
Added proof of the division among Egyptians in the UK was the protest organised by 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood or, as they call themselves, Rabia London. Egyptians in 
London held protests in memory of the Rabia incident of 2013, in London in 2014 and 2015, 
to show the Egyptian government, primarily President El-Sisi that they were still against the 
coup. Protesters were using slogans against President El-Sisi, as some call what happened in 
2013 a ‘military coup’, which removed President Morsi from office. Al-Jazeera (Arabic) was 
covering the protests and encouraging the public to support the anti El-Sisi protest led by the 
Muslim Brotherhood. According to Maha Azzam, the head of the Egyptian Revolutionary 
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Council in Europe, the activities which support Rabia are peaceful and extremely important, 
as they are to remind the world of what the Egyptian government, mainly El-Sisi’s, did to 
Egyptians (Ameen 2014). It is worth mentioning that the common factor among protests in 
the UK, according my personal observation, is the general peacefulness, despite the 
impression which such protests give to audiences. Moreover, no violent incidents were 
recorded.  
Summary  
This chapter has shown that the main finding is how social media was used by Egyptians 
in the UK as a tool to contribute to Egypt and stay informed about news on Egypt. The idea 
that the mainstream media have lost their credibility as a source of information regarding 
news on Egypt, and, that this media have not been used as a tool by Egyptians to stay 
connected to Egypt. Social media, in contrast, has been used as a source of information, a tool 
to stay attached to Egypt and for people to express their political engagement with Egypt. 
Personal networks, including family and friends, among Egyptians in the UK are more trusted 
as sources of information than social and the mainstream media. The ethnographic 
investigations have shown that social media have been used as tools for Egyptians to express 
themselves as Egyptians, through signing up for Facebook events but not protesting.  
The Egyptian uprising in 2011 led Egyptians abroad to feel more connected and involved 
in Egypt’s politics. The notion that Egyptians abroad do not have the right to interfere in 
Egypt’s business has slowly diminished. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she 
was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) says: ‘Egyptians nowadays are more 
connected to what’s going on in Egypt, as you feel you have a role, and your Egyptian passport 
has a value, not just to visit Egypt without getting a visa’. This confirms that Egyptians living 
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either inside or outside Egypt currently have the right to express their opinion, without 
worrying about preventing Egyptians abroad from being part of the decision-making in Egypt. 
Egyptians today feel they are part of Egyptian society again, thanks to the Egyptian uprising 
in 2011.  
The theories that have been adopted in this chapter are those of Goffman (1959) and 
‘performing identity’ through political participation concerning Egyptians in the UK. Goffman 
(1959) deals with identity as a theatrical stage (see Chapter Five). Goffman also asserts that 
performing identity concerns meeting other peoples’ expectations, and how individuals have 
a set of roles to play and expectations to meet in society regarding Egyptians and political 
participation, especially the effects of the 2011 revolution. Egyptians perform political 
activities as actors on a stage and should play the part to satisfy what is expected of them. As 
Egyptians, performing identity is another way to prove belonging to an identity, especially 
with those residing abroad.   
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Chapter Nine: Discussion  
Introduction  
The first aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings explored in the previous three 
chapters, and the second aim is to connect the findings to the current research and theories, 
in order to highlight the gap in literature which this study fills.  
The story of Egyptians in the UK started with the sense of belonging to Egypt and the UK. 
The sample of Egyptians studied in this research has been divided into two main groups: the 
first generation and second generation. Differences between the first and second generations 
have emerged regarding belonging, identity, political participation and media use, as 
illustrated in the interviews with Egyptians in the UK.  
Discussion on identity and belonging  
This section discusses the significant findings retrieved from conducting interviews with 
Egyptians from first and second generations regarding belonging and identity among diaspora 
communities.  
The first issue to discuss regarding identity and belonging among interviewees who 
participated in this study is the notion of ‘homeland’ defined, according to Kaplan (2003), as 
‘native land or country of origin, fatherland or motherland’. This demonstrates that homeland 
for some depends on their parents’ country of origin. According to Rumbaut (1994), 
immigrants to the United States tend to cling more to their national identity (their country of 
origin). First generation Egyptians in the UK are also inclined to cling to their homeland. Issam 
(M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left 
in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, believes that Egypt is his 
homeland, regardless of how many passports he holds. Factors affecting the sense of 
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considering a country a homeland are the place of birth and the period spent in that country. 
Issam was born in Egypt and moved to the UK in his twenties. His sense of belonging would 
be to Egypt, and Egypt would therefore be his homeland. First generation Egyptians tend to 
cling to their national identity (country of origin), as Rumbaut (2004) claims, no matter what.  
Egyptian interviewees in this project found the question of defining ‘homeland’ 
challenging to answer. The notion of choosing which country should be considered as one’s 
homeland – Egypt or the UK – is not easy. Participants occasionally feel that they belong to 
both countries; therefore, choosing one or the other often does not apply. Hani (M, 1st 
generation, he left Egypt in his 30s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood, active in 
political activities in Egypt and online activities such as blogging) defines homeland as ‘the 
place where I grew up and the place which has major factors which made me [are my make-
up]’. Caplan’s (2003) definition conforms to that of Hani, as he believes his homeland is what 
has defined him. Hani was asked if his point of view would have been different if he had been 
born in the UK or anywhere else, but his parents were Egyptian. Hani replied that in that case, 
he would have had two homelands. Additionally, place of birth and the period spent in that 
country would make a difference in deciding which country is the homeland for that person 
and the notion that people today live in a multicultural world and therefore, do not limit 
themselves to one homeland, as Hani argues. There are some Egyptians, conversely, who feel 
so strongly about being Egyptian, that they regard ‘homeland’ as being linked to the sense of 
one’s own identity: ‘I am Egyptian whatever happens’, says Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st 
generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt). There 
are some participants in this research who consider Egypt as their homeland, no matter where 
they reside and others who believe that they have two homelands.  
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The meaning of ‘homeland’ for second generation Egyptian participants varies. For 
instance, Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is 
interested in politics in the UK) believes that his homeland is Egypt although he was born in 
the UK. This demonstrates that there is a strong association with Egypt, also confirmed by 
Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is 
active in political activities in the UK and Egypt). The definition of homeland as Muhammad 
demonstrates is ‘the place [to which] you feel affiliated’. Rana (F, 1.25 generation as she came 
to the UK at the age of 16 and she is politically active in the UK) states that ‘homeland is Egypt 
forever’. This shows that the concept of homeland is always associated with Egypt despite 
living abroad. To conclude this point, Sama (F, 2nd generation, active in political activities in 
the UK especially during 2011 revolution) defines homeland as ‘wherever you feel 
comfortable’ and is the sense that second generation Egyptians have. Dina (F, aged 22, 
belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years 
old, interested in political activities in the UK) feels strongly about her Egyptian identity by 
demonstrating that although she does not look ‘British’, whenever she is asked where she is 
from originally the reply would be Egypt, although she also believes she is connected to the 
UK, as she was born here and it is where she has spent all her life. This reveals that second 
generation Egyptian participants are linked to and hold strong connections with Egypt.  
The definition of homeland for first and second generations of Egyptian participants in the 
UK have agreed on considering Egypt as their homeland. Even if the definition of homeland is 
determined by the country of birth, several participants of the second generation, born in the 
UK, still consider Egypt to be their homeland. The second generation agrees with the first 
generation regarding defining Egypt as ‘homeland’, no matter where they were born. 
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However, the sense of multiple belongings is also strong among the second generation due 
to the place of birth (the UK).  
The sense of pride is strong among first and second generation Egyptian interviewees. Al 
Aswany (2011) demonstrates how the 2011 uprising is a historical moment and motivated the 
Egyptians to feel proud of themselves in relation to what happened. The notion of being one 
family among Egyptians has led many of them to feel proud to be Egyptian once again. Issam 
(M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left 
in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) states: ‘I was really proud during 2011 
and even saw that pride in the eyes of non-Egyptians’. This sense of pride has led many 
Egyptians worldwide to feel that they can make a difference and achieve the change they 
desire. This sense of pride and euphoria has been shared by many Egyptians. Eslam (M, 1st 
generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and 
offline activities in the UK) shares the sense of pride with Issam by stating how Egyptians can 
change any bad situation, thus spreading the sense of pride to all or most Egyptians. 
Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is 
politically active in Egypt) believes that the Egyptian uprising has taught Egyptians and others 
how to start a peaceful revolution, which not only makes Egyptians proud, but also the entire 
world. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he 
is active in online activities and sometimes in Egypt) shares this sense of pride and euphoria 
with his fellow Egyptians, including those living in the UK. This sense of pride however has 
changed later, and became negatively affected, by the events following the 2011 revolution, 
and it has also had an impact on the sense of belonging and identity. Issam (M, aged 36, 
belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He 
is politically active in Egypt and the UK), declares that he does not wish to be called Egyptian 
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because of the current events in Egypt: ‘To be honest, I don’t wish to be Egyptian, if the system 
is going to be the same, as I feel the revolution has done nothing, and it is getting worse, not 
better’.  
The sense of pride has been the main belief uniting the second generation Egyptians 
interviewed for this thesis with the first generation regarding the events in Egypt. Dina (F, 
aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she 
was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) and Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging 
to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) agree 
on the notion of being proud of change in Egypt, which reinforces their sense of Egyptian 
identity. The first and second generations in this research experienced a strong sense of pride 
during and directly after the 2011 revolution, which united the two generations in their 
feelings of pride.  
Diaspora communities tend to be attached to their ‘homeland’. Safran (1991) argues that 
one of the significant features of diaspora is attachment to the homeland: homeland occupies 
an important space among diaspora communities; consequently, diasporic groups tend to be 
connected to their homeland whatever happens. Kuşcu (2012) examined the relationship 
between American-Egyptians and their homeland (countries of origin) and concludes that 
diasporic groups tend to be strongly connected to their homeland. Hirji (2009) also conducted 
research on diasporic communities and how second and third generations remain connected 
to their countries of origins. Safran (1991) indicates that the notion of return is one of the 
features of diasporic communities (Table 7 shows a comparison between Safran’s features 
and my proposed features of the second generation diaspora). 
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The first generation of Egyptian interviewees is strongly attached to Egypt, as previously 
mentioned. Nevine (F, aged 50, left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st generation from 
young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 revolution) has 
demonstrated how she is attached to Egypt, despite the extensive period she has spent in the 
UK. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is 
politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) spent the early stages 
of her life in Egypt, which explains why she is still strongly attached to Egypt. The fact that 
many Egyptians have close family members in Egypt would strengthen the relationship 
between an immigrant and their homeland (Egypt, in this case). The first-generation Egyptian 
interviewees are already strongly attached to Egypt, and the 2011 revolution has only had a 
slight impact on their sense of belonging and attachment. Mohamed’s (M, aged 32, 1st 
generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) 
sense of belonging has started to shift from Egypt to the UK because of ‘the decent lifestyle’ 
he enjoys in the UK.  
The notion of return to Egypt is common among the first generation, especially after the 
2011 uprising; however, for some first-generation Egyptians such as Mohamed (M, aged 32) 
the notion of return vanished after the uprisings, especially the one in 2013. This illustrates 
that external factors, such as the aftermath of an uprising may change the views of citizens. 
The sense of belonging to Egypt (parents’ country of origin) for second generation Egyptian 
interviewees is strong; the findings in this research conform to what Hirji (2009) claims about 
immigrants; specifically, second and third generations have a strong connection with their 
countries of origin. The sense of attachment and belonging to Egypt has been reinforced by 
the 2011 uprising – second generation Egyptian interviewees felt more attached to Egypt due 
to the 2011 revolt. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born 
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in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) demonstrates, for example, 
how certain he was of being Egyptian and more attached to Egypt after the 2011 uprising. The 
sense of belonging for Muhammad is associated with his parents and extended family. Hence, 
after the 2011 uprising, he genuinely feels that he belongs to Egypt as that his homeland is 
Egypt. 
The notion of multiple belongings to both Egypt and the UK among the second generation 
of Egyptian participants has emerged in the findings. The notion of return among the second 
generation was particularly influenced by the 2011 uprising, both during and straight after it 
happened. The desire to return among the second generation, however, is not easy to 
achieve. As long as the second generation of immigrants share the notion of ‘going back to 
the homeland’ (parents’ homeland), there is a need for a different approach. I propose a new 
feature as part of the diaspora called ‘second generation diaspora’. The main feature of the 
notion of return is present, but with special circumstances.  
Belonging and attachment for first and second generation Egyptian participants in this 
thesis have been strong. Nevertheless, for the first generation, the 2011 unrest has not had a 
dramatic effect on the sense of belonging and attachment for this group. The sense of 
attachment and belonging to Egypt from the second generation of Egyptian interviewees, in 
contrast, have been reinforced by the 2011 uprising. Egyptians from the first and second 
generations share an important concept: ‘happy with [the] combination of cultures’; both 
generations have a strong sense of belonging to Egypt, but both are also happy living in 
Egyptian and British cultures.  
Social Identity Theory addresses the formation of identity among ordinary citizens. 
Abrams and Hogg (1990) demonstrates how individuals tend to have multiple identities, for 
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instance religious, social and national, though for diasporic groups, construction of identity is 
challenging, especially with the identities of belonging to a homeland and to a country of 
origin. According to Hall (1990), identities are not about ‘who people are’ or ‘where people 
come from’ but about ‘who people might become’ (p. 4); forming identities is therefore not 
about place of birth or country of residence. The main theorist dealing with the concept of 
performing identities is Goffman (1959). Goffman explains that individuals tend to perform 
their identities in society according to what is expected of them.  
Egyptian identity is influential for first generation Egyptians, regardless of place of 
residence, as shown by Nevine (F, aged 50, left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st 
generation from young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 
revolution). Goffman (1959) claims Egyptian participants from the first generation have used 
political protests to perform their Egyptian identity; consequently, the term ‘proving 
Egyptianness’ has emerged. Khouloud (F, aged 45, 1st generation and considered 1st 
generation-young adulthood as she Left Egypt in her 20s, she is active in political activities in 
Egypt and the UK) performed her identity by travelling to Egypt during the uprising to prove 
to everyone that she is still Egyptian by sharing pictures online and sharing the demands of 
her fellow Egyptians. By doing so, Khouloud reinforces her Egyptian identity and reminds 
everyone that she is still Egyptian despite residing abroad.  
Goffman (1959) introduced the concept of ‘impression management’, which is how 
individuals are in control of the image of themselves that they present to society. Khouloud 
and Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is 
politically active in Egypt), from the first generation, preferred to be among family and friends 
in Egypt during historic moments, such as the uprising, convey a positive message about 
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themselves in regard to Egyptian society: the society to which they belong. ‘Performing’ an 
Egyptian identity, as Khouloud and Mazen have done, would satisfy them as Egyptians as well 
as Egyptian society. The sense of identity has been strengthened, according to second 
generation Egyptian interviewees. For instance, for Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 
2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt), 
the sense of being Egyptian was reinforced after the 2011 uprising. Thus, Muhammad has 
started to feel he is Egyptian and tells everyone that he is Egyptian and not ‘originally from 
Egypt’ as he did before. The concept of identity is divided between Egypt and the UK for 
Egyptians living in the UK. This has become obvious among second generation Egyptians, 
especially those who were born in the UK. Second generation Egyptians have not only 
undergone multiple feelings of belonging and identity, they have experienced it.  
Considering the above discussed findings around belonging and identity such as sense of 
pride, homeland belonging and Egyptian identity, I propose new features to Safran and 
Cohen’s diaspora model pertaining to the second-generation diaspora groups. Those features 
have been influenced by historic events, such as the Egyptian uprising of 2011. Egyptian 
interviewees in the UK from the second generation such as Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 
generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested 
in political activities in the UK) and Muhammad share some of the features of diaspora, such 
as notion of return to Egypt and duty to rebuild Egypt. Thus, the participants share some of 
Safran’s and Cohens’ features of diaspora; however, not all features could be applied. For 
example, one of the diaspora characteristics is around not being fully accepted in host 
countries. This feature does not apply entirely to the second-generation Egyptian diaspora. 
The proposed feature suggests that they are fully accepted in host countries and they often 
consider it as their homeland. As for the persistent notion of return to homeland, according 
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to Safran’s model, the first generation tend to feel impermanent in their host countries and 
have the persistent feeling to return, one day, to their home country. Conversely, my 
interviews show that the second-generation diaspora share this notion of return, but with 
restrictions. Those restrictions could be due to security concerns, significant life style changes, 
in addition to limited job opportunities and career prospects in their parents’ country of origin 
(Cohen 2008). 
As previously discussed, the second generation do preserve links with their parents’ 
homeland. However, this was not entirely done with a sense of duty as is the case with the 
first generation, as shown in Safran’s (1991) features. Their sense of attachment to Egypt was 
triggered by political milestones in their parents’ homeland, for instance the 2011 uprising. 
Their sense of attachment was strong but was rather communicated via distant means, such 
as online activities, protesting and raising awareness while remaining in the UK. Such an 
important political milestone ignited their sense of belonging to their parents’ homeland 
beside their belonging to their host country, which they also consider to be their homeland. 
This left the second generation with multiple facets of belongings and identities as opposed 
to the first-generation diaspora. Table 7 presents my observations of these features of 
diaspora (second generation) identity and compares them to Safran’s model.  
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Table 7 A comparison between Safran’s features of diaspora and my proposed features of diaspora 
1st generation diaspora: 
Safran’s features  
2nd generation diaspora: 
My proposed features  
Dispersion from country of origin to one of 
multiple host countries  
Those groups who were born in host countries 
(never migrated before)  
A collective memory of homeland (real and 
myth of homeland)  
A memory of myth of homeland (never lived in)  
Not fully accepted in host countries  
Fully accepted in host countries and considered 
as homeland (being born and raised in) 
Notion of return to homeland is 
overwhelming with sense of impermanency 
Notion of return is present with restrictions and 
sense of permanency  
Maintenance of homeland is a duty  
Sense of maintenance of homeland is strong but 
by distant activities 
Preserving links between homeland and 
host countries  
Maintaining links between the parents’ 
homeland and young diaspora’s homeland (host 
countries)  
 
Multiple belongings and identities (parents’ 
homeland and current homeland)  
 
Political events in parents’ homeland affect 
second generation diaspora 
 
The above discussed features reflect the need to propose a new model pertaining to the 
second generation drawn on the findings discussed in this thesis. I propose these features to 
be applied to second and third generations of immigrants. As the six features of Safran (1991) 
do not apply to all diaspora groups, some features are replaced with new features which fit 
new diasporic groups. Although Cohen (2008) has modified the features developed by Safran 
to fit other groups, the contribution of Cohen pertains to groups which have witnessed 
traumatic incidents, and which include collective identity and collective memory of 
homeland. Figure 10 explains the new features that I find more applicable to the sense of 
identity amongst second generation diaspora communities.  
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The first feature Safran (1991) discussed is dispersion of groups from homeland to one or 
many countries. The second generation – such as Dina, Sherif, Muhammad, Mohammed, 
Sama, Rami and Rana – have not been dispersed. However, the second generation should be 
named diaspora for sharing other features of diaspora and for being considered a ‘diaspora 
group’. The second feature proposed in the new characteristics is multiple belongings among 
the second generation. The second generation of Egyptians interviewed have shown multiple 
belongings and loyalties to both Egypt and the UK, which is the result of being born in the UK 
but feeling attached to Egypt at the same time. Safran has stressed the notion of belonging 
to just one homeland and not the host countries, but I suggest a sense of multiple belongings 
to the host country (where second-generation immigrants are residents) and country of origin 
(psychological attachment to their parents’ homeland).  
The next feature proposed is about maintaining links with both the host country (the UK) 
and the parents’ homeland (Egypt). Egyptian interviewees from the second generation vary 
in preserving links with Egypt through regular visits to Egypt even if it is for a holiday or visiting 
extended family. Moreover, another sign of maintaining links with Egypt is through 
acknowledging their ‘Egyptian identity’ and letting everyone know they are Egyptian or as 
Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then 
came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not 
anymore) prefers to be called ‘British-Egyptian’. A further sign of belonging to Egypt among 
the second generation could be the myth of return to Egypt; although some restrictions such 
as lack of job opportunities and freedom of expression in Egypt discourage many of them 
from settling down in Egypt. The other feature is sense of permanency in the host country 
(the UK) unlike the first generation who feel impermanent, as Safran (1991) claims. The last 
feature felt among the second-generation Egyptians is their sense of duty to rebuild Egypt, 
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which is one of the results of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which shows the impact of historic 
events on them.  
 
Figure 10 Researcher’s proposed features of second generation diaspora 
 
Discussion on political participation and Egyptians in the UK 
Political apathy is the first theme addressed concerning political participation. Indeed, the 
sense of political apathy among diaspora groups is common. A report by the House of 
Commons (2014) indicates that ethnic minorities in the UK are not interested in British 
politics. Moreover, the UNDP (2013) in the Good practice guide shows that although young 
people play an essential role in politics, they are excluded from politics, especially decision 
making, which consequently makes them politically apathetic. However, in countries which 
witnessed Arab uprisings, such as Egypt, the youth had a powerful role in achieving change. 
The political participation of the youth has been examined among interviewees from first and 
second generations. The sense of hopelessness for any change in Egypt, felt by the first 
generation prior to the 2011 uprising, has been overwhelming. This sense of hopelessness in 
Egyptians has led them to be politically apathetic regarding any political activities. Issam (M, 
aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in 
his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) demonstrates how hopeless he feels 
Born in host 
countries without 
dispersion  
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regarding Egyptian politics by believing nothing would change in Egypt, whether or not he 
becomes actively involved in politics.  
There are many factors contributing to the sense of hopelessness and political apathy. 
Adamson (2006) stated that those who have lived previously in strict oppressive regimes tend 
to be less actively involved in politics, as they sometimes do not see the value of their political 
participation. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so 
considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), for instance, 
could be an example of how growing up in Egypt under a supressing regime could affect 
political participation. He was born and raised in Egypt before moving to the UK which 
encouraged him to be more politically apathetic. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, he stated 
that he is not interested in participating in political activities such as demonstrations related 
to his country of origin. He would rather focus more on his personal life as opposed to getting 
involved in political affairs such as the revolution or regime change.  
Political apathy for the second generation has also been common regarding the 
uselessness of protesting prior to 2011. Egyptians abroad, primarily from the second 
generation, believed that their voices would not make any difference, even if they did become 
involved in politics. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and 
came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) shows 
that prior to 2011, she felt that there was no point in participating in political activities 
concerning Egypt. However, during the Egyptian uprising things changed, and Egyptians 
began to feel that they could become involved in Egyptian politics and do something for Egypt.  
Protesting for Egyptians has not been a common phenomenon. Ismaeel (2014) discusses 
the laws against protesting in Gulf countries and how these should be changed. This has been 
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one of the factors enforcing the sense of hopelessness of protesting among Egyptians in the 
UK. Protesting for the first generation, prior to 2011, was not common, but this changed 
during the uprisings. Egyptian interviewees from the first generation preferred to protest 
online during the 2011 uprising, as they felt it was the least they could do for Egypt while 
residing abroad. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and 
not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), for instance, prefers to join online protests 
as it is the easiest option for him due to his busy career. Online protests, which include raising 
awareness of the situation in Egypt, have replaced offline protests for the first generation of 
Egyptian interviewees.  
The 2011 uprising motivated many young Egyptians, particularly those from the second 
generation, to participate in offline protests. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation 
as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) was motivated by the 
revolution to join fellow Egyptians in the UK to demonstrate solidarity with Egyptians in Tahrir 
Square. Dina does not only feel that she has done something for Egypt but has also reinforced 
her Egyptian identity by mixing with other Egyptians in the UK. There are some second 
generation Egyptians who have also participated in online activities, predominantly social 
media platforms. Protesting for first and second generations has given them a good 
opportunity to show their solidarity with fellow Egyptians. Nevertheless, first generation 
Egyptians chose online protesting to support Egypt, whereas second generation Egyptians 
chose to be present on British streets to show their solidarity with the Egyptians, in addition 
to engaging in online activities.  
To sum up, first and second generations went through the stage of feeling hopeless 
regarding Egypt and lost faith in protesting before the 2011 uprising. Since then, participants 
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have actively engaged in political activities, online and offline until the present, although the 
sense of hopelessness in protesting has returned among the Egyptian participants in this 
study. I was able to confirm that during the ethnographic work conducted by attending 
protests organised in the UK.  
Kuşcu (2012) examines the role of Egyptian-Americans in the US and how they benefit 
Egypt. The findings revealed by Kuşcu (2012) show that Egyptian-Americans played an 
important role during 2011 – how they let the world know about what was happening in 
Egypt, for example. The role of the Egyptians in the UK regarding Egypt represented in my 
study – a sample of 22 Egyptian interviewees – has been examined. The first-generation 
Egyptians have shown that the role played by Egyptians in the UK regarding the uprising can 
be effective. The effectiveness can be visualised by raising awareness of what was happening 
in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. Shereen (F, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left 
Egypt in her 20s, she is active in political activities in the UK) believes, for instance, that the 
role of Egyptians in the UK could be effective by raising awareness of events in Egypt and 
organising the campaign ‘Ask about Egypt’ on the streets of Sheffield. Informing people 
around the world of the events occurring in Egypt was more useful than merely protesting on 
the streets. Conversely, some of the first generation feel protesting in the UK is useless and 
prefer to travel to Egypt to protest there. Raising awareness as Shereen does might be useful, 
but not as useful as protesting in Egypt, as Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood 
as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt) believes.  
The second generation Egyptians believe that it is better for them to protest in the UK 
than travel to Egypt and risk their lives. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was 
born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) prefers to protest on the streets 
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of London’s to support Egypt, and let everyone know that Egyptians abroad have a voice. 
Egyptian interviewees, including the first and second generations, agree with Kuşcu (2012) 
regarding the importance of the role of Egyptians abroad. However, each group expressed 
this importance differently, either by protesting, as the second generation did, or by raising 
awareness concerning Egypt.  
The 2011 revolution has not only helped Egyptians abroad to become more involved in 
politics, but also shown the world that they are politically active. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging 
to the second generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) 
mentioned how unifying Egyptians was a powerful result in relation to the 2011 uprising. 
Boursoti (2015) states that Egyptians were united during 2011, as most of them had the same 
desires, one being the downfall of President Mubarak. Sherif confirms Boursoti’s statement, 
by describing how everyone in Egypt sensed they were one and had common demands in 
2011. The unity of Egyptians results in the fact that all Egyptians living abroad and in Egypt 
were equal during the 2011 revolution and contributed to the betterment of Egypt. 
Nonetheless, Sherif claims that: ‘Egyptians today are polarised, no-one respects the others’ 
opinion, and that Egypt is divided’.  
The findings shed some light on the link between parenting style and political 
participation. For instance, Al-Rub and Majedh (2007) examine parenting styles. The most 
common style used by parents originally from the Middle East living in the US is authoritarian. 
As I show in this study, first generation Egyptians such as Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 
1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active 
in Egypt and the UK) blame their lack of political participation on the authoritarian style 
adopted by their parents who prevent them from protesting. Egyptian parents then have 
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frequently used their authority over their children to stop them from protesting. Mazen (M, 
aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in 
Egypt) has also suffered from his parents’ authoritarian style as they monitored his online 
activities and did not allow him to travel to Egypt to protest in Tahrir Square. Egyptian 
interviewees from the second generation have experienced the authority of parents over 
their political activities. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born 
in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), for instance, wanted to travel to Egypt to help 
the Egyptian medical teams, being a doctor himself; however, Sherif’s parents prevented him 
from travelling to Egypt and risking his life. Egyptians from the first and second generations 
receive the same authoritarian parenting style from their parents. The findings in this thesis 
confirm what Al-Rub and Majedh (2007) say regarding the authoritarian parenting style 
adopted by immigrant parents.  
Regarding voting and Egyptians abroad, Egyptians abroad did not have the right to vote in 
Egyptian elections and more than seven million Egyptians worldwide were not allowed to 
vote prior to 2011 (Zohry 2011). However, following the 2011 revolution, laws were changed 
to allow millions of Egyptians abroad to vote in Egyptian elections. Thus, Egyptians abroad 
obtained the right to participate in Egyptian elections since April 2012 (BBC 2012). Prior to 
2012, many Egyptians abroad felt detached from Egypt as they could not vote in national 
elections there. Zohry (2011) explains how Egyptians abroad were not contributing to 
decision making in their country of origin or parents’ homeland prior to the 2011 uprising. 
The participation of Egyptians abroad including the second generation has consolidated the 
sense of belonging to Egypt once more after the sense of hopelessness. Many interviewees 
who contributed to my study have expressed how voting in Egyptian elections has 
strengthened their sense of being Egyptian, especially post 2011. In other words, the 2011 
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revolution has been a political milestone in the political and social history of Egypt. It is worth 
mentioning that Iraq provides a similar example after 2003 and how the invasion of the 
country was considered an important event for Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq. For 
instance, Iraqis especially abroad contributed to the Iraqi election in 2005 and 2009; Iraqis 
had high hopes of change in Iraq straight after the invasion, particularly the 2005 election 
similarly to the case of Egyptians (Mahdi 2018). Nevertheless, Iraqis abroad faced some 
difficulties in their participation in Iraqi elections in addition to the belief among many Iraqis 
that change has been hard to achieve. Consequently, this has discouraged many Iraqis from 
being politically active in Iraqi politics except for voting in Iraqi elections (Mahdi 2018). The 
comparison between the cases of Iraqis and Egyptians abroad shows how Arab nations 
abroad share the same fate regarding changes in their country of origin in the wake of 
significant political milestones.  
Discussion on the role of the media among Egyptian interviewees in the UK  
Howard et al. (2011) contend that although the media, especially social media, played an 
essential role in the Arab uprising, they were not the reason for Arabs to revolt (Al Aswany 
2011). In fact, social media were used as tools to monitor protests, and were not the cause.  
Social media have been successful tools for first generation Egyptians to organise both 
Egyptians abroad and within Egypt to join protests; however, the sense of trust regarding 
social media varies among the first-generation Egyptians. Participants aged less than 40, such 
as Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is 
politically active in Egypt), seem to trust social media and consider them a source of 
information. Participants aged 40 years and over, such as Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to 
the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab 
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is not interested in politics), conversely, do not blindly trust social media. Sources of 
information for participants from the first generation can be a personal network, including 
family friends and credible newspapers.  
Social media for second generation Egyptians have been the source of information for 
most of the participants in this study. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was 
born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities 
in the UK), for instance, demonstrates how she regularly follows social media as her source 
of information. The credibility of news on social media must be painstakingly checked to avoid 
‘fake news’. Johnson and Kaye (2004) conducted a study to measure the credibility of online 
sources. Although the results show that online sources are more trusted than traditional 
sources, people still check the credibility of such sources from other sources or ordinary 
people, as there is a substantial amount of fake news on the Internet.  
The findings regarding the first and second-generation participants in this study reconcile 
with Howard et al. (2011) in terms of the importance of social media, although the credibility 
of news is still questionable. Participants also conform to Al Aswany’s (2011) claim concerning 
the use of social media as a tool to organise themselves regarding protests. Social media has 
been a good platform for the Egyptian participants in this thesis to be politically active and 
‘perform their identity’ by displaying solidarity with Egypt to show they are still Egyptian or 
by raising money for Egypt. The findings illustrate that almost all the first and second-
generation participants agree that Western and Arab mainstream media cannot be trusted as 
they have a hidden agenda, for instance political or religious ideologies and the economic 
value [advertising and subscriptions] of their broadcast.  
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Summary  
The story of the Egyptian participants in this study has revealed that both first and second-
generation Egyptians felt a sense of hopelessness concerning Egypt prior to 2011. The uprising 
in 2011 was the historic moment that awakened Egyptians and motivated them to be 
politically active. Participants have been seen in this study to be politically active through 
protests and voting. These political activities have reinforced their Egyptian identity, sense of 
pride and belonging to Egypt. Compared with the features of the first-generation Egyptian 
diaspora in the UK, the study showed that the second generation have different features. As 
they were born in the UK and have not been dispersed before, they have a myth of homeland. 
They are more accepted in their country of birth (the UK) so they have a restricted notion of 
return to their parents’ homeland. In addition, the 2011 uprising has encouraged the first and 
second generation to be politically active during the uprising. Media primarily social media 
have been used as a tool among first and second generations of Egyptian participants to 
‘perform’ their identity and to prove their belonging to Egypt.   
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion  
Introduction  
This chapter concludes the thesis and is divided into three main sections. The first section 
is a summary of the thesis and the findings, and the researcher’s contribution to knowledge. 
The second section addresses the limitations of this project, whilst the last section focuses on 
future research.  
The present study investigates the effects of the 2011 Egyptian revolution on the Egyptian 
diaspora, including first and second-generation Egyptians residing in the UK, in terms of 
belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity, political participation and media use. The majority of 
studies conducted on the Egyptian revolution focus on the uprising’s impact on the Egyptians 
in Egypt but not Egyptians abroad. The focus sample of Egyptian diaspora has been chosen 
for this study, as most studies conducted on the 2011 Egyptian uprising have focused on how 
the revolution had an impact on Egyptians living in Egypt though Egyptian expatriates and the 
2011 uprising have not been the subject of scholarly studies. The focus of a few studies 
conducted on the Egyptian diaspora and the uprising have principally been on social media 
and political participation, but not on the sense of belonging and identity, which is the focus 
of this thesis.  
The results of this thesis extracted from interviews and ethnographic research have 
revealed differences among Egyptians from the first and second generations regarding 
belonging, Egyptian identity, political participation and media use. Each interviewee from 
each generation has viewed the revolution differently in terms of belonging, identity and 
political participation. It is worth mentioning that Egyptians from the first and second 
generation were united at some point regarding sense of pride, achieving change in Egypt, 
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the victory Egyptians enjoyed in forcing a dictator to step down, and so on. The main finding 
in this thesis is that there is a significant difference between Egyptians from the first and 
second generations regarding the 2011 revolution. The other important finding is how the 
2011 revolution has been a political milestone for Egyptians abroad, albeit temporarily. In 
other words, Egyptians had enjoyed a sense of euphoria in terms of what Egyptians achieved 
during and straight after the 2011 revolution.  
The 2011 uprising temporarily affected the first generation in terms of belonging to Egypt 
and Egyptian identity. This can be described as a sense of euphoria which almost all Egyptians 
experienced during the 2011 uprising, considering that Egypt had not had a political change 
since the 1980s. Egypt needed change which would only be possible through a national 
movement such as a revolution. No one expected Egypt to change, and everyone felt a sense 
of hopelessness. This sense of hopelessness was shared by all (or most) Egyptians, including 
the first generation, and united the Egyptians prior to 2011. The Egyptians from the first 
generation were again united during the 2011 uprising in terms of the sense of pride they felt 
regarding the revolutionary events in Egypt. This euphoria did not last long for the first 
generation, as, after the 2011 uprising and its consequences, Egyptians in the UK began to 
have negative feelings again: a bad situation had returned to Egypt, such as the violation of 
human rights, no freedom of expression, insecurity and a lack of job opportunities.  
This is one of the findings regarding the effect that the 2011 uprising has had on every 
aspect of Egyptians’ lives. The feelings of negativity are principally concerned with the notion 
of ‘return’ which most interviewees from the first generation have rejected due to the current 
political and economic situation in Egypt. This notion of returning to Egypt to settle down was 
powerful during and soon after 2011; however, a short while after 2011, the notion of return 
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vanished for the first generation. Regarding political participation and how first-generation 
Egyptians have expressed their belonging to Egypt, they have preferred to use alternatives 
such as raising awareness and online protesting in contrast to protesting on the streets in the 
UK or Egypt. According to the first-generation Egyptians, protesting is not helpful regarding 
the progress of Egypt, especially for those residing abroad; therefore, they decided to raise 
awareness of Egypt’s situation to non-Egyptians. The second option the first generation had 
was to travel to Egypt to protest with friends and family. Concerning other political activities 
such as voting in elections, the 2011 uprising has encouraged many first-generation Egyptians 
to vote, and to be a part of the decision-making in Egypt, having previously lost faith in the 
elections.  
The sense of belonging to Egypt among the second generation has been reinforced 
regarding finding the opportunity to express themselves as being part of Egyptian society. The 
notion of return to Egypt was strengthened during 2011 and immediately after, but has been 
weakened once more, owing to the uncertain political situation in Egypt. The 2011 uprising 
was therefore influential regarding the sense of belonging and Egyptian identity among 
second generation Egyptians, but only for a short time. Specifically, the notion of return to 
Egypt has been conditional due to this important milestone, the uprising and its aftermath. 
The scenario would have been different if Egypt had not witnessed the 2011 uprising. The 
proof of how conditional the notion of return is among diaspora groups due to the situation 
and its aftermath, is evident in how the notion of returning to Egypt has turned to wishing 
not to return at all, even if the idea was common among some people prior to the uprising. 
Thus, the 2011 uprising has been effective in positive and negative ways. In other words, the 
unstable situation in Egypt has led many to change their mind about returning to Egypt. 
Consequently, the uprising has affected the notion of return and even the notion of ‘home’ 
 
 
230 
and what home means to these diaspora groups. The theoretical application which can be 
made from this finding is the notion of return to ‘homeland’ can be conditional due to various 
factors, such as revolution, social movement, unemployment and others. In other words, 
even if the notion of return has crossed the mind of many Egyptians after the revolution, the 
idea died after the euphoria of the uprising diminished. Egyptians from the second generation 
had felt that it is their duty to support Egypt by any means during 2011, but this feeling of 
loyalty to the ‘homeland’ has been weakened due to the current situation there. 
Concerning political activities among the second generation, they have protested on the 
streets as well as online to express their ‘Egyptianness’. The second-generation Egyptians 
have decided to show their support for Egypt, both offline and online. This is the second 
finding that has emerged regarding how the Egyptians from the first and second generations 
expressed their feelings of belonging and support for fellow Egyptians in Egypt during the 
2011 uprising. Egyptians from the second generation have faced many obstacles, however, 
such as respecting the authority of their parents who prohibited them from being politically 
active.  
Regarding theoretical foundations, I have adopted Goffman’s concept of ‘performing 
identity’ especially among Egyptians from the second generation and some of the first 
generation. In terms of the core themes of Goffman’s theory, the main concepts adopted are 
‘expression management’ which consists of three main components: performers, performing 
and audience. Having applied those concepts to Egyptians in the UK, the following results 
have emerged: political protests during the 2011 uprising have allowed Egyptians residing in 
the UK to perform their identity and prove their belonging to Egypt. It is worth mentioning 
that second generation Egyptians have resorted to the act of ‘performing identity’ much more 
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so than the first generation. I have adopted the concept of ‘expression management’ in terms 
of how ‘performers’ (Egyptian interviewees) used the ‘performance’ (political protests) as a 
platform to perform their Egyptian identity and show the ‘audience’ (fellow Egyptians back in 
Egypt and the world) that they share a sense of ‘Egyptianness’.  
The other theoretical foundation applied to the group selected for this study is Safran’s 
model of diaspora. I have challenged Safran’s model and have created a new model to apply 
to second generation Egyptians in the UK. The reason for modifying Safran’s model to apply 
to the second generation is related to how interviews with Egyptians in the UK revealed 
shared features among the first and second generations.  
Finally, findings reveal how Egyptians from the first and second generations have used 
media, especially social media, as a tool to express their sense of belonging and their Egyptian 
identity by being politically active through online protesting. This finding emerged from 
participant observation; specifically, attending events and protests organised by Egyptian 
groups in the UK, predominantly in London. The social media websites were used as tools of 
expression during the 2011 uprising by the first and second generations. Although the first 
generation, for instance, do not blindly trust social media, the second generation depends on 
social media as a source of information, even though it may not always be true.  
The first and second generations agree on the notion of mistrusting mainstream media 
for its biased and misleading coverage of events concerning Egypt. Another finding from 
conducting interviews, is the difference between first generation Egyptians – 40 years and 
above – who mistrust both mainstream and social media, while the first generation of 
Egyptians – under 40 years old – trust social media and consider it a reliable source of 
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information. There are new sources of information for Egyptians in the UK, which are 
interpersonal communication and online media.  
To sum up the results of this thesis, the Egyptian diaspora have developed their sense of 
belonging to Egypt: starting with the feeling of belonging to Egypt and a strong sense of 
Egyptian identity prior to the 2011 uprising, and subsequently feeling that this belonging and 
identity have been affected by the uprising. Egyptians differ in the extent of political activism 
practised either in the UK or in Egypt. Social media have been used by Egyptians as a tool to 
express their feelings towards the uprising and helped them perform political activities online.  
The general theoretical consideration adopted and applied to the entire project is Safran’s 
features of diaspora. As results of the thesis have shown, second generation Egyptians have 
shared many diaspora features with the first generation though Safran’s features are specific 
to the first generation. Consequently, a new model including features of the second 
generation of diaspora is proposed.  
Researcher’s contribution  
This thesis contributes to the literature about belonging and identity amongst diaspora 
communities, such as the Egyptian diaspora; its main contribution is in its focus on the impact 
of this sense of identity on the Egyptian diaspora’s engagement with political events affecting 
Egypt, especially at a historic moment, the 2011 revolution. This focus has not been previously 
explored, as several studies have highlighted different themes but not the impact of political 
upheaval on this diaspora community. Studying the effects of the 2011 revolution on the 
Egyptian diaspora is a new perspective pertaining to this subject and the results of this study 
can be added to the current studies focusing on the Egyptian diaspora. I have contributed 
new knowledge to the work of current theorists such as Safran (1991) by proposing new 
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features of diaspora or, what I termed the ‘second generation diaspora features’. It relates to 
some of the features which Safran illustrates and is applied to the second generation. I 
propose developing Safran’s model to take into account the specificity of the second 
generation born in the host country (in this case, the UK). The second-generation diaspora 
are not usually labelled ‘diaspora’, as proposed by Safran, hence my proposal to develop that 
model.  
A further contribution to the literature is on identity amongst these communities and how 
immigrants can ‘perform’ the identity of their country of origin in times of significant political 
events, such as the 2011 uprising in Egypt, which shook up the country after 30 years of 
stagnation under Mubarak’s rule. Goffman’s (1959) theory of performing identity has been 
selected to study Egyptian identity among Egyptians in the UK, especially those who need to 
prove their Egyptian identity. To my knowledge, no previous studies on Arab diaspora 
communities have made use of Goffman’s identity theory. Moreover, this study creatively 
combines theories of Goffman and Safran to add to our knowledge about the ways diaspora 
communities’ political activities can be a manifestation of their identity and also a stage for 
performing this sense of identity and belonging to a distant homeland.  
Finally, this thesis shows that some of the Egyptian participants were politically active in 
affairs concerning their home country in the wake of such a significant political milestone as 
the 2011 uprising. Those participants were part of the ethnic minorities in the UK, whom the 
House of Common’s report (2014) singled out as being less politically active in British politics. 
This project looked at political participation from a different angle and unveiled different 
political participation behaviours related to their homeland. Therefore, it indicates that in 
order to acquire a full understanding of motivations and engagement in political participation, 
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one should study both participation in the host as well as the country of origin of the 
diasporas. This is particularly important now in the wake of Brexit and the future of the UK 
being apart from the EU. It is possible that the same diaspora communities will show 
significantly more political involvement if an opportunity arises, for instance, a second 
referendum on Brexit. As such, political events do impact on the political participation of 
young people and minorities in democratic societies such as the UK.  
Challenges and limitations  
It is important to mention some of the limitations faced in this study. The main limitation 
is regarding conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK. The first challenge was to find 
Egyptians in the UK fulfilling specific criteria, as not every Egyptian in the country was eligible 
to be interviewed. The time limit and limited budget to travel and access as many Egyptians 
as possible, meant I could not travel to some cities where many Egyptians are concentrated, 
such as Manchester. Furthermore, accessibility was another challenge I faced while 
conducting this project. Time, budget and accessibility limitations have resulted in the fact 
that this study cannot be a generalised reflection of all Egyptians in the UK but can only be 
applied to the chosen sample.  
The other limitation I faced whilst conducting this research was the poor response from 
potential participants who were invited to participate in my project. I used Facebook as a 
platform to access Egyptians, but many did not even reply. Distributing leaflets in some 
universities, as shown in Chapter Five, the methodology chapter, was not a successful way of 
accessing participants, as only one contacted me to be interviewed. It appears that people do 
not seem to care about leaflets and do not read them. The second challenge encountered in 
this project was the disorganisation of events, principally the protests organised by Egyptian 
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groups in the UK. It was difficult to find any events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK, 
due to the lack of advertising. Attending events was part of the participant observation 
process for this project; therefore, attending events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK 
was essential.  
The problem was these events were either postponed or cancelled without prior notice: 
this cost me money, time and effort. The other challenge I faced while conducting this project 
was being outside the group being studied. Although me being an Arab and speaking Arabic 
made it easier for the interviewees who preferred to conduct the interview in Arabic, it was 
a challenge in terms of their ‘opening up’ to a non-Egyptian. Eventually, this problem was 
surmounted, as most interviewees were fine speaking to me about their views regarding 
Egypt. In fact, some felt that it was better to speak about Egypt to a non-Egyptian, but others 
were distrustful. Being a non-Egyptian studying Egyptians in the UK, political participation was 
viewed with some suspicion occasionally, as some interviewees thought I might have been a 
spy. Nonetheless, when the main aim of the research was explained to them, that this 
research is an academic project as part of my PhD, participants became more relaxed. 
Moreover, accessing the Egyptian embassy as a non-Egyptian, was not an easy task and the 
Egyptian authorities were not very helpful.  
The few sources available for recruiting Egyptians in the UK was an additional limitation 
that needs to be acknowledged. Sources were limited to Facebook, Meetup forums and 
distributing leaflets. Using Meetup as the second tool for recruiting Egyptian participants was 
beneficial to some extent, although this website is not as well-known as Facebook. Some 
interviewees were recruited from Meetup but changed over to communicating on Facebook 
as an easier option.  
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Considerations are various but the most important generalisation to be made here is 
regarding the differences between generations. The first generation differs in its sense of 
belonging, identity, political activities and media use from the second generation. These 
findings are applied to the sample studied in this study and cannot be generalised to all 
Egyptians in the UK.  
Future research 
These are several recommendations for future research. In future research, it will be 
beneficial to focus on issues that were not addressed. One of these issues is to interview 
Egyptians who currently reside in Egypt and who witnessed the 2011 uprising in Egypt, and to 
draw a comparison between those residing in the UK and those residing in Egypt during the 
uprising. The second issue is, what sorts of activities political activists organise or in which 
ones they participate, and the difficulties they might face in the UK. The limited sources 
available for recruiting interviewees, as mentioned in the limitations of this research, could 
be expanded on in the next research project to more platforms that recruit participants, for 
example, other social networking websites such as Twitter and some other Egyptian groups. 
Another recommendation is to examine how religion can affect the sense of belonging, 
identity and political participation, as religion was not an important variable regarding this 
project. Interviewing Egyptians of mixed parentage would result in new findings concerning 
sense of belonging and Egyptian identity. Dealing with the concept of identity crisis more in 
depth and whether the 2011 revolution has had any effects in this regard would be valuable. 
Moreover, focusing on class, gender and religion and their effects on Egyptians after the 2011 
revolution could be another avenue concerning future research. In this research, the focus is 
not on class, gender and religion and no comparison was made.   
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Appendix 1: Recruitment 
Appendix 1.1: Sample of the leaflet used for recruitment  
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Appendix 1.2: Message sent to potential interviewees  
Dear member, 
My name is Rua Al-sheikh, PhD student at University of Bedfordshire. I found your name in 
one of the Egyptian groups on Facebook. The topic of my PhD thesis is the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution and its effects on the Egyptian community in the UK with regard to political 
activities, relations with Egypt and the U.K. and media consumption. This project involves 
conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK (Born in Egypt and the UK), especially if you 
have been living in the UK since 2011 and witnessed the revolution either in the UK or 
travelled to Egypt to do so and you are above 18...The interview can be conducted via skype 
or face to face Many thanks and looking forward to hearing from you.  
ءاسم   يخلا   مسا ىؤر خيشلا ةبلاط هاروتكد   
 
ف ةعماج  رياشدروفديب ,  ايناطيرب  .. ةحورطا هاروتكدلا نع ةروثلا ةيصملا 
2011  اه  يثاتو لع نيرجاهملا    ييصملا   
 
ف  ايناطيرب  اذهو نمضتي تاقلاعلا عم  صم تاطاشنلاو ةيسايسلا ملاعلااو 
   نرغلا    نرعلاو  و للاخ   
 يحب   
 
ف تابورج احفصوت سيفلا كوب ةيصملا تدجو كمسا  امبو هنا   
 يحب بلطتي ءارجا 
تلاباقم عم    ييصم   
 
ف  ايناطيرب هجو هجول  وا نع قيرط بياكس  ..   يمتا نا    يقفاوت لع ةكراشملا   
 
ف   
 يحب نم للاخ 
ءارجا ةلباقم  اذا  تنك نكاس   
 
ف  ايناطيرب  ذنم ماعلا 2011 تدهشو ةروثلا ماع 2011  اما   
 
ف  ايناطيرب  وا سترفا  اصيصخ 
 صمل  روضحل ةروثلا كانه نوكيو كرمع قوف لا 18 ءاوس( نم  ديلاوم  صم  وا  ....)ايناطيرب  اركش  لايزج  امدقم  
Contact details:  
Email: rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk  
Skype: ruaalsheikh1 
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Appendix 2: Samples of transcripts  
Appendix 2.1: Transcript of Shereen (1st generation) with colour coding  
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Appendix 2.2: Transcript of Sherif (2nd generation) with colour coding  
 
  
 
 
5 
Appendix 3: Consent form  
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
          
Title of the Project: The Egyptian community in the UK and the 2011 Egyptian revolution  
Name of researcher: Rua Al-sheikh 
Position: PhD researcher  
Contact address of Researcher: rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk  
 Please tick Box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntarily and I  
 am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reasons. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
  
 
 
4. I agree to the interview being audio 
recorded.  
 
 
  
  
5. I agree to the use my first name in quotations in 
the final report.  
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
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Appendix 4: Information sheet  
 
 
 
 
 
Information sheet 
 
Name of researcher: Rua Al-sheikh  
Student number: 1317405 
Title of project: the Egyptian community in the U.K. and the 2011 Egyptian revolution.  
Degree: MPhil/PhD project  
Director of Studies: Prof. Noha Mellor  
 
 This project focuses on the participation of Egyptian community in the UK in the 
2011 Egyptian revolution. The aim of the project is to examine the effects of 2011 Egyptian 
revolution on Egyptian diaspora in the UK in terms of political activities, relations with Egypt 
and the U.K. and media consumption. This project involves conducting interviews with 
Egyptians in the UK. The participation is voluntarily. Participants have the right to withdraw 
from the whole project at any stage without giving any reasons. The interviews will be audio 
recorded and interviewees have to give the permission to be recorded. The data will be 
confidential and kept in a password protected computer with a password protected folders. 
The data will only be viewed by the researcher and information will be used only for the 
academic purposes. Data will be destroyed after completion of the project. Participants 
have the right to request the transcript of their interview to review before publishing to 
make sure the information used is accurate.  
 For confidentiality purposes, each participant has the right to agree on using first 
name in the final report or not. For those disagreeing on using first names, the technique 
used will be using fake names. For those who agree on using their first names, first names 
are used without giving any further details such as contact details.  
 Every participant will be provided with a consent form to sign before the beginning 
of the interview to confirm his/her official participation. The interview will be conducted in 
public places.  
 In case any questions causing any discomfort or stress, the participant has the right 
not to answer and withdraw from the whole project. This can be avoided by asking unbiased 
and neutral questions away from personal opinion. In addition, questions asked in the 
interviews must not be leading to specific answers. The researcher should be neutral and 
unbiased in order to produce valid and unbiased results of the project.  
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Appendix 5: Checklists of Ethnographic work  
Appendix 5.1: ‘The 1st anniversary of Rabia incident’  
Observation checklist  
Name of 
event and 
date  
The first anniversary in memory of Rabia incident where many 
Egyptians were killed by the Egyptian military and police back in 
August 2013.  
Date of event 16/8/2014  
 
Timing  • Original time of event was 12 in the afternoon  
• Protesters were late not sharp 12  
Location • The Egyptian embassy in London  
Number  50 I think  
Peaceful or 
violent  
• No aggression reported 
 
Appearance  People were from mixed background, veiled non-veiled, men with 
beard and without.  
Atmosphere  It was mainly peaceful  
Type of 
banners  
Against military rule  
Type of 
cheers  
• Protesters were talking in English to attract foreigners 
but then talked in Arabic 
• Down down military rule  
• Shame on you El-Sisi  
Language of 
cheers  
Arabic and English  
 
Any 
problems  
 
Other 
comments  
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Appendix 5.2: ‘The 4th revolution anniversary’  
Observation Checklist  
Name of 
event and 
date  
The fourth 25th revolution anniversary in London  
Date of event 25/1/2015  
 
Timing  1pm but people had started gathering late  
Location The Egyptian embassy in London  
Number  Almost 50 people, I am not sure  
Peaceful or 
violent  
It was a peaceful protest but the majority of protesters were holding 
Rabaa banners and reminding the world that Egyptians in the UK are 
against coup led by El-sisi.  
Appearance  The majority of protesters were Muslim from their appearance wearing 
vie or niqab but there were unveiled women.  
Atmosphere  The atmosphere was ok but I felt the majority supports the Muslim 
brotherhood by showing the hatred to El-sisi and his government and 
mentioning Rabia incident.  
Type of 
banners  
• Banners were mainly supporting Rabia, President Morsi, Muslim 
brotherhood’s candidate by holding his pictures.  
• Against the coup.  
• Holding martyrs of 25th of Jan revolution  
Type of 
cheers  
President is back soon in shaa Allah (God willing), VIVA Rabia with holding 
the symbol of Rabia  
Language of 
cheers  
Arabic and English  
Any 
problems  
No reported incidents.  
Other 
comments  
• I didnt feel that this event is neutral, and majority of protesters 
were supporters of Muslim brotherhood (from their clothes and 
symbols against President El-Sisi and even if there were some who 
support El-Sisi or genuinely supporting the revolution won’t be 
visible  
• I chose to attend this event to observe a neutral event gathering 
all Egyptians, but it sounds that even Egyptians in the UK are 
polarized  
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Appendix 5.3: ‘Protest against El-Sisi’s visit to London’  
Observation checklist  
Name of 
event and 
date  
Solidarity with students and academics (Against El-Sisi’s visit to 
London)  
Date of event 4/11/2015  
Timing  5pm but the preparation for the protest started an hour before but 
people were not on time  
Location 10 Downing street to oppose the official visit of President El-Sisi to 
London to meet prime minister David Cameron. Most of protests 
are held in front of Egyptian embassy, this is the first time to hold 
the protest in front of 10 Downing street  
Number  There were almost 200 people 
Peaceful or 
violent  
It was a peaceful protest but there were some violent incidents 
such as attacking an Egyptian journalist, who came with President 
El-Sisi to support him and participated in the 5th of November 
protest to show support to El-Sisi. The police then arrested the guy 
who attacked the journalist.  
Appearance  Majority of protesters were Muslim wearing headscarf, nikab and 
men with beards but there were foreigners, there was a father who 
looked Egyptian but his daughters looked English.  
Atmosphere  The atmosphere was a bit tense as an outsider, I could not talk to 
many as I don’t look like one of the group as I tried to be neutral but 
it was hard to do so as you cant predict what some might do if you 
disagree with some. As a researcher, it is important to be neutral 
and doesn’t show personal points of view but as the protest was 
about opposing President El-Sisi, you can’t find someone who might 
be neutral.  
Type of 
banners  
Banners were a bit bloody using strong language such as the 
butcher and killer 
Type of 
cheers  
Down, Down military rule  
Language of 
cheers  
Against the military and El-Sisi 
Any 
problems  
A woman pro-El-Sisi called the demonstrators against El-sisi, 
terrorists and the British police arrested her.  
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Other 
comments 
(Event 
flyer) 
 
 
Appendix 5.4: ‘Protest pro El-Sisi’s visit to London’  
Observation checklist  
Name of 
event and 
date  
Protest to support the visit of President El-Sisi to London  
Date of event 5/11/2015  
Timing  6pm  
Location 10 Downing street to support the visit of President El-Sisi and to 
show groups who organized the protest yesterday opposing El-Sisi’s 
visit that they support El-Sisi and Egypt. To show that El-Sisi has 
supporters in London.  
Number  Almost 100 people, I am not sure  
Peaceful or 
violent  
It was a peaceful protest 
Appearance  Majority of protesters were non- veiled women and bearded men 
or wearing Islamic wear.  
Atmosphere  The atmosphere was ok but as the protest was pro-El-Sisi, You cant 
find someone neutral. Some protesters were afraid of clashes 
between them and those against El-Sisi as happened in other 
countries.  
Type of 
banners  
Banners were pro El-Sisi and military and supportive to the current 
Egyptian government under El-Sisi’s rule.  
Type of 
cheers  
Pro the visit of El-Sisi  
Viva Egypt and El-Sisi,  
Language of 
cheers  
Arabic and English  
Any 
problems  
Fear of clashes with pro-Muslim brotherhood groups and those 
against President El-Sisi 
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Other 
comments  
 
 
Appendix 5.5 Notes on events postponed and cancelled  
1. Freedom and dignity to our people back home organized by (25th of Jan. Egyptians 
in the UK group on Facebook) 
• 19/10/2014  
• 23/11/2014  
• 13/12/2014  
• 27/12/2014  
• 11/1/2015 then cancelled.  
• According to the admins organising the event, ‘people are busy and not 
attending’ 
2. The current moment in Egypt ةظحللا ةنهارلا   
 
ف  صم by Zyad Elelaimy is one of the 
Revolutionary Youth Coalition after the rising of the 25th of Jan revolution and will 
be the speaker to talk about the CURRENT MOMENT IN EGYPT.  
• Was first organised to be on April 2015 the postponed to: 
o September 2015 
o 26 November 2015 
o 20.12.2015 
o 20.2.2016 
o 3.3.2016 
• The event is still to be confirmed. 
 
